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The Constitution allocates sovereign power between gov-
ernments along two dimensions: a vertical plane that estab-
lishes a hierarchy and boundaries between federal and state 
authority, and a horizontal plane that attempts to coordinate 
fifty coequal states that must peaceably coexist. Both vertical 
and horizontal federalism are fundamental elements of U.S. 
government. Yet most scholarship about constitutional “fede-
ralism” focuses on vertical federal-state interactions while neg-
lecting horizontal state-state interactions. Vertically-oriented 
scholarship often transcends doctrinal boundaries to connect 
numerous discrete sources of federal-state friction, such as reg-
ulation under the Commerce Clause, incentives under the 
Spending Clause, sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment, and protection of individual rights and liberties 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 This broad approach pre-
sumes that distinct vertical federalism doctrines comprise a co-
 
 1. For examples of the many broad approaches to vertical federalism, see 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2008); DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995); Akhil 
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987). Cf. Se-
minole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64 (1996) (noting “established federalism 
jurisprudence”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 955 n.16 (1997) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (collecting examples of “recent federalism jurisprudence”). 
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herent field of study in which analysis of one component can in-
fluence approaches to others. In contrast, scholars rarely 
ceptualize horizontal federalism as an integrated field and have 
not developed theories and models linking its subsidiary ele-
ments.2 Judicial regulation of interstate activity similarly lacks 
the broad perspective necessary to engage constitutional values 
animating and connecting strands of doctrine, leading to 
sprudence that is often unprincipled, unsatisfying, and un-
ble.3 
This Article gives horizontal federalism the systemic scru-
tiny typically reserved for vertical federalism by viewing my-
riad forms of state regulation as subtle permutations of a single 
constitutional problem. Adopting this high level of abstraction 
weaves threads of constitutional text and jurisprudence that 
are undertheorized in academic literature and underdeveloped 
in case law into a more coherent pattern. Exploring that pat-
tern can help explain, assess, and improve numerous seemingly 
distinct strands of constitutional doctrine governing such di-
 
 2. Some scholars have linked subsets of horizontal federalism. See, e.g., 
Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism, Community, and State Borders, 41 DUKE L.J. 1 
(1991) (discussing role of political theory in justifying states’ exercise of coer-
cive power over entities involved in interstate activity); Samuel Issacharoff & 
Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353 (2006) 
(analyzing role of federal law and federal judicial forums in mitigating extra-
territorial harms of state commercial regulations); Douglas Laycock, Equal 
Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of 
Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992) (discussing constitutional status 
of states); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 1468 (2007) (focusing on federal power to authorize inter-
state discrimination); Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Hetero-
geneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 856 (2002) (consider-
ing extent of constitutionally permissible “legal pluralism” among states); see 
also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1021–292 (3d ed. 
2000) (discussing “Union-Preserving Aspects of Federalism”). 
 3. See infra Part IV.B; see also Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The 
Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 888 (1986) (“[T]he field 
[of federal common law] is one in which inconsistent and conflicting state-
ments and formulations abound[].”); Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The 
Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 789 (2001) 
(noting “unsettled and poorly understood” aspects of Dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence); Laycock, supra note 2, at 259 (contending that “abdica-
tion” of the federal role in choice of law has led to “chaotic” results); James 
Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Impli-
cations for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 277 (2004) (suggesting need 
to “bring coherence to the Court’s perpetually muddled personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence”); Stephen F. Williams, Severance Taxes and Federalism: The 
Role of the Supreme Court in Preserving a National Common Market for Ener-
gy Supplies, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 281, 288 (1982) (“[T]he Court has built up a 
rich, if not internally consistent, jurisprudence on tax apportionment . . . .”). 
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verse subjects as personal jurisdiction, restraints on interstate 
commerce, choice of law, federal subject-matter jurisdiction, in-
terstate compacts, federal common law, tax apportionment, in-
terjurisdictional preclusion, and discrimination based on state 
citizenship. 
The analysis has four steps. Part I focuses on why inter-
state friction is likely in theory, Part II on how it arises in fact, 
Part III on how the Constitution regulates it, and Part IV on 
how courts implement that regulatory framework. 
Part I defines horizontal federalism, explains how horizon-
tal and vertical federalism overlap, and explores structural fea-
tures of the Constitution that complicate horizontal interac-
tions. This structural analysis demonstrates that the 
Constitution invites interstate friction by empowering coequal 
states in the aggregate without developing clear rules to allo-
cate power between states. Sporadic or simmering interstate 
conflict is inevitable under this arrangement as parochial ef-
forts by each state to exercise the full scope of its ostensibly in-
sular powers risk infringing the other states’ autonomy, fru-
strating the others’ legitimate interests, or burdening the 
others’ citizens.4 The equal status and independence that states 
enjoy in theory can therefore be illusory in practice. If the 
states were independent nations, they could rely on custom, 
treaty, or force to address interstate disputes or individual 
grievances arising from the extraterritorial effects of local regu-
lation. But in the federal system, the Constitution supplants 
international law and military power as a mechanism for inter-
state coordination. Parts II-IV examine the dynamics of this 
constitutional coordination mechanism. 
Part II explores the underappreciated breadth of horizontal 
federalism by considering the many forms in which interstate 
conflict can manifest, ranging from private civil disputes in-
fused with overtones of federalism to aggressive standoffs be-
tween armed state officials. The analysis groups seemingly un-
related examples of state action into eight categories: attempts 
 
 4. The magnitude of the threat to national stability has varied over time, 
with volatility in the Founding and Civil War eras yielding to today’s relative-
ly staid encounters in which states exchange rhetoric rather than cannon 
balls. See infra notes 54, 56, 65, 87 (discussing fears of interstate violence dur-
ing the Founding era). This deescalation is evidence of evolving interstate co-
dependency and the effectiveness of the Constitution’s antifriction mechan-
isms. See infra Part III. Nevertheless, interstate disagreements over social 
and economic policy continue to create tension, retaliation, and litigation in a 
wide variety of regulatory spheres. See infra Part II. 
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to exercise dominion over other states’ officers or territory, cre-
ation of havens for conduct that other states would prefer to 
ban or limit, exclusion of activities that other states promote, 
favoritism for in-state actors at the expense of out-of-state ac-
tors, allowing in-state activity to generate negative out-of-state 
externalities, aggressive rogue behavior that fails to respect the 
interests of other states, mutually debilitating interstate com-
petition, and overreaching of state borders through extraterri-
torial regulation. This transsubstantive typology highlights 
thematic connections between forms of state action that pre-
vailing doctrine often treats separately. Viewing these seeming-
ly disparate fact patterns as manifestations of a deeper pathol-
ogy motivates the systematic approach in Parts III and IV to 
the Constitution’s regulation of horizontal federalism. 
Part III analyzes the Constitution holistically to identify 
the clauses that regulate horizontal federalism and consider 
how these fragments fit together to resolve, deter, or mitigate 
the problems discussed in Part II. This approach illuminates a 
potentially coherent field of law lurking amidst components 
usually viewed in isolation. Commentators often overlook con-
nections between the constitutional mechanisms of horizontal 
federalism because they emerge from clauses scattered 
throughout the Constitution’s text and regulate ostensibly dis-
tinct problems. A systemic approach to the text uncovers five 
methods that the Constitution uses to regulate interstate activ-
ity: creating codependence and disability among states by 
stripping them of powers that could instigate or escalate con-
flicts, establishing institutions to resolve interstate disputes 
and mechanisms to promote interstate coordination, imposing 
first-in-time rules to resolve competing claims of authority, em-
powering individuals to enforce rights that promote horizontal 
stability, and enabling federal legislative and common law to 
avoid or mitigate interstate conflict. Exploring these methods 
offers a richer understanding of horizontal federalism and aids 
Part IV’s fresh reassessment of judicial doctrines governing in-
terstate activity. 
Part IV shifts focus from constitutional text to constitu-
tional common law by suggesting a model for analyzing ostens-
ibly unrelated lines of precedent addressing horizontal federal-
ism. This approach reveals that doctrines implementing the 
constitutional provisions discussed in Part III rely on a varying 
combination of four concepts: capacity (the scope of a state’s au-
thority); constraint (rights or immunities that limit state pow-
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er); centralization (express or implied federal preemption or au-
thorization of state action); and comity (the need for states to 
respect each other even when capacity exists free from con-
straint or central control). Identifying these concepts exposes at 
least three sources of incoherence or instability within horizon-
tal federalism jurisprudence. First, judicial decisions are often 
imprecise about which concept controls, leading to a lack of fit 
between reasoning and outcomes. Second, the role of the four 
concepts can vacillate within a line of precedent over time, 
leading to confusion about a doctrine’s rationale and proper ap-
plication. Finally, distinct lines of precedent can deploy the four 
concepts differently despite the lack of meaningful distinctions 
between the doctrines’ underlying purposes or functions. Part 
IV discusses these three flaws both in the abstract and in the 
context of illustrative Supreme Court decisions. Examples in-
clude the invalidation of punitive damages for extraterritorial 
conduct in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,5 affirmance of 
successive state criminal prosecutions in Heath v. Alabama,6 
and acceptance of differential tax rates for in-state and out-of-
state municipal bonds in Department of Revenue v. Davis.7 The 
analysis suggests that a more rigorous approach to capacity, 
constraint, centralization, and comity arguments can affect the 
implementation, justification, and coordination of horizontal 
federalism doctrines. The model thus provides a foundation for 
future scholarship reevaluating vast swaths of constantly 
evolving law. 
I.  THE CONTOURS OF HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM   
This Part defines horizontal federalism, distinguishes it 
from vertical federalism (while noting overlapping attributes), 
and identifies structural features of the Constitution that make 
horizontal federalism problems intractable. 
A. DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM 
“Federalism” is a surprisingly amorphous concept given its 
importance and ubiquity within discourse about U.S. govern-
ment. The term has an “I know it when I see it” character, ex-
emplified in the Supreme Court’s frustratingly opaque invoca-
tion of “our federalism” as a “slogan” for a deeper set of 
 
 5. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 6. 474 U.S. 82 (1985). 
 7. 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008). 
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constitutional commitments.8 Fully defining federalism is not 
necessary for this Article, but parsing the term can clarify 
which aspects of federalism are relevant here and which are 
not. 
The concept of federalism encompasses a broad range of 
phenomena associated with the Constitution’s division of “sove-
reignty”9 between federal and state governments. From a nor-
mative perspective, federalism is a euphemism for at least four 
partially incompatible preferences: “diffusion” of authority from 
national to relatively local government units,10 “centralization” 
of national authority,11 “separation” of national and state au-
 
 8. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1970); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 748 (1999); New York v. O’Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 9 (1959); La. Power & 
Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959). 
 9. I describe states as “sovereign” to emphasize their substantial inde-
pendence and significant reservoir of authority, but do not take a position on 
precisely which aspects of sovereignty states possess. “Sovereign” is a term of 
art that the Supreme Court has employed inconsistently (or, to be less gener-
ous, haphazardly) over the centuries, such that different types of quasi-
sovereigns possess different bundles of powers in different contexts. See H. 
Jefferson Powell & Benjamin J. Priester, Convenient Shorthand: The Supreme 
Court and the Language of State Sovereignty, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 645 (2000) 
(identifying patterns in the Court’s invocations of sovereignty). Labeling states 
as “sovereign” thus does not determine the scope of their authority in a system 
that divides sovereign control over U.S. territory between “the United States,” 
“the States,” and “the people,” and then further subdivides it among fifty 
states. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Randy E. Barnett, The People or the 
State?: Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1729, 
1741–58 (2007) (discussing concepts of sovereignty underlying Ninth, Tenth, 
and Eleventh Amendments). The semantic label for state power is in any 
event immaterial for my purposes. Whatever power states have, each has it in 
equal amounts and subject to some federal oversight, which leads to the coor-
dination problems that this Article addresses. I also do not take a position on 
precisely what powers and immunities states should have. My project is to 
provide a framework for thinking about interstate disputes, which is a prere-
quisite for analysis of appropriate outcomes. 
 10. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 11 (distinguishing federalism from national-
ism). A more formal permutation of diffusion is the notion of “subsidiarity” in 
the European Union, which favors national—rather than supranational—level 
action even when jurisdiction is concurrent: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Com-
munity shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsi-
diarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can there-
fore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community. 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
art. 5, July 24, 2002, O.J. (C325) 42. 
 11. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 137; see also Ernest A. Young, The Rehn-
quist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 97 (2004) (“[T]hroughout the 
 500 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:493 
 
thority,12 and “empowerment” of both state and national gov-
ernments.13 These norms can aid in allocating power between 
tiers of government,14 but have little to say about allocating 
power within a tier among competing states that each have a 
plausible entitlement to regulate local entities or activity. This 
Article’s analysis of how states exercise their concurrent au-
thority therefore does not require accepting any particular 
normative position about how broad or narrow that collective 
authority should be.15 
From a descriptive perspective, federalism is a shorthand 
moniker for a complex set of political, legal, and economic rela-
tionships within a system of divided sovereignty. For example, 
congressional deliberations about whether to regulate an activ-
ity traditionally subject to state oversight are aspects of politi-
cal federalism, judicial decisions about whether Congress has 
the power to regulate are aspects of legal federalism, and the 
implications of such regulation in a national market are aspects 
of economic federalism. Political, legal, and economic issues 
may of course blur. For instance, the prospect that political ne-
gotiations will resolve intergovernmental disputes might be re-
levant to determining the scope of legal constraints on the dis-
puting entities.16 Despite the blurring, considering federalism 
on a more granular level can reveal useful insights. 
 
Nineteenth Century judicial enforcement of federalism primarily took the form 
of enforcing constitutional limits on state power.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 12. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (“[S]eparation of the 
two spheres is one of the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty.”). 
 13. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 4; see also id. at 10 (“[U]ltimately the 
issue of federalism is about what allocation of power provides the best gover-
nance with the least chances of abuse.”). Mutual empowerment does not nec-
essarily mean that federal and state governments will pursue shared inter-
ests, and leaves room for both cooperation and conflict. See Jessica Bulman-
Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. (forth-
coming 2009). 
 14. Allocation of a particular power can follow one of three broad models: 
exclusive federal authority, exclusive state authority, or various forms of con-
current authority with shades of federal supremacy and federal-state equality 
that defy easy categorization. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1048 
(1977) (noting that models infected with the “lawyer’s disease of sovereignty” 
often obscure “conflict and indeterminacy” in the allocation of shared power 
between tiers of the federal system). 
 15. However, the extent to which one perceives interstate squabbling as 
undesirable may influence the extent to which one supports broad federal 
power to preempt state law or otherwise intervene. See infra Part III.E. 
 16. See Garcia v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550–54 (1985). Simi-
larly, when a question of legal federalism hinges on an assessment of economic 
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I focus here primarily on legal federalism, especially on 
how the existence of multiple states limits the power of each 
when interacting with the others or with the others’ citizens.17 
Legal federalism itself fractures into distinct components, in-
cluding mandatory constitutional principles that structure in-
tergovernmental relations, statutory and common law re-
straints that governments voluntarily impose on themselves,18 
and rules governing private conduct that allow individuals to 
contract around federalism’s complexities.19 My interest lies in 
the constitutional foundation on which all other aspects of legal 
federalism rest. 
Constitutional federalism has two distinct dimensions: the 
federal government must interact with the states, and states 
must interact with each other. The Supremacy Clause20 makes 
federal/state interactions hierarchical—and thus in a sense 
“vertical”—while state/state interactions are between entities 
on an equal plane of constitutional status, and are thus “hori-
zontal.” This taxonomy of vertical and horizontal federalism 
 
federalism, the problem may become political. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 
128 S. Ct. 1801, 1819 (2008) (rejecting Dormant Commerce Clause challenge 
to state tax in part because “an elected legislature is the preferable institution 
for incurring the economic risks of any alteration in the way things have tradi-
tionally been done”). 
 17. For a survey of scholarship addressing other aspects of interaction be-
tween local, state, federal, and international tiers of government, see Robert 
B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing Na-
ture of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (2007) (discussing “cross-
jurisdictional regulatory engagement”). 
 18. See, e.g., K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589, 594 (Tex. 1994) (recognizing 
sovereign immunity of the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System as a 
matter of comity rather than constitutional obligation); Wayne A. Logan, Ho-
rizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal Justice Interconnectedness, 154 U. 
PA. L. REV. 257 (2005) (considering whether state sentencing guidelines for 
recidivists and registration systems for sex offenders should recognize out-of-
state criminal sanctions); infra note 268 (discussing common law presumption 
against interpreting statutes to apply extraterritorially). 
 19. For example, contracting parties who wish to avoid uncertainty oth-
erwise inherent in multijurisdictional activity can often specify the forum that 
will hear disputes and the law that will apply. See generally 7 SAMUEL WIL-
LISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 15.15 
(4th ed. 2007); 8 id. § 19.6. More extreme circumvention of conflicting state 
regulatory approaches can occur in class action settlements that construct 
compensation mechanisms which resemble state administrative agencies but 
are not required to conform to any one state’s law. See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, 
MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 269 (2007) (“[Mass tort litigation] is 
less a form of litigation and more an occasion for a series of miniaturized, pri-
vatized workers’ compensation programs.”). 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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does not exist in Supreme Court decisions,21 and has only re-
cently started to appear prominently in legal scholarship.22 
Nevertheless, the distinction provides a helpful framework for 
conceptualizing recurring constitutional dilemmas. 
Academic analysis of vertical federalism often obscures 
problems of horizontal federalism. Scholars typically concen-
trate on determining how power is or should be allocated be-
tween the federal and state tiers of government, and how to 
prevent the federal and state governments from encroaching on 
each other’s prerogatives. The essential question is how to de-
termine the tier(s) of government at which particular types of 
power “belong.” Analysts can assess the concept of belonging 
through various prisms, such as constitutional text, constitu-
tional structure, original understanding, economic efficiency, 
and political accountability, among many others. These ques-
tions about vertical power allocation are important, but elide 
an equally important dynamic of horizontal power allocation. 
Vertical federalism inquiries end when the inquirer reaches a 
conclusion about how much (if any) power “states” possess rela-
tive to the federal government. That endpoint is where analysis 
of horizontal federalism should begin, but is usually missing. 
States do not exist in the aggregate; the whole is a sum of fifty 
parts, and those parts must each share the power that the Con-
stitution allocates to them as a group. Such sharing creates the 
possibility of interstate friction because there is no bright-line 
rule capable of fully confining the effects of a state’s regulation 
within its borders. When people, products, and natural re-
sources are mobile, neither problems nor solutions are fully lo-
cal. Activities and regulations may overlap or cause ripples in 
other states, which can create interstate conflict or tension.23 
This friction can flare out of control if left unchecked, and thus 
 
 21. Opinions in 562 Supreme Court cases use the word “federalism,” but 
only one opinion uses “vertical federalism” and none use “horizontal federal-
ism.” (These counts are based on searches of Westlaw’s SCT database on Octo-
ber 24, 2008.). 
 22. See Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal 
Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internatio-
nalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 44 (2007) (“Horizontal federalism—state-to-state 
interactions of a variety of kinds—is coming into view as a subject for the legal 
academy.”); id. at 44 n.35 (citing examples of recent scholarship addressing 
interstate relations); see also Scott Fruehwald, The Rehnquist Court and Hori-
zontal Federalism: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Moderate Constitutional 
Constraints on Horizontal Federalism, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 289 (2003). 
 23. See infra Part II.B. 
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a framework must exist to manage conflict before it under-
mines national stability. 
The foregoing analysis suggests a rough definition of hori-
zontal federalism in the context of constitutional law. In most 
cases, we can think of horizontal federalism as encompassing 
the set of constitutional mechanisms for preventing or mitigat-
ing interstate friction that may arise from the out-of-state ef-
fects of in-state decisions.24 This definition requires an adden-
dum, however, to encompass situations where a local regulation 
might not have any substantial extraterritorial effect, but is 
nevertheless troubling because of its lack of respect for limits 
on state authority that flow from the multi-state structure of 
the Union. Some individual rights and liberties that constrain 
state power—often framed in terms of due process25 and equali-
ty26—therefore fit within horizontal federalism. Disputes impli-
cating horizontal federalism thus can involve both states and 
individuals. What matters in the calculus of horizontal federal-
ism is not who is making a claim against whom, but rather 
whether some aspect of that claim implicates an interest that is 
constitutionally protected (if at all) because of the equivalent 
and overlapping powers of multiple states.27 The range of po-
 
 24. Scholars sometimes use the term “horizontal federalism” in a different 
(and in my view incongruous) context to describe a methodology by which a 
court in State A interprets a provision in State A’s constitution with reference 
to how a court in State B interpreted a similar provision in State B’s constitu-
tion. See James N.G. Cauthen, Horizontal Federalism in the New Judicial Fe-
deralism: A Preliminary Look at Citations, 66 ALB. L. REV. 783, 783–84 (2003). 
This kind of interpretative borrowing does not seem uniquely federalist in na-
ture—indeed, state courts can apply the same methodology with reference to 
constitutions in foreign nations. The approach might more appropriately be 
classified as a species of common law reasoning rather than an incident of fe-
deralism. (Federalism might be a factor in the unlikely scenario where a state 
borrows reasoning from other states because it believes that interstate consis-
tency is a virtue of the federal system.). 
 25. See infra notes 266, 281–84, 304, 310 (discussing due process chal-
lenges to personal jurisdiction and choice of law). 
 26. Constitutional prohibitions against discrimination based on state re-
sidency create equality rights that serve two distinct purposes: they are a tool 
for enforcing structural aspects of horizontal federalism and preserving na-
tional stability, and they shield individuals from burdens that might be unde-
sirable regardless of their effect on interstate harmony. This Article focuses 
primarily on the instrumental rather than intrinsic value of equality rights. 
See infra Part III.D. 
 27. For discussion of how nominally private disputes can generate inter-
state friction, see infra text accompanying notes 96, 155–67, 189–200. 
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tential conflict-inducing behavior is vast, as explained below in 
Part II.28 
B. INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL 
FEDERALISM 
Although I distinguish horizontal and vertical federalism, 
a complete analytical separation is impossible because federal 
power is a mechanism for restraining state power. First, federal 
institutions play a coordinating role in the exercise of concur-
rent state authority. This role is evident, for example, in consti-
tutional provisions authorizing congressional oversight of in-
terstate compacts and creating federal jurisdiction over 
interstate disputes.29 Second, some grants of exclusive or 
preemptive power to the federal government serve both a ver-
tical allocation function and a horizontal conflict avoidance 
function.30 For example, Congress’s power to regulate inter-
state commerce both establishes federal supremacy over a na-
tional market and allows Congress to intervene when regula-
tion of regional markets by multiple states creates a possibility 
of excessive friction.31 Likewise, Congress’s constitutional pow-
 
 28. My definition of horizontal federalism and discussion of interstate con-
flicts assumes that all entities subject to state regulation are federal or state 
citizens or instrumentalities. This assumption is oversimplified: states also 
regulate tribal and foreign actors in ways that trigger constitutional scrutiny. 
However, the Constitution’s incongruous treatment of tribes—which the Su-
preme Court classifies as “domestic dependent nations,” Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831)—and additional questions of federal and 
international law relevant to foreign actors warrant carving them out for sep-
arate study and focusing on constitutional regulation of a closed state-federal 
system. 
 29. See infra Part III.B and text accompanying notes 226–37. 
 30. Integration of vertical and horizontal federalism theories was striking-
ly evident shortly before the Civil War, when the intensity of federal-state and 
state-state conflict fused multiple rationales for invoking the Constitution as a 
limit on state authority. For example, in Abelman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 
506, 510–11 (1858), the Supreme Court rejected the power of a northern state 
court to issue a writ of habeas corpus freeing a federal prisoner convicted of 
aiding a fugitive slave. The opinion can be understood as relying on vertical 
federalism principles to immunize supreme federal actors from interference 
from inferior state actors. See id. at 514–20. However, there is also an under-
current of horizontal federalism because the Court sought to prevent what it 
viewed as “injustice by one state upon the rights of another” in the form of 
northern interference with the interests of southern slaveholders. Id. at 517. 
The Court thus claimed to be preventing states from aggrandizing themselves 
at the expense of both the federal government and each other. The holding 
was of course not neutral with respect to competing state interests because it 
implicitly prioritized the concerns of states where slavery was legal. 
 31. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (“The few simple 
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er to raise navies and the concurrent prohibition against states 
maintaining navies during peacetime can be read as avoiding 
both vertical and horizontal conflict among federal and state 
fleets,32 while the limited ability of states to arrest congres-
sional representatives en route to or from a legislative session 
can be read as both preserving federal supremacy and avoiding 
conflicts that would arise if one state arrested another’s dele-
gates.33 
Horizontal and vertical federalism are thus both distinct 
and entangled, merging into a hybrid “triangular federalism” 
that encompasses the area between the horizontal base and the 
elevated federal point floating above it. Within this triangle, ef-
forts to divide sovereignty along a vertical dimension create ho-
rizontal conflicts, and efforts to address those conflicts by fed-
eral intervention create vertical conflicts.34 Observers therefore 
cannot fully understand either of the two dimensions of federal-
ism in isolation.35 However, distinguishing horizontal and ver-
tical federalism is still analytically useful even though they are 
not mutually exclusive. Just as a mathematician cannot com-
prehend the properties of a triangle without understanding 
both its horizontal base and its vertical median, a constitution-
al scholar cannot understand the complexities of federalism 
without at least partially disaggregating its structural compo-
nents of state-state and federal-state relationships.36 
 
words of the Commerce Clause . . . reflected a central concern of the Framers 
that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the 
conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the 
tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among 
the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.”). 
 32. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 10. 
 33. See id. § 6. 
 34. Separation of powers doctrine adds a third dimension to the puzzle. 
The existence of fifty states risks excessive diffusion of power, the existence of 
a national government remedies diffusion at the risk of excessive centraliza-
tion, and the separation of national powers remedies centralization with diffu-
sion. 
 35. The interweaving of federalism’s distinct dimensions is a byproduct of 
the Union’s novel design, which James Madison elegantly showed to be “nei-
ther a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both.” THE FE-
DERALIST NO. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 36. Further disaggregation (and geometric complexity) is possible if one 
expands the model of federalism beyond constitutional parameters to include 
international and local actors. At an international level, the federal govern-
ment is a participant in a system of nations and supranational institutions 
that can constrain national discretion. At a local level, the fifty states encom-
pass quasi-autonomous units that interact with each other, with states, and 
with the federal government. People, activity, and ideas can easily permeate 
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C. STRUCTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM 
Analyzing horizontal federalism requires understanding 
the structural features of the Constitution that make interstate 
conflicts difficult to resolve. The basic problem is that the Con-
stitution does not create a preference rule for prioritizing com-
peting state interests analogous to the Supremacy Clause, 
which aids in resolving vertical disputes. In a vertical federal-
state dispute, a conclusion that federal power exists resolves 
the question of whether that power trumps a countervailing as-
sertion of state power: the federal power is supreme. In con-
trast, in a horizontal state-state dispute, a conclusion that 
states possess a particular regulatory power does not determine 
which state(s) can exercise that power in a given context. There 
is no transsubstantive preference rule for resolving state-state 
conflicts,37 and thus the relevant law exists as an accumulation 
of context-sensitive doctrines implementing commands scat-
tered throughout the Constitution.38 
Instead of offering clear preference rules to facilitate allo-
cating power between states, the Constitution contains two 
 
local, state, and national boundaries, and thus the many dimensions of fede-
ralism cannot exist in isolation. See Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American 
Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 
115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1576 (2006) (“[L]aws (like people) migrate, and seepage is 
everywhere.”). For a discussion of how substate actors fit into the framework 
of federalism, see David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 
51 DUKE L.J. 377, 378–79 (2001) (“The ability of each locality to make effective 
decisions on its own is inevitably shaped by its relation to other cities and 
states, by its relation to broader, private market forces, and, most importantly, 
by the way the central power structures these relations, even when central go-
vernmental power appears to be dormant.”). 
 37. The presence of a transsubstantive preference rule for vertical dis-
putes and absence of an equivalent rule for horizontal disputes may be due to 
the relative complexities of drafting such rules. Writing a rule stating that in 
vertical disputes the federal government always wins regardless of context is 
much easier that writing a rule attempting to prioritize competing state 
claims when each state has a plausible justification for protecting its interests. 
Such a rule would likely be either prohibitively long or intolerably vague. 
 38. For example, a dispute implicating competing interests of multiple 
states in regulating a regional market might raise questions about which 
states could exercise judicial power over market participants, which states 
could apply their laws to particular transactions, whether any state exceeded 
the scope of its regulatory power by interfering with extraterritorial aspects of 
the market, and whether any state excessively slanted its regulations to favor 
local interests. These questions would implicate the Due Process, Full Faith 
and Credit, Commerce, Privileges and Immunities, and Equal Protection 
Clauses, and would trigger distinct doctrinal inquiries looking variously at the 
location where conduct occurred, the citizenship of relevant actors, the parties’ 
expectations, and the national, state, and individual interests at stake. 
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structural features that render such allocation more difficult. 
First, states are equal in status, which complicates prioritizing 
competing interests. Second, the Constitution defines state 
power in the aggregate rather than individually, which compli-
cates efforts to define limits on state authority. 
1. Coequality 
Long-established constitutional doctrine holds that all 
states exist on an “equal footing” and are “equal in power, dig-
nity, and authority.”39 This sweeping conclusion contradicts the 
Constitution’s drafting history40 and is in tension with some of 
the Constitution’s text.41 Nevertheless, the equality norm may 
have some implicit textual foundation in the Constitution’s vi-
sion of a “Union.”42 The norm also is consistent with the equali-
ty of state representation in the Senate, which is so integral to 
the Constitution’s design that it is immune from amendment 
 
 39. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911); see also Underwriters Nat’l 
Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 455 U.S. 
691, 704 (1982) (noting “the structure of our Nation as a union of States, each 
possessing equal sovereign powers”); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 
(1907) (“One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the States to each 
other, is that of equality of right. Each state stands on the same level with all 
the rest.”). 
 40. The Constitutional Convention explicitly and overwhelming rejected 
(by a 9-2 vote) including language in what is now Article IV, Section 3 that 
would have required admission of new states “on the same terms” as existing 
states, subject only to conditions regarding extant state debt. 2 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 454 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) [herei-
nafter Farrand]. At least one delegate thought the provision was “inconve-
nient,” and another felt that “equality” was fine for “existing” states, but not 
for new states. Id. This view may have been short-sighted in light of the jeal-
ously and tension that inequality among states would have created if the Su-
preme Court endorsed it. Indeed, in a counterintuitive way, the framers’ hos-
tility toward equality for new states illustrates the necessity of structural 
mechanisms to prevent interstate friction. If even the framers—who were ded-
icated to national unity and acutely aware of the need for existing states to 
respect one another—were nevertheless willing to disadvantage new states, 
one can assume that less nationally inclined state leaders would go to much 
greater lengths to promote parochial interests unless restrained from doing so. 
 41. The Constitution contemplates some inequality among states by 
granting relatively populous states greater representation in the House and 
electoral college, and does not explicitly forbid imposing status-diminishing 
conditions on entities seeking to join the Union as new states. See U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 1 (electoral college); id. art. IV, § 3 (admission of new states); id. 
amend. XIV, § 2 (representation in House); see also Metzger, supra note 2, at 
1499 (noting congressional power under Article I to impose conditions on as-
piring states). 
 42. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; id. art. IV, § 3. 
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without each affected state’s consent.43 Even if the Constitu-
tion’s text did not require equality, deeming states to be equals 
is a sensible baseline absent plausible metrics of hierarchy. 
Prioritizing states based on minutia (such as date of joining the 
Union) seems pointless, and prioritizing based on population or 
resources would reduce to the maxim that “the strong do what 
they can and the weak suffer what they must,”44 which is in-
consistent with the spirit of a Constitution written in the wake 
of revolution against an imperial power.45 
The coequality of states frustrates efforts to cope with hori-
zontal federalism. Each state has an equivalently strong claim 
to exercise collectively held powers absent a context-specific re-
straint. Each state likewise has an equivalently strong claim to 
operate without interference from the others. When state regu-
latory claims conflict, or when one state’s assertion of a right 
infringes another state’s asserted immunity, the fact that 
states are “equal” merely articulates the problem rather than 
suggesting a solution. Prioritizing one state’s interest over 
another’s would require an argument that rules intrinsic to the 
particular power at issue determine how to allocate that power 
when more than one state has an interest in its exercise. This 
observation leads to a second structural problem in the Consti-
tution: there is no clearly discernible basis for assessing how 
the Constitution allocates most powers among the states be-
cause the text grants power en masse to the states as a whole. 
2. Aggregate Power 
The Constitution is very detailed in explaining what the 
federal government can do and what states cannot do, but is 
relatively spare in defining how the existence of multiple states 
 
 43. See id. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its 
equal Suffrage in the Senate.”); see also Metzger, supra note 2, at 1518 (citing 
equality in the Senate as one of several potential justifications for the equal 
footing doctrine). 
 44. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 351 (T.E. Wick ed., Modern 
Library 1982). 
 45. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 726 (1838) 
(noting importance of ensuring formal settlements of interstate disputes ra-
ther than tolerating triumph of “large and powerful” states over “small and 
weak” states). Aside from its ideological appeal, equality also provided practic-
al benefits to small states who were reluctant to subsidize larger states, feared 
how larger states would wield power, and sought to mitigate dilution of their 
authority and dispersion of their tax base upon the Union’s westward expan-
sion. See CATHY D. MATSON & PETER S. ONUF, A UNION OF INTERESTS: POLIT-
ICAL AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 54–57 (1990). 
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possessing equivalent powers limits the scope of those powers. 
The Tenth Amendment provides that “the States respectively” 
may exercise powers not delegated to the federal government 
(and not expressly precluded elsewhere in the text).46 But the 
text offers no guidance about what to do when “the States re-
spectively” do not respect each other. Article IV partially fills 
the void with coordination rules that specify how states should 
react to each other’s statutes, judgments, and extradition re-
quests, and how each state should interact with the others’ citi-
zens, but these provisions have limited scope and effect and are 
subject to exceptions that give states flexibility to antagonize 
each other.47 The Constitution thus confirms that states in the 
aggregate possess a bundle of powers—such as police power, 
taxing power, and adjudicative power—without explaining how 
the existence of multiple states affects the exercise of particular 
powers by any one of them. 
The aggregate power problem is evident in the imprecision 
of the “spheres” model that courts historically used to explain 
the structure of U.S. federalism, and that seems to resurface 
periodically as courts muddle through difficult questions.48 The 
model posits that the federal and state governments occupy 
separate “spheres” of authority, with each type of government 
independent within its own sphere.49 This vision of federal-
 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 47. See id. art. IV, § 1 (Full Faith and Credit Clause); id. § 2 (Privileges 
and Immunities, Extradition, and Fugitive Slave Clauses); infra Part III. 
 48. See Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and 
the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 142–67 (2001) (ana-
lyzing past efforts to draw sharp doctrinal lines across indeterminate constitu-
tional boundaries, and noting disagreement about whether modern decisions 
revive the historical approach). 
 49. See, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 
(1981) (noting “separate spheres of governmental authority preserved in our 
federalist system”); White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 650 (1871) (“The 
government of the Nation and the government of the States are each alike ab-
solute and independent of each other in their respective spheres of action.”); 
Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 (1870) (“The general government, 
and the States, although both exist within the same territorial limits, are sep-
arate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each 
other, within their respective spheres.”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting “boundaries between the spheres 
of federal and state authority”); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting “historic spheres of state sovereignty”). An 
alternative vision of horizontal federalism explained that states are “sovereign 
within their respective boundaries, save that portion of power which they have 
granted to the federal government, and foreign to each other for all but federal 
purposes.” Rhode Island, 37 U.S. at 720. These models are hopelessly unrea-
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ism—apparently borrowed from James Madison50—neatly 
tracks the Tenth Amendment, and therefore shares its impreci-
sion. From a vertical perspective, commentators now recognize 
that the model ignores the “inevitable overlap” of federal and 
state authority.51 But there is a less-noticed flaw from a hori-
zontal perspective: the model ignores the fifty sub-spheres 
within the state sphere, and fails to explain how the Constitu-
tion regulates the friction between these mini-spheres when 
they inevitably collide. Thus, whether federal and state powers 
are exclusive or concurrent, there is still a separate problem of 
defining regulatory boundaries between the states. A more 
nuanced account of federalism is therefore necessary to deter-
mine limits on state power. 
II.  TYPOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONALLY SIGNIFICANT 
INTERSTATE FRICTION   
The combination of coequality and aggregate power absent 
a transsubstantive preference rule creates conditions ripe for 
interstate friction. Some antagonism from pursuit of mutually 
inconsistent interests is inevitable, even if shared preferences 
and regional political and economic pressures provide counter-
vailing incentives for states to cooperate.52 
 
listic: as Part II explains, the idea that border lines on a map provide an easily 
enforceable starting and stopping point for each state’s regulatory power does 
not recognize the multijurisdictional dimensions of many regulatory problems 
and the ease with which regulatory ripples can flow across state lines. The 
stilted formality of the spheres model is evident in the infamous Dred Scott 
decision, in which at least two Justices simplified the complex question of 
whether the movement of a slave from a slave state to a free state and then 
back to a slave state affected his status as a slave by asserting that only the 
state where a person happened to be at the moment could determine his sta-
tus. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 460 (1856) (Nelson, J., con-
curring) (“Every State or nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and juris-
diction within her own territory; and, her laws affect and bind all property and 
persons residing within it. . . . And it is equally true, that no State or nation 
can affect or bind property out of its territory, or persons not residing within 
it. . . . This is the necessary result of the independence of distinct and separate 
sovereignties.”); id. at 469 (Grier, J., concurring) (noting agreement with Jus-
tice Nelson’s concurrence). 
 50. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 35, at 245 
(“[L]ocal or municipal authorities . . . [are] no more subject, within their re-
spective spheres, to the general authority than the general authority is subject 
to them, within its own sphere.”). 
 51. Young, supra note 48, at 139. 
 52. See infra note 108. Even if states are well-intentioned and inclined to 
cooperate, transaction costs and strategic behavior can prevent interjurisdic-
tional negotiations from producing efficient outcomes. See ROBERT COOTER, 
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The Constitution’s drafters were well aware of the poten-
tial for interstate mischief and discord. Each had lived through 
a tumultuous period under the Articles of Confederation in 
which states pursued conflicting self-interests at their collec-
tive expense.53 Supporters of the Constitution bluntly warned 
of states’ propensity to undermine and antagonize each other 
and the attendant threat of “frequent and violent contests.”54 
These dire predictions may have exaggerated the risk of inter-
state conflict to justify supplanting the Confederation with a 
new Union,55 but they clearly reflected contemporary anxiety 
about the prospects for peace and stability absent restraints on 
interstate jostling.56 Eighteenth-century leaders presumably 
 
THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 103–25 (2000). 
 53. See infra text accompanying notes 131–34. The framers presumably 
also recognized that failure of the supposedly “perpetual” union, ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION art. XIII, after less than a decade signaled a need for more 
robust mechanisms to integrate adventuresome states. Cf. THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 35, at 248, 252 (defining mandate of the 
Convention in part as “preservation of the union” through “correcting the er-
rors” in the Articles). 
 54. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 35, at 54; see 
also id. (“To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of indepen-
dent, unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighborhood would be 
to disregard the uniform course of human events . . . .”); id. NO. 5, at 51 (John 
Jay) (contending that, absent Union, states “would always be either involved 
in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them”); id. NO. 45, 
at 288 (James Madison) (arguing that Union was “essential to [the people’s] 
security against contentions and wars among the different States”). 
 55. See MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION 1781-1789, at 339 (1950) (“[S]upporters 
of centralized power used the few discriminatory [trade] laws as an argument 
for a new government, but they ignored other laws which disproved their 
case.”); id. at 345 (“The truth, as always, lay somewhere between the extremes 
of political propaganda.”); JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL 
POLITICS: AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 333 
(1979) (noting disagreement among historians about the extent to which sys-
temic “chaos” was a reasonable fear in 1787). A related paradox of pro-union 
political rhetoric was that it envisioned states as sufficiently strong to gener-
ate plausible fears of violence, but sufficiently weak to acquiesce in a reduction 
of their authority. See PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUB-
LIC: JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1775-1787, at 5 
(1983) (“Fears of imminent anarchy and bloodshed were vitally important in 
creating a climate favorable to constitutional reform. . . . The very fact that 
such fears were unfounded demonstrated the defective and diminutive charac-
ter of early American state power that permitted the institution of a stronger 
central government.”). 
 56. See, e.g., 2 Farrand, supra note 40, at 642–43 (statement of Benjamin 
Franklin) (“I think [the new Constitution] will astonish our enemies, who are 
waiting with confidence to hear that our councils are confounded like those of 
the Builders of Babel; and that our States are on the point of separation, only 
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could not have imagined the complete range of mischief that 
states could cause as innovations in manufacturing, transpor-
tation, and communication integrated physically distinct com-
munities and markets. But their basic insight that unchecked 
interstate maneuvering could create destabilizing friction has 
been proven valid in myriad contexts over the intervening 220 
years. 
Part II briefly outlines the diverse types of interstate fric-
tion that coequality and aggregate power enable. The goal is 
not to create a comprehensive account of all the ways in which 
states can antagonize each other. The point instead is to illu-
strate that state conduct relevant to horizontal federalism 
takes diverse forms that transcend traditional categories for 
thinking about constitutional restraints on state power. Map-
ping the precise contours of these categories is less important 
than highlighting their numerosity, variety, and seepage across 
doctrinal boundaries. This observation suggests a need for the 
broad perspective on constitutional text and jurisprudence that 
Parts III and IV propose. 
A. METHODOLOGY FOR CONSTRUCTING CATEGORIES 
This Part focuses on themes uniting discrete forms of state 
action rather than on trying to pigeonhole state behavior into 
 
to meet hereafter for the purpose of cutting one another’s throats.”); THE FE-
DERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 35, at 60–66 (presenting 
five distinct scenarios by which interstate warfare could arise); DAVID C. 
HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 
9–10 (2003) (discussing Founding-era apprehensions about interstate conflict). 
The framers were also well aware of the zeal with which partisans could pur-
sue and potentially escalate interstate grievances. This was a generation, after 
all, that had fought a war against its King and frequently participated in vola-
tile and radical political discourse. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967) (discussing heated rhetoric 
and general culture of suspicion and ferment during the revolutionary era); 
ONUF, supra note 55 (discussing Founding-era struggles by states to restrain 
local political movements that resisted state authority within putative state 
borders); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
229–43 (1992) (noting potentially destabilizing intellectual trends toward ega-
litarianism, individualism, anti-intellectualism, and sectionalism); cf. ALEXIS 
DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 367 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Law-
rence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1850) (observing that “patriotism” in the 
early nineteenth century centered on state rather than national affiliations). 
Even if disunited states could avoid conflict by successfully deterring each 
other from aggression, federalists were concerned that the mechanism of de-
terrence—a strong executive with a large army—would threaten individual 
liberty. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 
U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 486–89 (1991). 
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categories defined by constitutional text—such as behavior 
burdening interstate commerce, behavior infringing privileges 
and immunities of state citizens, and the like. Approaching 
state action atextually reveals that practical threats to horizon-
tal stability and doctrinal solutions do not neatly overlap: some 
categories of conduct implicate multiple doctrines, and some 
doctrines address multiple categories of conduct. Parts III and 
IV develop this observation to show how constitutional provi-
sions governing horizontal federalism can function as an inte-
grated system capable of adapting to the wide range of prob-
lems requiring constitutional solutions. 
The typology in this part also avoids formal distinctions 
that might invite a jurisprudence of labels keyed to tangential 
attributes of state action. Alternative rubrics could distinguish 
state regulations based on criteria such as form (e.g., taxes vs. 
safety standards), the regulated field (social vs. economic, civil 
vs. criminal, tort vs. contract, etc.), attitude to other states (ag-
gressive vs. indifferent), identity of the regulator (judicial vs. 
legislative), and identity of the regulated entities (private vs. 
public). These factors can obscure connections between types of 
state action that raise similar theoretical problems but tran-
scend formal boundaries. The categories below therefore draw 
functional lines that isolate salient themes, albeit at the risk of 
some overlap and indeterminacy that brighter lines would 
avoid. 
The categories that I define encompass sources of inter-
state friction that raise potential threats to constitutional val-
ues, but that would not necessarily fail constitutional scrutiny. 
Friction-inducing behavior can be tolerable, or even desirable, 
for three reasons. First, some interstate jostling might be suffi-
ciently minor to obviate judicial review in favor of relying on 
political and market mechanisms to contain disputes.57 Hori-
zontal federalism in this respect is no different than any other 
area of constitutional law in which courts must draw lines be-
tween material and immaterial impairments of constitutional 
values.58 Second, some diversity between state regulatory ap-
proaches is an inevitable consequence of federalism and one of 
 
 57. See infra note 108 (discussing state incentives to cooperate). 
 58. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 36–37 
(2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (distinguishing between 
“slight” constitutional harms and actions that are not “constitutional viola-
tions at all”); Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1996) (considering how constitutional law should 
distinguish between “direct” and “incidental” burdens on rights).  
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its oft-presumed virtues.59 Even direct competition between 
states can produce efficient outcomes60 and enhance the demo-
cratic process.61 Constitutional challenges to such state action 
may therefore inappropriately squelch innovation or inject the 
judiciary into disputes that courts are poorly equipped to han-
dle.62 Finally, the significance of friction is relative, such that 
antagonizing some states by discriminating against their inter-
ests can—if done under federal supervision—avoid even greater 
friction or advance a more significant national interest.63 
Whatever the appropriate scope of interstate friction might 
be, understanding different potential manifestations of friction 
can help in analyzing how the Constitution deters and contains 
it. The typology below therefore considers the most troubling 
categories of friction-inducing behavior to give a flavor of the 
problems that the constitutional texts discussed in Part III 
must confront. 
B. SOURCES OF INTERSTATE FRICTION 
1. Dominion 
Destabilizing conflict can occur when one state attempts to 
assert sovereign power over another’s territory or officers. For 
example, at least eleven interstate border disputes existed dur-
ing the Founding era,64 creating simmering tension over the 
 
 59. Justice Brandeis famously articulated a variant of this theory when he 
observed that “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a 
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and 
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). Of course, the “without risk to the rest of the country” caveat begs 
the question of when federalism concerns limit a state’s leeway to experiment. 
 60. See infra note 108. 
 61. See Mark D. Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?: Positive, Normative, 
and Institutional Considerations of States’ Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 749 (2007) (discussing how interstate policy diversity en-
hances opportunities for individual participation in politics). 
 62. See Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Com-
merce, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1211 (1986) (“Another type of doctrine testing the 
limits of judicial competence would require the courts to assess . . . whether 
the overall economic benefits and burdens of a regulation favor local inhabi-
tants against outsiders. Even expert economists might find themselves hard 
put to make this determination.”). 
 63. For a comprehensive discussion and defense of federally authorized 
discrimination, see Metzger, supra note 2. 
 64. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 724 (1838). 
Border disputes were relatively common in the Founding era in part because 
the technology for delineating state boundaries was primitive. See Virginia v. 
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limits of each state’s power and a significant risk of armed con-
flict between rival militias.65 Politically contentious border dis-
putes continue to arise even in the modern era.66 Other poten-
tial examples of attempted dominion would include efforts by 
one state to assert civil jurisdiction over another state or its in-
strumentalities, issue writs of habeas corpus to officers of 
another state, or make formal demands upon other states (e.g., 
for the extradition of fugitives or return of escaped slaves). 
Grouping these potential sources of interstate conflict high-
lights how the Constitution and case law interpreting it use a 
mix of approaches to address similar problems. On the one 
hand, the Constitution mitigates friction from interstate disa-
greements over the scope of territorial authority by creating a 
federal forum and federal common law for resolving boundary 
disputes.67 Yet on the other it tolerates forcing a state or its of-
ficers to accede to jurisdiction in another state’s courts,68 where 
they may be subject to potentially onerous remedies.69 Like-
 
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 516 (1893) (noting that state border was marked by 
trees with hatchet indentations). 
 65. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 35, at 61 
(fearing settlement of border disputes by “the sword”); JENSEN, supra note 55, 
at 330–31, 335–36, 342–44 (noting violent border disputes early in the Confe-
deration era as well as successful efforts at conciliation). 
 66. For example, in the past decade New Jersey litigated against New 
York regarding sovereignty over Ellis Island, and against Delaware regarding 
the right to regulate construction on the Delaware River. See New Jersey v. 
Delaware, 128 S. Ct. 1410, 1415–16 (2008) (holding that New Jersey lacked 
authority to construct a liquefied natural gas unloading terminal that would 
have extended from the New Jersey shoreline into Delaware territory); New 
Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 771 (1998) (holding that New Jersey had 
sovereign power over portions of Ellis Island created by landfill). 
 67. See infra notes 151, 227. 
 68. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426–27 (1979) (rejecting state’s so-
vereign immunity defense); Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v. Montana Bd. of Invs., 
850 N.E.2d 1140, 1142 (N.Y. 2006) (rejecting state agency’s personal jurisdic-
tion defense); Hansen v. Scott, 2002 ND 101, 645 N.W.2d 223, 225 (N.D. 2002) 
(rejecting state officers’ personal jurisdiction defense). 
 69. A state court’s exercise of jurisdiction over another state or its officers 
raises an interesting question about what remedies the forum state may pro-
vide. Damages are clearly appropriate. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 413, 427 (affirm-
ing California court’s $1,150,000 judgment against Nevada). In contrast, the 
Supreme Court has not determined whether the Constitution limits the equit-
able remedies that state courts may impose on foreign officers in actions aris-
ing under the forum state’s law. Such remedies could be troubling if, for ex-
ample, the forum state enjoined foreign officers from implementing policies 
required by foreign statutes. Federal courts clearly may compel state officers 
to disregard state law in favor of federal law, and state courts clearly may 
compel their own state’s officers to disregard forum law in favor of federal law, 
but the authority of state courts to compel another state’s officers to disregard 
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wise, the Constitution explicitly compels states to respect each 
other’s extradition demands, but apparently allows them to ig-
nore each other’s habeas demands.70 Each of these mechanisms 
for coping with acts of dominion might be defensible, but it is 
interesting to note in anticipation of Parts III and IV how a 
single basic problem—direct assertions of power by one state 
over another—implicates diverse doctrines and regulatory me-
thods that might each open the others to reevaluation.71 
2. Havens 
A constant threat to interstate harmony is that one state 
will become a haven for behavior that other states seek to re-
strain. This problem has three variants: an outlier permissive 
state can frustrate a restrictive majority, a permissive majority 
can frustrate a restrictive outlier, and restrictive states can in 
rare instances frustrate permissive states. 
First, an outlier permissive state can become a magnet for 
citizens of relatively restrictive states, creating tension when 
those citizens fail to return, or return seeking to import new-
 
foreign law in favor of forum law is unsettled. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 
123, 168 (1908) (discussing federal judicial authority to issue injunctions 
against state officers); Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 226 (1908) (discuss-
ing state judicial obligation to issue injunctions against local officers). A re-
lated problem—with an additional vertical federalism wrinkle—arises in the 
rare instances when state courts must consider whether to apply federal law 
rather than forum law against officers or instrumentalities of another state. 
See Carrigan v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 802 P.2d 813, 817 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1991) (noting that “principles of comity” would allow a state court to “decline 
jurisdiction over another state” in an action seeking remedies under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983). 
 70. Compare U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (Extradition Clause), with Abelman 
v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858) (stating in dicta that a Wisconsin 
court would lack authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus against a custodian 
in Michigan). But cf. Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 639 (1884) (holding that 
a state may issue habeas writs directed at officers of another state operating 
within the issuing state’s territory). 
 71. A rare permutation of the dominion problem arises when two states by 
mutual agreement or federal statute exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the 
same territory, such as a river that provides a common boundary. Shared au-
thority may create tension over optimal policy, although often conduct would 
clearly be sanctionable in either state. Compare People v. Pitt, 435 N.E.2d 
801, 803–04 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that Illinois had jurisdiction over an 
armed assault on a bridge spanning the Mississippi River between Illinois and 
Missouri regardless of whether the assault occurred on Illinois’ side of the 
bridge), with State v. Alexander, 259 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Ark. 1959) (holding 
that Arkansas did not have jurisdiction over an act violating Arkansas fishing 
regulations that occurred on Tennessee’s side of the Mississippi River because 
the defendants complied with Tennessee law). 
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found rights. For example, there is a long history of some en-
trepreneurial states frustrating the restrictive divorce policies 
of others by using the prospect of easy divorces to lure visi-
tors,72 a few states allow same-sex marriages or civil unions 
that most states prohibit,73 and before the Civil War northern 
and southern states differed over the propriety of slavery and 
disposition of slaves who crossed state lines.74 Here again the 
Constitution adopts distinct approaches to similar problems: 
 
 72. See generally NELSON M. BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF 
DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1962) (discussing competition between states 
for divorce filings and efforts by states to invalidate foreign divorces). 
 73. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (recognizing same-
sex marriage); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135 (2008) 
(same); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) 
(same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457-A:1 to 457-A:8 (West Supp. 2007) (recog-
nizing same-sex civil unions); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1-28 to 37:1-36 (West 
Supp. 2007) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–1207 (West 2002) (same); 
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297–297.5 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008) (recognizing same-
sex domestic partnerships); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (West Supp. 
2007) (same). States that do not allow same-sex marriages have taken conflict-
ing approaches to dealing with potential havens problems. At least one state 
(New York) decided to recognize same-sex marriages that were valid in the 
states that performed them, while thirteen others attempted to avoid the need 
for such recognition by trying to convince the California Supreme Court to 
stay its decision finding a right of same-sex couples to marry. See Memoran-
dum from David Nocenti, Counsel to the Governor of N.Y. to All Agency Coun-
sel (May 14, 2008) (“[I]t is now timely to conduct a review of your agency’s pol-
icy statements and regulations, and those statutes whose construction is 
vested in your agency, to ensure that terms such as ‘spouse,’ ‘husband’ and 
‘wife’ are construed in a manner that encompasses legal same-sex marriages, 
unless some other provision of law would bar your ability to do so.”) (on file 
with author); Docket Sheet, In re Marriage Cases, No. S147999 (Cal. 2008) 
(May 29, 2008, June 2, 2008, and June 4, 2008), available at 
http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=
447693&doc_no=S147999 (noting filings by Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, 
Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, South 
Dakota, Utah, and Virginia). 
 74. In addition to well-known tension arising from southern efforts to cap-
ture fugitive slaves, see infra note 187, two relatively subtle types of interstate 
problems were particularly vexing. First, if a slaveholder traveling with a 
slave temporarily crossed into free territory, could the forum state liberate the 
slave, or was it obligated to respect the property laws of the traveler’s domi-
cile? Second, if a slave obtained a judgment from a northern state that libe-
rated her, were courts in southern states obligated to enforce that judgment 
(for example, by allowing the freed slave to inherit property under a will pro-
bated in a southern court)? For a discussion of how these and similar choice of 
law and comity problems created interstate friction before the Civil War, see 
PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (1981). Cf. ROBERT M. 
COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 87–99 
(1975) (discussing theoretical foundations of judicial reasoning about choice of 
law in cases involving slavery). 
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the text includes a general default rule requiring states to re-
spect each other’s “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceed-
ings” (which include divorces),75 authorizes federal legislation 
to supplant that default rule (which Congress invoked in an at-
tempt to limit recognition of same-sex marriages),76 and con-
tained an explicit pro-southern preference rule for the disposi-
tion of “fugitive slaves.”77 Congress also has discretion to 
regulate havens that involve the export of tangible items (as 
opposed to intangible rights) from an outlier permissive forum. 
For example, in the late nineteenth century Louisiana autho-
rized a lottery, to the annoyance of other states with anti-
gambling policies whose citizens purchased Louisiana’s tickets 
on a nationwide black market.78 Individual states’ attempts to 
squelch Louisiana’s lottery were largely ineffective, but federal 
legislation solved the problem by prohibiting interstate trans-
portation of lottery tickets.79 
Second, a havens problem can arise when a permissive ma-
jority of states provide a haven for refugees from a restrictive 
outlier. The prospect of what Mark Rosen calls “travel eva-
sion”80 would frustrate efforts by the outlier to enforce its poli-
cies and could therefore chill innovations that are prone to cir-
cumvention through geographic mobility. For example, suppose 
that a state concerned about the dangers of alcohol abuse by 
young adults tried to address the problem by adopting a rela-
tively high minimum drinking age. If other states retained 
 
 75. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 76. See id.; Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). 
For an argument that Congress’s effort to address the potential havens prob-
lem was unconstitutional, see Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of 
Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 
(1997). 
 77. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 78. See Ronald J. Rychlack, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A His-
torical Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 38–42 
(1992). 
 79. See id. at 42–44. 
 80. Rosen, supra note 2, at 856; see also Rosen, supra note 61, at 745–47 
(postulating a future in which abortion is legal in some states but not in oth-
ers, and considering whether a state that prohibits abortions should also have 
authority to prohibit its citizens from obtaining abortions in other states). 
What Rosen calls “evasion,” Seth Kreimer characterizes as seeking “sanctu-
ary.” Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 66, 71–72 (2001). This distinct emphasis highlights two competing 
interests that influence assessment of havens: the state’s interest in enforcing 
restraints on local citizens and the individual’s interest in enforcing the poten-
tially broader rights of national citizenship. 
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their lower minimums, consumers could circumvent the restric-
tive state’s policy by traveling across state lines. Worse, induc-
ing consumers to travel—often by car—to obtain alcohol in-
creases the risk that they will drive back after consuming it, 
which would put more intoxicated drivers on the road for longer 
distances and thus exacerbate one of the side effects of alcohol 
abuse that the restrictive state was trying to address. Some 
types of restrictive state policies thus require national unifor-
mity to avoid evasion through havens, which can in part ex-
plain the existence of federal power to preempt state law or to 
provide incentives for states to adopt national standards.81 
Finally, restrictive states can in rare instances be havens 
for citizens of permissive states seeking to flee the correlative 
obligations of liberty. For example, the identity of the haven 
state in the context of same-sex marriages can depend on one’s 
characterization of the underlying marriage. If same-sex mar-
riages are inherently suspect, then permissive states that allow 
such marriages are havens for citizens of restrictive states. But 
if same-sex marriages warrant respect, then restrictive states 
are havens for citizens of permissive states who seek to evade 
their marriage obligations by relocating and obtaining de facto 
annulments.82 
 
 81. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208–09 (1987) (affirming con-
gressional power under the Spending Clause to condition highway funding on 
state adoption of a specified minimum drinking age). If national legislation is 
not feasible or is insufficient to prevent travel evasion, then states arguably 
have some authority to protect their interests by regulating extraterritorial 
conduct that facilitates evasion of restrictive in-state laws and causes in-state 
harms. In the drinking-age example above, states concerned that local drivers 
will consume alcohol in more tolerant jurisdictions could impose statutory or 
common law penalties on out-of-state vendors who cause intoxication that 
leads to in-state injuries. See Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 720, 
727 (Cal. 1976) (holding that California negligence law applied to a Nevada 
entity that served alcohol to intoxicated California residents who later caused 
injuries in California), partially superseded by statute, CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 25602(c) (West 2008). But see West Am. Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 337 
N.W.2d 676, 681 (Minn. 1983) (holding that Minnesota lacked personal juris-
diction over a tavern in Wisconsin that caused the intoxication and subse-
quent injury in Minnesota of an eighteen-year-old Minnesota resident who had 
traveled to evade Minnesota’s minimum drinking age of nineteen); Dunaway 
by Dunaway v. Fellous, 842 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to 
enforce an Illinois dram shop statute against a tavern in Missouri that sold 
alcohol to an intoxicated person who later caused injuries in Illinois). 
 82. See Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Cre-
dit, and the Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 1 
(2005) (contending that states should not assist foreign citizens attempting to 
circumvent marriage obligations). A similar problem could in theory arise if a 
state with relatively restrictive rules regarding capacity to contract (e.g., for 
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3. Exclusions 
A corollary to the havens problem occurs when states de-
cide to ban conduct that others allow. These exclusions can 
cause friction if the practical effect is to force actors with a na-
tionwide presence to comply with the most restrictive state 
laws in order to do business in any state. For example, imagine 
that State A is a large market for widgets and imposes costly 
product safety standards that exceed what other states consid-
er appropriate. Widget manufacturers might decide that it is 
easier to comply with State A’s standards nationwide than to 
manufacture separate lines of widgets for different markets. 
This decision could lead to higher widget prices in states that 
would prefer the less-safe cheaper widgets, in effect allowing 
one state to frustrate the others’ regulatory goals. Recent ex-
amples of this phenomenon include New York City’s regulation 
of transfats in foods,83 and California’s and Texas’s standards 
for school textbooks.84 There is no clear constitutional restraint 
on exclusions that indirectly frustrate regulatory objectives in 
other states,85 leaving the problem to political resolution or fed-
eral preemption.86 
 
minors or the mentally disabled) declined to bind newly arrived citizens to 
preexisting contracts that would have been enforceable in their prior domi-
ciles. But cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 187–88, 198 
(1971) (suggesting implicitly that a party’s post-contracting change in resi-
dence to a state with no prior relationship with the transaction should not af-
fect the contract’s validity). 
 83. See Christopher Grimes, Ban on Trans Fats Seals New York’s Tough 
Reputation, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 9, 2006, at 7 (noting possibility that na-
tional restaurant chains and food producers would adopt New York’s standard 
nationwide). 
 84. See DIANE RAVITCH, THE LANGUAGE POLICE 98–104 (2003) (noting 
that publishers tailor textbooks to state-imposed content guidelines in larger 
markets, which homogenizes textbooks nationwide). 
 85. The Commerce Clause might apply if the exclusion directly burdens 
interstate commerce. For example, one of several factors that the Supreme 
Court considered in invoking the Commerce Clause to invalidate a state sta-
tute limiting the length of interstate trains was a concern that railroads would 
“conform to the lowest train limit restriction of any of the states through 
which its trains pass,” which would increase costs and threaten safety in other 
states forced to contend with a larger number of smaller trains. S. Pac. Co. v. 
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 773 (1945). However, exclusions in the 
transportation context raise unique concerns because they obstruct inherently 
mobile activity through an interstate channel. Extraterritorial effects of exclu-
sions in other contexts will likely be less direct and thus less likely to consti-
tute a prohibited burden on commerce. 
Alternatively, the Due Process Clause might constrain a state’s ability to 
use its local police powers as a tool for inducing regulated entities to alter 
their extraterritorial conduct in a manner that “infring[es] on the policy choic-
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4. Favoritism 
States have an incentive to favor local interests over out-of-
state interests, which can lead to friction with other states con-
cerned about the mistreatment of their citizens or the competi-
tive disadvantage of their businesses.87 Even seemingly inno-
cuous regulations, such as limits on shellfish harvesting in lo-
local waters by out-of-state citizens, have led to armed stan-
doffs between state agents and a spate of Supreme Court deci-
sions.88 Aside from this lex lobster, states have made numerous 
attempts to privilege local interests by, for example, taxing out-
of-state citizens arriving at local ports,89 using health “quaran-
tine” laws to bar imports from other states,90 shielding local 
 
es of other States.” BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996). The 
quoted dicta from Gore, however, is probably limited to cases where states use 
the threat of punitive “sanctions” to induce extraterritorial conduct, id., rather 
than when states ban in-state conduct and hope that market forces will trans-
late the local exclusion into a national norm. 
 86. An analogous process of “leverag[ing] standards upward” can occur in 
the international system, where stringent regulations in one of several inter-
connected markets can lead foreign participants to comply with local stan-
dards even outside the local jurisdiction. Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and 
Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting 
Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2000); see id. at 78 
(“[I]t will be pragmatically difficult for businesses to employ two sets of data 
privacy practices, one for EU residents (providing for greater privacy protec-
tion) and one for U.S. residents (providing for less).”). 
 87. Alexander Hamilton warned, with typical hyperbole, that parochial 
“distinctions, preferences, and exclusions . . . would beget discontent,” leading 
to “outrages,” and then to “reprisals and wars.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alex-
ander Hamilton), supra note 35, at 62–63; see also 3 Farrand, supra note 40, 
at 478 (statement of James Madison) (noting Confederation-era concern about 
“injustice among the States” arising from parochial “abuse” of power over re-
gional trade). 
 88. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 364 n.1 (1976) (observing 
that dispute between Maine and New Hampshire over regulation of lobster 
fishing in boundary waters threatened to become violent prior to litigation); 
Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, 35 (1906) (noting “danger of an armed 
conflict” between state police forces competing to regulate oyster beds); Whar-
ton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155 (1894) (affirming denial of a habeas petition by a 
Maryland resident jailed for harvesting oysters in Virginia); Thompson v. 
Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873) (affirming judgment for the plaintiff in 
a civil action by a New York resident challenging the seizure of his ship by a 
New Jersey sheriff enforcing limits on clam harvesting in New Jersey waters). 
Other aquatic creatures have created similar controversy. See Hughes v. Ok-
lahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (reversing criminal conviction of a Texas resident 
who violated an Oklahoma statute by attempting to export minnows from Ok-
lahoma to Texas). 
 89. See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 409 (1849) (invalidating 
the tax under the Commerce Clause). 
 90. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 3 (1900) (dismissing challenge to qua-
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debtors from foreign judgments,91 and using local residency as 
a factor in discriminating between businesses competing in lo-
cal markets.92 More subtle examples of favoritism include taxes 
that fall disproportionately on visitors from out-of-state (such 
as hotel patrons and car renters),93 efforts to neutralize the 
competitive advantage of out-of-state producers who enjoy a 
lower cost structure than in-state producers,94 and regulations 
couched in “public health and safety” terms but tailored to ben-
efit local manufacturers at the expense of importers.95 The no-
minal victim of such biased or protectionist legislation is usual-
ly a private actor rather than another state (although state 
economies can suffer depending on the magnitude of aggregate 
private injuries), but the harm exists only because the multis-
tate structure of the Union divides sovereign power in a way 
that creates opportunities for discrimination. Challenges to 
state laws that discriminate against foreign entities thus illu-
strate how private claims, often framed in terms of individual 
equality rights, have a role in implementing the Constitution’s 
framework for horizontal federalism.96 More generally, the 
Constitution’s hostility to parochial favoritism helps create a 
sense of national identity, which in turn avoids creating en-
 
rantine on jurisdictional grounds). 
 91. See President & Dirs. of the Bank of Ala. v. Dalton, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 
522, 527–29 (1850) (enforcing Mississippi statute that provided a shorter limi-
tations period for actions to enforce out-of-state judgments than for actions to 
enforce in-state judgments). Preferences for local debtors also create a havens 
problem by giving debtors incentives to flee to states that provide safe harbor. 
See id. at 527 (noting that the challenged statute “invites to the State and pro-
tects absconding debtors from other States”). 
 92. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 878 (1985) (invalidat-
ing an Alabama tax that tried to create a “home team” advantage by taxing 
out-of-state insurers more heavily than in-state insurers). 
 93. See Jesse H. Choper & Tung Yin, State Taxation and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause: The Object-Measure Approach, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 227 
(discussing possible Commerce Clause challenges to state statutes “exporting” 
tax burdens onto nonresident transients). 
 94. See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193–94 (1994) (cit-
ing examples of creatively unconstitutional efforts by states to offset impor-
ters’ cost advantages with price controls, taxes, and subsidies). 
 95. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 492 (2005) (invalidating state sta-
tutes discriminating against shipments of wine to in-state consumers from 
out-of-state producers); see also id. at 473 (noting that state regulation of in-
terstate wine shipments created “an ongoing, low-level trade war”). 
 96. For further discussion of how the Constitution uses rights as an ad-
junct to more traditional structural constraints on horizontal power, see infra 
Part III.D. 
 2008] HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM 523 
 
trenched regionally-defined factions that would undermine na-
tional stability.97 
5. Externalities 
Interstate friction can arise when one state pursues other-
wise lawful objectives that have negative effects in other states. 
For instance, air and water pollution from industrial activity 
span “natural rather than political boundaries,”98 potentially 
allowing one state to experience the benefits of economic activi-
ty while externalizing the costs to neighbors. There is obviously 
no “Externalities Clause” in the Constitution, leaving this prob-
lem to legal resolution, if at all, through a hodgepodge of me-
 
 97. Friedrich Hayek noted the basic theoretical problem with intra-
systemic parochial economic policies on the eve of World War II, although he 
was not specifically referring to the United States: 
[E]conomic frontiers create communities of interest on a regional ba-
sis and of a most intimate character: they bring it about that all con-
flicts of interests tend to become conflicts between the same groups of 
people, instead of conflicts between groups of constantly varying com-
position . . . . [I]t is clearly in the interest of unity of the larger whole 
that these groupings should not be permanent and, more particularly, 
that the various communities of interest should overlap territorially 
and never become lastingly identified with the inhabitants of a par-
ticular region. 
Friedrich A. Hayek, Economic Conditions of Inter-State Federalism, 5 NEW 
COMMONWEALTH Q. 131, 133–34 (1939), reprinted in FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, 
INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 255, 257–58 (1948). This observation is 
slightly in tension with James Madison’s willingness to tolerate state-based 
factions within a republic, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra 
note 35, at 84, although the tension dissipates if one recognizes that Hayek 
and Madison were pursuing distinct inquiries. Hayek was attempting to ex-
plain how regional factions could frustrate the ability of federations to pre-
serve peace among their members, while Madison was attempting to allay 
fears that regional factions would undermine individual liberty. The two posi-
tions can be harmonized by positing that conflicts between regional factions 
are useful to ensure the absence of a dominant majority capable of oppressing 
a minority, but that the composition of each region, and intensity of each re-
gion’s interest, should vary by subject to avoid creating self-reinforcing dyads 
of conflict. Cf. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE 86 (2007) (noting “pragmatic” effect 
of “kaleidoscopic” shifts in interstate alliances over time). 
 98. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 24 (1951) (rejecting 
challenge to an interstate compact regulating sewage discharge into the Ohio 
River); see also Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238–39 (1907) (not-
ing that a copper factory in Tennessee spewed “sulphurous acid gas” into 
Georgia, damaging forests and crops); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 517–
18 (1906) (noting that an Illinois law allowing Chicago to dump sewage into a 
local river sent “fifteen hundred tons of poisonous filth daily” downstream to-
ward Missouri, and was the type of act that in an international context “might 
lead to war”). 
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thods, such as statutory or dormant federal preemption, inter-
state compacts, and diversity litigation.99 
The inverse of state action creating negative externalities 
is free-riding by states on the positive externalities of invest-
ments in infrastructure and human capital by other states. For 
example, a heavily subsidized public university in one state 
benefits neighboring states whose citizens attend it. Horizontal 
federalism doctrines recognize this problem by allowing public 
universities to charge higher tuition to out-of-state students, 
contrary to the general norm prohibiting states from discrimi-
nating based on state residence.100 However, the Constitution 
does not create any mechanism for one state to compel another 
to share the costs of mutually beneficial projects, although Ar-
ticle IV’s compacts process facilitates politically expedient vo-
luntary burden sharing.101 
6. Rogues 
Observers of contemporary interstate relations might take 
for granted the mutual respect that states exhibit toward each 
other and their general restraint from overtly hostile interac-
tions. But such respect and restraint was far from assured dur-
ing the Founding era, when the possibility of rogue or maverick 
behavior was a significant threat to interstate harmony.102 For 
instance, there was a risk that states would ignore each other’s 
civil judgments,103 threaten each other militarily,104 or refuse to 
 
 99. For a discussion of how externalities flowing from state regulation of 
national markets have led to federalization of areas traditionally subject to 
state control, see Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 2, at 1368–98. 
 100. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452–53 (1973) (recognizing legiti-
macy of differential tuition rates while invalidating a flawed implementation 
of such rates). 
 101. See, e.g., New York-New Jersey Port Authority Compact, ch. 77, 42 
Stat. 174 (1921) (enabling shared administration of regional transportation 
infrastructure). 
 102. The mutual mistrust was sufficiently deep that the framers disre-
garded their mandate to submit the Constitution for unanimous approval from 
all thirteen states in favor of requiring ratification from only nine, which 
avoided shackling the majority to the “perverseness or corruption” of a holdout 
state. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 35, at 251. This 
fear of holdouts was plausible given that Rhode Island did not send any dele-
gates to the Constitutional Convention, and two of New York’s three delegates 
departed in protest while the Convention was in session. See 3 Farrand, supra 
note 40, at 244–47 (letter from New York delegates to New York governor); 2 
id. at 641 (official tally of final vote to approve Constitution, showing absence 
of Rhode Island and New York). 
 103. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 181 (1895) (noting that before 
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come to each other’s assistance.105 The Constitution’s Full Faith 
and Credit Clause and restraints on state militias help—in 
very different ways—to avoid such friction,106 illustrating the 
mutually reinforcing effect of distinct structural elements of 
horizontal federalism.107 
7. Competition 
A more subtle form of rogue behavior can arise in the are-
na of interstate economic competition. The extent to which 
states compete and the efficiency of rules that competition pro-
duces are open and context-sensitive questions.108 However, 
some forms of horizontal competition clearly create at least a 
risk of undermining state or national interests. For example, 
states can attempt to poach each other’s tax base and engines 
of employment and growth by offering relocation incentives to 
businesses109 or individuals,110 or by diluting public welfare 
 
the Revolutionary War colonial courts could question the merits of each others’ 
judgments); M’Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 325 (1839) (noting “un-
certainty” during colonial era about whether out-of-state judgments were en-
forceable); James v. Allen, 1 U.S. 188 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1786) (refusing to re-
spect order from a New Jersey court discharging a debt, and upholding 
imprisonment of the debtor in a Pennsylvania jail). 
 104. See supra note 65; infra note 151. 
 105. See KEITH L. DOUGHERTY, COLLECTIVE ACTION UNDER THE ARTICLES 
OF CONFEDERATION 103–28 (2001) (discussing refusal of some states to assist 
in suppressing Shays’ Rebellion in Massachusetts). 
 106. See infra text accompanying notes 125, 129, 176–78. 
 107. In contrast, the Eleventh Amendment impedes resolution of interstate 
debt cases, illustrating that constitutional provisions sometimes work at cross-
purposes. See infra text accompanying notes 170–75. 
 108. The motive for interstate competition is debatable. Many conventional 
accounts of state behavior posit that governments are inherently prone to self-
aggrandizement that leads to competition, but recent scholarship suggests a 
more nuanced approach that focuses on how politically accountable state lead-
ers respond to constituent preferences, which sometimes but not always favor 
competitive policies. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in 
Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 944–50 (2005). Even when states 
compete, market forces can produce efficient outcomes and political forces can 
provide countervailing incentives to cooperate or negotiate that mitigate the 
potential for disputes to escalate. See Kramer, supra note 76, at 1989–90 
(“While states still compete with one another, their relations are characterized 
by a large degree of what international theorists call ‘diffuse reciprocity,’ a ge-
neralized commitment in which self-interested calculations of expected utility 
are replaced by a general willingness to let things play out in the long run.”). 
For general discussions of interstate competition, see THOMAS R. DYE, AMERI-
CAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990); JOSEPH F. 
ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE RELATIONS (1996); COMPETITION AMONG STATES 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991). 
 109. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Com-
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regulations to make themselves more hospitable to regulated 
entities.111 Such “races to the bottom” can harm all the compet-
ing states as each seeks to outdo the others’ concessions or face 
capital flight as a result of inaction.112 If all states matched 
each other’s policies, then all would be worse off and none bet-
ter off; businesses would have no reason to relocate, and thus 
no state would gain residents but each would lose the potential 
benefit of foregone regulations or taxes. The state behavior un-
derlying this competition seems to involve precisely the sort of 
decisionmaking about local activity that “independent” states 
are free to pursue, subject only to federal preemption if Con-
 
merce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 377, 380 (1996) (discussing “interstate ‘bidding wars’” through tax incen-
tives). The Supreme Court recently considered a Commerce Clause challenge 
to an Ohio tax incentive designed to encourage an Ohio manufacturer to ex-
pand its operations in Ohio rather than in Michigan, but decided the case on 
standing grounds without reaching the merits. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. 
Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 338 (2006). 
 110. See, e.g., PURCELL, supra note 97, at 87 (noting attempted “population 
grab” by Wisconsin, which sent a “commissioner of immigration” to New York 
City in hope of luring new residents). 
 111. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Fe-
deralism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Poli-
cy, 86 YALE. L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977) (“If each locality reasons in the same way, 
all will adopt lower standards of environmental quality than they would prefer 
if there were some binding mechanism that enabled them simultaneously to 
enact higher standards, thus eliminating the threatened loss of industry or 
development.”); Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competi-
tion in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002) (concluding that state 
competition for corporate charters tends to privilege manager interests over 
shareholder interests); Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, 
and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing 
Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1121 (2008) (discussing “race-to-the-bottom” in 
state usury laws). But see Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 727–35 (2002) (arguing 
that government inefficiency and political constraints limit competition among 
states for corporate charters). Competition can also distort judicial as well as 
legislative policy. See Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the 
Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (2007) (contending that 
competition for cases between English courts tilted the common law toward 
favoring plaintiffs). Another relevant potential manifestation of interstate 
competition is the formation of cartels comprised of states seeking to obtain an 
advantage over nonmembers. See infra text accompanying notes 135–46 (dis-
cussing role of the Compact Clause in ensuring federal oversight of potential 
cartels). 
 112. But see Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Re-
thinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regu-
lation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1233–35 (1992) (discussing theoretical models 
of state regulatory and tax behavior that are inconsistent with the race-to-the-
bottom theory). 
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gress concludes that a uniform or minimum regulatory baseline 
is appropriate. Yet the friction-inducing ripples that competi-
tion can produce suggest that at least some instances of aggres-
sive state self-promotion could be seen as akin to more obvious-
ly suspect conduct. Whether this observation translates into a 
constitutional prohibition is questionable,113 but the broader 
point remains that a systemic approach to horizontal federal-
ism can highlight troubling aspects of state activity that might 
seem less objectionable when viewed in isolation. 
8. Overreaching 
A final category of friction-inducing state behavior that is 
similar to, but not as aggressive as, the “dominion” and “rogue” 
categories involves efforts to extend the effective reach of state 
authority beyond a state’s borders. For example, states have at-
tempted to regulate out-of-state conduct by locally chartered 
corporations,114 to tax out-of-state property,115 to exercise civil 
and criminal jurisdiction over nonresidents with tenuous local 
connections,116 to control the disposition of land located in other 
states,117 to forbid other states from adjudicating certain civil 
 
 113. Among the problems that judicial enforcement of horizontal con-
straints on competition would encounter are the lack of a clear constitutional 
standard, the absence of an objective metric for determining whether competi-
tion produced suboptimal rather than efficient levels of taxation or regulation, 
and the risk that states would circumvent limits on competition in one corner 
of the market by competing in a different corner. See id. at 1247 (noting that 
federal limits on state competition over environmental standards would lead 
states “to respond by competing over another variable”). 
 114. See FTC v. Travelers Health Ass’n, 362 U.S. 293, 295–96 (1960) (dis-
cussing a Nebraska statute that purported to regulate the content of commu-
nications that local insurers could have with insureds in other states). 
 115. See Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 477–79 (1925) (holding that 
the Due Process Clause barred Pennsylvania from imposing transfer tax on 
art in New York owned by the estate of a deceased Pennsylvania domiciliary). 
 116. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980) (invalidating effort by Min-
nesota to use the local presence of defendant’s automobile insurer as a basis 
for asserting civil jurisdiction over the defendant, who was an Indiana resi-
dent without Minnesota contacts); Hageseth v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 385, 388 (App. 2007) (holding that California had jurisdiction to prosecute 
defendant for practicing medicine without a license because he transmitted a 
drug prescription to a California resident via an international website, a Flor-
ida contractor, and a Mississippi pharmacy, even though he “was at all ma-
terial times located in Colorado and never directly communicated with anyone 
in California”). 
 117. See Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186, 195 (1900) (holding that a South 
Carolina court could not alter title to land in Connecticut). 
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actions,118 to regulate anticompetitive behavior in other 
states,119 and to punish extraterritorial conduct by local actors 
that was legal in the state where it occurred.120 Judicial efforts 
to distinguish appropriate reaching out from inappropriate 
overreaching have led to many of the vague and much-criticized 
horizontal federalism doctrines discussed in Parts III and IV.121 
The doctrinal instability illustrates the conceptual failure of the 
“spheres” model of federalism noted above. When fifty coequal 
sub-spheres share power provided in the aggregate to regulate 
activities that span physical boundaries, there is no simple way 
to define the powers of each while respecting the prerogatives 
of the others. 
  * * *   
The foregoing examples illustrate that interstate friction 
can arise from a range of behavior that transcends traditional 
categories for thinking about law and lawmaking. Friction can 
emanate from decisions by a state’s executive, legislative, or 
 
 118. See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 361 (1914) 
(holding that a Georgia court could enforce a right under an Alabama statute, 
even though the statute purported to limit enforcement to Alabama courts); cf. 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 70–71 (1909) (al-
lowing Texas court to ignore a New Mexico statute that required all common 
law suits for personal injuries sustained in New Mexico to be tried in New 
Mexico courts). New Mexico was a territory rather than a state at the time of 
Sowers, but the Court did not consider that difference material. See id. at 64–
66. 
 119. See Heath Consultants, Inc. v. Precision Instruments, Inc., 527 
N.W.2d 596, 606 (Neb. 1995) (“While there is no showing that any of the con-
duct about which [the claimant] complains occurred within the territorial lim-
its of this state, the record nonetheless inferentially establishes that the tying 
arrangement affected end users of [the defendant’s] equipment in Nebraska by 
denying them the advantage of parts sold in a freely competitive market.”). 
 120. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996) (reversing 
award of punitive damages that punished “lawful conduct in other states”); 
Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315, 321 (1909) (reversing a criminal conviction in 
Oregon of a Washington resident who fished on the Washington side of the Co-
lumbia River using a type of net permitted on the Washington side but prohi-
bited on the Oregon side); State v. Mueller, 171 N.W.2d 414, 415 (Wis. 1969) 
(permitting criminal prosecution in Wisconsin of a Wisconsin resident subject 
to a Wisconsin child-support order who violated a Wisconsin statute that re-
quired permission from a Wisconsin court before entering a marriage in Illi-
nois). 
 121. For an illuminating discussion of doctrine distinguishing overreaching 
from appropriate reaching, see Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Impor-
tance of Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973 (2002) (res-
ponding to Rosen, supra note 2); Rosen, supra note 61 (in part responding to 
Kreimer). 
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judicial branches, and such decisions can implicate civil, crimi-
nal, and administrative law. The ensuing disputes can involve 
a mix of private citizens, state instrumentalities, or states 
themselves, and can escalate into legal battles in adjudicative 
fora, rhetorical battles in political fora, or military battles in fo-
ra such as Gettysburg and Antietam. 
The diversity of potential threats to interstate harmony 
coupled with the problems of coequality and aggregate power 
suggest that no one constitutional clause or doctrine can coor-
dinate all aspects of horizontal federalism. The problem is too 
sprawling and too ingrained into the Constitution’s structure to 
permit a simple solution. The rest of the Article builds on that 
intuition by revealing (in Part III) horizontal federalism provi-
sions scattered throughout the Constitution’s text, and explain-
ing (in Part IV) how discordant doctrinal strands share com-
mon purposes and methods. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL METHODS FOR ADDRESSING 
INTERSTATE FRICTION   
The Constitution still flourishes 220 years after its adop-
tion, which suggests that it contains features that mitigate the 
risk of interstate conflict and friction—albeit imperfectly, as 
the Civil War attests. This Part will explore those features, 
demonstrating how seemingly unrelated constitutional provi-
sions comprise a system for regulating horizontal federalism. 
Part IV then builds on this observation to propose a model for 
thinking about horizontal federalism that can rationalize and 
reshape jurisprudence that is chronically undertheorized and 
unstable. 
The analytical approach in this Part mirrors the approach 
in Part II by considering ostensibly distinct phenomena from 
the perspective of horizontal federalism in order to expose hid-
den connections. The effect is akin to viewing a landscape 
through tinted lenses: distorting the spectrum illuminates pat-
terns that might otherwise blend into the background. Part II 
analyzed categories of behavior that could generate interstate 
friction, while this Part analyzes categories of methods for cop-
ing with such friction. These inquiries demonstrate the rich va-
riety of problems that threaten horizontal federalism, the rich 
variety of solutions that the Constitution provides, and the po-
tential for thinking about these solutions as part of an inte-
grated field of law permeating the Constitution’s text rather 
than as distinct silos of doctrine. 
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Proposing a thematic outline of the Constitution from the 
perspective of horizontal federalism is a different enterprise 
than interpreting each subsidiary clause. Definitive conclusions 
about so many distinct aspects of the Constitution would re-
quire more comprehensive analysis than one article can pro-
vide. Rather, this Part is a first pass over the fragmented land-
scape of horizontal federalism. The methodology is designed to 
demonstrate that mapping the terrain is not only possible, but 
rewarding. The point is not to provide an originalist explana-
tion of what the founding generation understood the Constitu-
tion to mean, a textualist account of what the Constitution 
must mean, or a normative assessment of what the Constitu-
tion should mean. The goal instead is to offer a plausible ac-
count of values and methods that the Constitution could be 
deemed to support if read systemically from the perspective of 
horizontal federalism, and to suggest how that perspective 
enables a fresh reassessment of doctrines that clearly need im-
provement.122 This structural analysis lays a foundation for 
further scholarship incorporating originalist, textualist, or 
normative methods in the context of specific fact patterns and 
doctrines.123 
 
 122. Positing an underlying coherence to the Constitution’s treatment of 
horizontal federalism does not suggest a specific intent or plan. To the con-
trary, the relevant constitutional law contains three sets of layers that could 
not possibly be part of a single grand design: (1) original text that reflects 
compromises between competing visions of federalism; (2) multiple amend-
ments that altered the balance of state and federal power (notably the Tenth, 
Eleventh, and Fourteenth); and (3) a gloss of evolving normative commitments 
and textual understandings that generations of interpreters have imposed. 
Coherence thus emerges from an iterative process, much as renovations and 
additions to a home over decades can both preserve and alter its character. Cf. 
Walter Dean Burnham, Constitutional Moments and Punctuated Equilibria: A 
Political Scientist Confronts Bruce Ackerman’s We The People, 108 YALE L.J. 
2237, 2249 (1999) (discussing efforts to model the “dialectics of continuity and 
change in our constitutional order”). 
 123. Analyzing the Constitution’s structure to find clues about its meaning 
is an established interpretive method and is especially common in the related 
context of vertical federalism. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
918 (1997) (“We turn next to consideration of the structure of the Constitution, 
to see if we can discern among its ‘essential postulate[s],’ a principle that con-
trols the present cases.” (citation omitted)); Vicki C. Jackson, Cook v. Gralike: 
Easy Cases and Structural Reasoning, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 299, 299 (noting 
that in “cases involving questions of federalism” the Supreme Court has relied 
on “basic principles it believes immanent in the structure of the United States 
as a federal union”); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
747, 795 (1999) (observing that many methods of constitutional interpretation, 
including some forms of historical, doctrinal, and textual analysis, “aspire to 
holism”). The technique has limits, of course, because prescriptive inferences 
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Examining the Constitution for evidence of how it ad-
dresses potential interstate friction reveals five distinct me-
thods spanning numerous textual provisions. Each could merit 
an entire article. My goal, however, is not to analyze each me-
thod comprehensively, but rather to make the broader point 
that distinct methods exist, whatever their precise contours 
might be. The existence of these methods suggests the possibili-
ty for a more coherent approach to horizontal federalism doc-
trine, as discussed in Part IV. 
A. CODEPENDENCE AND DISABLEMENT 
The structural counterpart to interstate coequality is inter-
state codependence. The equal status of states frustrates efforts 
to resolve disputes between them, but the dependence of states 
on each other—and on national institutions that are fruits of 
their cooperation—creates incentives for conciliation and re-
moves or disables instruments of potential conflict escalation. 
For example, states cannot print money to finance self-
aggrandizement,124 must share with the federal government 
control over militias that might threaten neighbors,125 rely on 
 
from structure “can radiate . . . in a number of ideological directions, depend-
ing on who is doing the inferring,” Vince Blasi, Creativity and Legitimacy in 
Constitutional Law, 80 YALE L.J. 176, 183 (1970), and the passage of time al-
ters the significance of past structural commitments, see Lawrence Lessig, 
Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1801 (1997) (discussing “meaning’s vulnerability to 
changes in context.”). A complete normative account of horizontal federalism 
therefore requires more than merely weaving together disparate strands of 
constitutional text to reveal a broader structure. The analysis here is thus the 
first rather than only step in reaching a conclusion about the Constitution’s 
meaning. 
 124. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. States can raise money through taxation 
and borrowing, but historically the ability to print money enabled states to 
finance militarization that the tax base and debt markets could not sustain, 
and states’ subsequent refusal to honor that money was a source of “violent 
opposition” from creditors. JENSEN, supra note 55, at 303 (discussing Confede-
ration-era repudiation of revolutionary war debts); see also THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 44 (James Madison), supra note 35, at 282 (justifying federal power over 
currency in part by expressing fear of “animosities . . . among the states” aris-
ing from states’ manipulation of exchange values). 
 125. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Daniel H. Deudney, The Philadelphia Sys-
tem: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-
Union Circa 1787-1861, 49 INT’L ORG. 191, 201 (1995) (“Unrestrained by the 
Union, state militias were perceived to be an instrument of potential inter-
state conflict, but within the Union they could play a vital role of counterba-
lancing power centralized in the union government . . . .”). Many Convention 
delegates held senior positions in the Continental Army during the Revolution 
and had become frustrated by unreliable state militias, which may in part ex-
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jointly-supplied national military forces for protection,126 have 
no formal apparatus for conducting foreign relations,127 and 
have only a limited ability to regulate regional trade.128 Each 
must also at least partially subordinate its own preferences and 
parochial interests to the greater interest of interstate harmony 
by respecting other states’ laws and not discriminating against 
other states’ citizens.129 States in the federal system are thus 
 
plain why the Constitution provides for federal oversight and coordination. See 
RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE CREATION 
OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783-1802, at 9–13, 77 (1975) 
(discussing military experience of leading federalists). 
 126. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 127. The national government appoints and receives ambassadors, id. art. 
II, §§ 2–3, negotiates and approves treaties, id. art. II, § 2, declares war and 
issues letters of marque and reprisal, id. art. I, § 8, regulates foreign com-
merce, id., enforces international law, id., and battles pirates, id. The federali-
zation of foreign affairs enables the nation to speak with a single voice on the 
international stage and avoids the interstate friction that might arise if indi-
vidual states could align themselves with competing sides in a foreign conflict. 
See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575 (1840) (plurality opinion) 
(“It was one of the main objects of the Constitution to make us, so far as re-
garded our foreign relations, one people, and one nation . . . .”); id. at 578 (not-
ing “mischief” that might arise if states had discretion to provide different le-
vels of comity to competing foreign countries seeking extradition of fugitives). 
However, state and local governments still have some capacity to roil interna-
tional waters by, for example, refusing to enforce foreign judgments, incorpo-
rating foreign legal norms into local law, or exporting legal innovations 
abroad. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895) (holding that the Consti-
tution permits states to refuse to enforce foreign judgments); Resnik, supra 
note 36, at 1626 (discussing “state courts as ports of entry for transnational 
rights” and “the intake of transnational rights through city councils, state leg-
islatures, mayors, and national organizations of local officials”). 
 128. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 
2 (Imposts and Duties Clause); id. (Duty of Tonnage Clause). Conceptualizing 
the Commerce Clause as an aspect of constitutional restraints on state power 
rather than solely as a grant of federal power suggests that horizontal federal-
ism principles may in part justify the seemingly atextual Dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine that some observers view as merely “an unjustified judicial 
invention.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 129. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1–2 (Full Faith and Credit and Privileges 
and Immunities Clauses); Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: 
Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2511 (1999) (“Full Faith and 
Credit determines when parties must be accorded the rights granted by for-
eign law; Privileges and Immunities when they must be accorded rights 
granted by forum law.”). Both clauses were designed to avoid friction that 
might arise from local favoritism and to “fuse into one Nation a collection of 
independent, sovereign States.” Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948). 
States also may have reciprocally obligated themselves to maintain an unspe-
cified level of internal tranquility and republican virtue. See U.S. CONST. art. 
IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Re-
publican Form of Government . . . .”); Metzger, supra note 2, at 1498 (treating 
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economically, militarily, and politically hobbled compared to 
traditional nation-states. This incapacity denies states conve-
nient means to escalate disputes and creates incentives to coo-
perate in order to continue receiving the protection and stabili-
ty that union provides.130 
The extensive codependence between states is a defining 
feature of the Constitution and was far from inevitable. Al-
though some sacrifice of independence is inherent in any coop-
erative enterprise, it is easy to imagine an alliance of states 
that preserves far more power for each to create mischief. A 
stark example was the Confederation that preceded the Union, 
in which states harboring mutual “animosities and enmities”131 
asserted their independence by retaining their own monetary 
systems, erecting barriers to regional trade, and controlling 
their own militias.132 Supporters of the Constitution apparently 
viewed the Confederation as inadequate in part because state 
independence was too intoxicating, leading states to pursue 
their own self-interest to the point of creating systemic friction 
that left them collectively worse off.133 The Constitution’s fra-
 
the Guarantee Clause as relevant to “interstate relations”). 
 130. From a game theory perspective, pursuing codependence was a sensi-
ble strategy for states if they lacked mutual trust and feared that unilateral 
attempts at comity would leave them vulnerable to defection by other states. 
Mutual disablement from independent action inhibited defection and thus sent 
a credible signal of states’ commitment to cooperation. Cf. Thomas C. Schel-
ling, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 22 (1960) (noting potential value in bargain-
ing of a party’s “voluntary but irreversible sacrifice of freedom of choice”). 
 131. MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRE-
TATION OF THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 1774-1781, at 117 (1940). 
 132. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, Vices of the Political System of the United 
States, in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 345–49 (Robert A. Rutland et al. 
eds., 1975) (discussing “Trespasses of the States on the Rights of Each Other,” 
including protectionist tariffs, as one of several justifications for a Constitu-
tional Convention); KOHN, supra note 125, at 77 (noting that the framers be-
lieved that federal control over state militias was necessary to “prevent a state 
from evading or checkmating the national will”); MATSON & ONUF, supra note 
45, at 72–73 (noting interstate disputes over regional trade); Brannon P. Den-
ning, Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce and the 
Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37, 60–66 
(2005) (collecting examples of protectionist tariffs). 
 133. See MATSON & ONUF, supra note 45, at 50 (“In pursuit of their inter-
ests, the states appeared willing to jeopardize the common cause and subvert 
the Union . . . [through] hostile competition for relative advantage . . . .”); su-
pra text accompanying notes 53–56. An alternative possibility is that the 
states and a significant number of their citizens were reasonably satisfied 
with the Confederate-era level of comity, and that the contrary perception was 
a myth orchestrated by a loose collection of groups—such as holders of state 
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mers and ratifiers responded by lashing states to the mast of 
Union and codependence. Today we take for granted that they 
did so, but the fact that they did reveals a foundational consti-
tutional method for coping with interstate friction.134 
B. COOPERATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
A second set of constitutional provisions prevents or miti-
gates interstate friction by creating institutions and procedures 
to facilitate peaceful resolution of disputes. These provisions 
demonstrate the framers’ awareness that while conflict be-
tween diverse coequal states is inevitable, escalation of such 
conflict is avoidable. 
The Constitution uses two distinct mechanisms to prevent 
interstate sparks from flaring into fires. First, the “interstate 
negotiation clauses”—my term for the Compacts and State 
Treaty Clauses in Article I, Section 10—enable peaceful settle-
ment of disputes while minimizing the chance that settlement 
terms will create further conflicts. Second, the “interstate ju-
risdiction clauses”—my term for a cluster of clauses in Article 
III—provide a neutral forum for disputes implicating state in-
terests that might otherwise fester or terminate in ways that 
incite further controversy. The combined effect of these clauses 
is to contain interstate conflicts before they metastasize beyond 
control. 
1. Interstate Negotiation Clauses 
The interstate negotiation clauses stabilize horizontal fe-
deralism in three distinct ways: by permitting some interstate 
 
debt, manufacturers, and merchants—interested in creating a national econ-
omy. See JENSEN, supra note 55, at 344–45. Whatever the precise mix of mo-
tives leading states to doubt the wisdom of continued independence, the fact 
remains that states eventually surrendered substantial autonomy. This sur-
render had the effect of making interstate conflicts more difficult to instigate 
and escalate. 
 134. Another example of an alliance that creates a federal system while 
preserving substantial member independence is the European Union. Like the 
U.S., the E.U. has legislative bodies, executive agencies, and its own courts, 
and the federal-level governments in each wield substantial power over re-
gional commerce. Many E.U. members also share a common currency and con-
tribute to a supranational military force (under the aegis of NATO rather than 
the E.U.). Yet the national members of the E.U. retain far more attributes of 
sovereignty than the state members of the U.S., including their own national 
militaries and foreign ministries, and have a far greater potential to antagon-
ize each other than do U.S. states. For a general discussion of the E.U.’s struc-
ture, see CLIVE ARCHER, THE EUROPEAN UNION 33–58, 73–79, 119–28 (2008).  
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agreements, forbidding others, and reserving a supervising role 
for Congress. First, the Compact Clause permits states to re-
solve their differences by “Agreement or Compact,” subject to 
congressional approval.135 The importance of enabling nego-
tiated agreements is evident from the range of potentially vola-
tile disputes that compacts have resolved, including disagree-
ments about the location of state borders, disposition of scarce 
natural resources, allocation of tax revenues, and regulation of 
regional transportation and economic activity.136 Second, the 
State Treaty Clause prohibits any “Treaty, Alliance, or Confe-
deration” between states.137 The precise meaning of this clause 
has been “lost” to time because the semantic distinction be-
tween a permissible “compact” or “agreement” and an imper-
missible “treaty” or “confederation” has no modern reson-
ance.138 Whatever its exact meaning, the clause’s rationale 
seems to be that some types of formal commitments between 
states to aggregate their power are intolerable because they 
pose a severe threat to state equality (as well as federal supre-
macy).139 The wisdom of the clause becomes apparent if one im-
agines the instability that would have arisen before 1860 if the 
Constitution permitted—or forced Congress into the position of 
rejecting—a “Confederation of Southern States” or “Alliance of 
Free States” that might have hastened a civil war.140 Finally, 
 
 135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 136. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: 
The Problem of Permanency, 49 FLA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 nn.14–18 (1997). Compacts 
might also promote interstate harmony in a second way, by creating institu-
tions (such as administrative agencies) that enable prolonged interstate coop-
eration. However, there is no reliable evidence establishing whether the con-
flicts that prolonged cooperation avoids are more or less significant than the 
conflicts that prolonged interaction incites. 
 137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 138. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 461–62 
(1978) (“[T]he Framers used the words ‘treaty,’ ‘compact,’ and ‘agreement’ as 
terms of art, for which no explanation was required and with which we are un-
familiar.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 460–64 (discussing origins and 
early interpretations of the State Treaty Clause). The often useful Federalist 
Papers are frustratingly unhelpful here, asserting that the State Treaty 
Clause serves “reasons which need no explanation.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 
(James Madison), supra note 35, at 281. 
 139. The clause also bars treaties, alliances, and confederations between 
states and foreign nations. Such arrangements could threaten federal supre-
macy in the field of foreign relations and cause interstate friction if states 
joined with competing sides in a foreign conflict. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 35, at 65 (warning that states might become 
“entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars”). 
 140. Of course, the Confederacy eventually formed despite Article I’s prohi-
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the requirement that Congress approve interstate compacts 
helps ensure that states do not use the right to negotiate as an 
opportunity to externalize costs on non-negotiating states or to 
form cartels that would undermine interstate relations. 
My contention that Congress’s role in approving interstate 
compacts is an aspect of horizontal federalism calls into ques-
tion modern Supreme Court doctrine and helps uncover a lost 
strand of Compact Clause jurisprudence. The prevailing inter-
pretation of the Compact Clause presumes that negotiated ar-
rangements between states constitute “Agreements or Com-
pacts” requiring congressional approval only when the 
agreements potentially destabilize vertical federalism.141 This 
interpretation posits that congressional intervention is neces-
sary solely to ensure a “proper balance between federal and 
state power” that respects “federal supremacy.”142 However, a 
fresh look at the Constitution’s structure from the perspective 
of horizontal federalism illuminates an alternative (and com-
plementary) role for Congress in mitigating interstate friction. 
Scholars who have studied specific compacts have noted a ten-
dency of negotiating states to externalize harms on outsider 
states and “exploit” the leverage over other states that joint ac-
tion creates.143 The Supreme Court likewise recognized as early 
 
bition, illustrating that structural restraints on state action can go only so far 
in the face of intense state opposition. 
 141. One might reasonably wonder why congressional approval is not re-
quired for all negotiated arrangements between states given the seemingly 
broad reach of “Agreement” in Article I, Section 10. However, the Supreme 
Court has disclaimed a literal reading of “Agreement” to avoid crippling rou-
tine interstate interactions. See U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 459 (“the Clause 
could not be read literally”); id. at 469 (“[N]ot all agreements between States 
are subject to the strictures of the Compact Clause.”). 
 142. Id. at 460, 471; see also Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. 
Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175–76 (1985); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 
363, 369–70 (1976); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518 (1893) (noting 
possibility that compacts might “tend to increase and build up the political in-
fluence of the contracting states, so as to encroach upon or impair the supre-
macy of the United States”). The U.S. Steel Corp. Court concluded that a chal-
lenged compact did not require congressional approval because it did not 
undermine federal supremacy. See 434 U.S. at 472–77. The Court also consi-
dered the factual possibility that the compact “impair[ed] the sovereign rights 
of nonmember States,” but rejected that assertion and thus never considered 
whether, if true, a threat to nonmember states would require congressional 
approval. Id. at 477. 
 143. Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 
MO. L. REV. 285, 293 (2003); see also Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, 
The Compact Clause of the Constitution: A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 
YALE L.J. 685, 695 (1925) (stating that compacts affect “interests of states oth-
er than those parties to the agreement”). These observations are subjective 
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as 1838 that states might use compacts not only to undermine 
the federal government, but also to impose costs on other states 
excluded from the agreement.144 By 1854, the Court went so far 
as to state in dicta that the Compact Clause “is obviously in-
tended to guard the rights and interests of the other States, 
and to prevent any compact or agreement between any two 
States, which might affect injuriously the interest of the oth-
ers.”145 But by 1893, concerns about horizontal federalism had 
yielded to a postbellum emphasis on federal supremacy, with-
out any explanation of why interstate friction was no longer re-
levant.146 A holistic approach to horizontal federalism suggests 
that the Supreme Court’s pre-1893 insights provide a more ap-
propriately nuanced account of the national interests at stake 
in compact formulation, and that modern doctrine focused on 
federal supremacy is needlessly myopic. 
2. Interstate Jurisdiction Clauses 
When negotiation fails to resolve an interstate dispute, ad-
judication is often preferable to allowing the conflict to simmer 
or escalate beyond mere rhetoric. However, adjudication could 
do more harm than good if the parties perceive the forum as bi-
ased or illegitimate, such that its judgments go unenforced or 
incite further animosity and discord. The Constitution ad-
dresses this problem by authorizing federal courts to hear cases 
implicating horizontal federalism concerns, in the apparent be-
lief that an order from a federal court is more likely to preserve 
interstate harmony than an order from a court in a state with 
an interest in the dispute’s outcome. 
Adopting a horizontal perspective can add a new dimension 
to recurring debates about the proper scope of federal judicial 
power. Five of the nine heads of jurisdiction in Article III can 
be understood as part of the constitutional structure of horizon-
tal federalism: the State Controversies Clause, the Diversity 
 
because there is no aggregate empirical data about the horizontal effects of 
compacts. 
 144. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 726 (1838) 
(stating that congressional review prevents “derangement” of “federal rela-
tions with the other states of the Union, and the federal government”). 
 145. Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 494 (1854). The two dissen-
ters in U.S. Steel Corp. reached a similar conclusion. See 434 U.S. at 494 
(White, J., dissenting) (“[E]ncroachments upon non-compact States are as se-
riously to be guarded against as encroachments upon the federal authori-
ty. . . .”). 
 146. See Virginia, 148 U.S. at 518. 
 538 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:493 
 
Clause, the Land Grants Clause, the Admiralty Clause, and the 
Out-of-State Citizen Clause.147 These jurisdictional grants are 
also an aspect of vertical federalism because they define the 
scope of federal authority broadly at the expense of state au-
thority, but the horizontal consequences of such vertical expan-
sion can help determine whether the expansion is justified. 
The clause authorizing federal jurisdiction over “Contro-
versies between two or more States”148 promotes horizontal fe-
deralism in at least three ways.149 First, federal jurisdiction has 
a peace-keeping effect, especially if one assumes that an inter-
state dispute that resists political resolution is probably suffi-
ciently sensitive to generate friction and the risk of escala-
tion.150 The Supreme Court has thus long understood its 
jurisdictional role as arising from “universal conviction of its 
necessity, in order to preserve harmony among the confede-
rated states.”151 Second, the clause arguably enables states to 
 
 147. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Early precursors to Article III discussed at 
the Constitutional Convention were more explicit in linking jurisdiction to ho-
rizontal and vertical stability by granting federal courts power over “questions 
which may involve the national peace and harmony.” 1 Farrand, supra note 
40, at 22 (text of the Virginia Plan); see also id. at 238 (statement by Edmund 
Randolph emphasizing “the difficulty in establishing the powers of the judi-
ciary” and the need “to preserve the harmony of states and that of the citizens 
thereof”); 2 id. at 39 (reporting unanimous approval of resolution stating 
“[t]hat the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases arising 
under laws passed by the general Legislature, and to such other questions as 
involve the National peace and harmony”). 
 148. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Constitution authorizes original ju-
risdiction in the Supreme Court, id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, and Congress has made 
the Court’s jurisdiction exclusive, see 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). 
 149. The Clause also can be considered an aspect of vertical federalism that 
ensures state compliance with federal obligations. See James E. Pfander, Re-
thinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 
CAL. L. REV. 555 (1994) (arguing that original jurisdiction in state-party cases 
was intended to circumvent practical limits on judicial enforcement of federal 
rights caused by state immunity doctrines and the possibility that inferior fed-
eral tribunals would not be available). 
 150. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 35, at 
477 (noting that jurisdiction would address “bickering and animosities” be-
tween states). The sensitivity of a horizontal dispute can create vertical ten-
sion when the federal government leaps into it, which may partially explain 
why the Supreme Court is cautious about using its equitable powers. See Con-
necticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669 (1931) (“[T]his Court will not ex-
ert its extraordinary power to control the conduct of one State at the suit of 
another, unless the threatened invasion of rights is of serious magnitude and 
established by clear and convincing evidence.”). 
 151. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 728 (1838); see 
also Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907) (noting that jurisdiction is an 
alternative to use of “force” by states). The risk of friction and need for neutral 
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file federal parens patriae actions against other states on be-
half of their citizens, which can extinguish sources of friction by 
remedying private injuries and consolidating burdensome pri-
vate litigation that might otherwise be a lingering source of in-
terstate tension.152 The Supreme Court has vacillated about 
whether states have standing to file such actions.153 However, 
the Court has not expressly considered the standing question in 
the broader context of horizontal federalism discussed here, 
which might add another dimension of support. Finally, federal 
jurisdiction complements the Compact Clause, and is thus part 
of a broader structural web regulating horizontal federalism, 
because the existence of a forum for adjudicating interstate 
disputes creates the prospect of definitive resolution and thus 
an incentive to negotiate in its shadow.154 
Analyzing the Diversity Clause, which authorizes federal 
jurisdiction over controversies “between citizens of different 
states,”155 as an aspect of horizontal federalism offers a novel 
perspective on perennial debates about the clause’s utility. 
Commentators generally view diversity jurisdiction through a 
vertical federalism prism. They defend the clause, if at all, on 
the ground that it promotes federal interests by protecting out-
 
resolution was especially acute in border disputes, which accounted for all six 
of the cases that arose under the interstate dispute resolution mechanism in 
the Articles of Confederation. The Court recognized the importance of “peace-
ful procedure” in such disputes to prevent “prolonged and harassing conflicts.” 
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 504 (1893); see also ARTICLES OF CONFE-
DERATION art. IX, § 2 (“[Congress] shall also be the last resort on appeal in all 
disputes and differences . . . between two or more states concerning boundary, 
jurisdiction or any other cause whatever . . . .”); Robert Granville Caldwell, 
The Settlement of Inter-State Disputes, 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 53–54 (1920) (dis-
cussing border disputes under Article IX); cf. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 
574, 580 (1922) (noting possibility of “armed conflicts” between state militias 
over a border region rich in natural resources). 
 152. Of course, the parens patriae suit could itself create friction, which 
may explain why the Constitution also enables individuals to enforce some 
structural rights without state assistance. See infra Part III.D. 
 153. Compare Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 666 (1976) (state 
lacks standing to aggregate “collectivity of private suits” against allegedly dis-
criminatory taxes), and Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 22 (1900) (“[I]n order 
that a controversy between States, justiciable in this court, can be held to ex-
ist, something more must be put forward than that the citizens of one State 
are injured by the maladministration of the laws of another.”), with Missouri 
v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (standing exists to protect “health and 
comfort” of citizens), and Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 739 (1981) 
(standing exists to prevent “substantial economic injury”). 
 154. See Rhode Island, 37 U.S. at 726 (observing that the “resort to judicial 
power” may “persuad[e]” states to enter compacts). 
 155. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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of-state citizens (who are also U.S. citizens entitled to vertical 
protection)156 from local bias, facilitating the orderly function-
ing of national markets that might otherwise suffer interfe-
rence from parochial state courts, easing collection of interstate 
debts, and creating a mechanism for sharing ideas and best 
practices between state and federal judicial systems.157 Yet 
concurrent federal jurisdiction over private interstate disputes 
serves an additional goal of promoting horizontal stability 
when the dispute implicates state interests, such that a neutral 
forum mitigates interstate friction during the litigation and in 
efforts to enforce the judgment.158 The prospect of private di-
versity suits entangling state actors or provoking intense state 
reactions may seem remote today. But the concern was more 
pressing in the Founding era, when some diversity actions in-
volved claims by out-of-state residents against state officers en-
forcing state law,159 or addressed matters that were sufficiently 
significant to excite state interest.160 Even today, commercial 
 
 156. See id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 157. For discussion of the competing positions and arguments, see RI-
CHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1454–56, 1498–
503 (5th ed. 2003); see also Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: 
The Jury and the Historical Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 997, 1003 (2007) (contending that federalization of interstate litigation 
may have occurred in part due to hostility toward “unrestrained democracy” 
evident in the behavior of state juries). 
 158. The fact that diversity jurisdiction is concurrent rather than exclusive 
limits its effectiveness as a tool for managing interstate friction because litiga-
tion decisions by the parties about where to file and whether to remove can 
allow tension to fester in state court. However, if a case is sufficiently impor-
tant to generate substantial interstate friction, at least one of the parties will 
likely have an incentive to escape from the courts of an interested state by fil-
ing an original action in federal court or filing a notice of removal. That incen-
tive helps to preserve the diversity statute’s role in mitigating interstate fric-
tion, but raises a different problem—the removal statute might not allow 
removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000) (barring removal in diversity actions if 
a defendant is a citizen of the forum state). Any future reexamination of diver-
sity jurisdiction from a horizontal federalism perspective must therefore reex-
amine removal as well. 
 159. See Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the 
Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263 (2000) (dis-
cussing diversity suits involving interpretation of state constitutions); Ann 
Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Reme-
dies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 91–99 (1997) (discussing diversity suits against state 
officers). 
 160. See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 557 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 
1836) (reporting John Marshall’s statement at the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion that “refusal of justice” by state courts to out-of-state residents in private 
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disputes involving nationwide conduct can implicate sensitive 
and conflicting regulatory interests of multiple states. These 
conflicting interests may partially explain Congress’s recent 
decision to expand the scope of diversity jurisdiction in class ac-
tions.161 The contribution of diversity jurisdiction to horizontal 
stability may or may not be worth the burdens that diversity 
cases impose on federal courts and the costs of denying state 
courts an opportunity to adjudicate private disputes.162 Never-
theless, analyzing diversity jurisdiction from a horizontal ra-
ther than a vertical federalism perspective provides additional 
grist for discussion about the proper scope of federal judicial 
power. 
Three other provisions of Article III can also be understood 
as part of the constitutional structure of horizontal federalism. 
First, the clause granting federal jurisdiction over controversies 
“between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under 
Grants of different States”163 was an important aspect of inter-
state conflict-avoidance because these ostensibly private dis-
putes could lead to formal judicial determinations of state bor-
ders.164 An “impartial tribunal” was essential in such cases 
because “a state tribunal might not stand indifferent in a con-
troversy where the claims of its own sovereign were in conflict 
with those of another sovereign.”165 
 
suits could lead to “disputes between the states.”); 2 Farrand, supra note 40, at 
147 (reprinting an early draft of the Constitution that included the Diversity 
Clause as a subset of a section granting jurisdiction over “such other cases, as 
the national legislature may assign, involving the national peace and harmo-
ny”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 35, at 477 
(noting that the Diversity Clause was one of several that were “essential to the 
peace of the Union”). 
 161. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, §§ 4–5, 119 
Stat. 4, 9–13 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Issacharoff & Shar-
key, supra note 2, at 1416 (contending that expansion of federal jurisdiction 
reflected concern about “opportunistic state-court oversight of the national 
market”). 
 162. See sources cited supra note 157. 
 163. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Congress vested this jurisdiction in the 
first Judiciary Act. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1354 (2000)). 
 164. See Moore v. McGuire, 205 U.S. 214 (1907) (determining boundary be-
tween Arkansas and Mississippi); St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U.S. 226 (1891) (de-
termining boundary between Illinois and Missouri); Handly’s Lessee v. Antho-
ny, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 374 (1820) (determining boundary between Ohio and 
Indiana). 
 165. Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 292, 322 (1815). 
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Second, admiralty jurisdiction, which is sensibly consi-
dered an aspect of vertical federalism,166 is also an aspect of ho-
rizontal federalism. Disputes that arise in boundary waters or 
navigable interstate waters can involve competing claims of so-
vereignty by different states or conflicting claims to property by 
owners or crews from different states. These disputes can have 
ripple effects on interstate relationships, and in fact were con-
tentious during the Founding era.167 A federal forum can thus 
serve the same conflict-avoidance role in admiralty cases as in 
diversity cases. 
Finally, the clause granting jurisdiction over suits “be-
tween a State and Citizens of another State”168 attempted to 
provide a federal forum to address potentially delicate matters 
that might generate friction—including “war and 
bloodshed”169—in the hands of state courts. However, the pros-
pect of successful federal litigation by out-of-state creditors 
seeking to collect Confederation-era debts from nearly insolvent 
states was so inimical to state interests that the Eleventh 
Amendment partially170 repealed this head of jurisdiction in 
 
 166. Admiralty law has several characteristics that trigger federal inter-
ests. It can apply in areas that are not clearly part of any state (such as boun-
dary and coastal waters), it implicates foreign relations and international law 
(for example, in prize cases), it governs a labor force that is inherently mobile, 
and it applies to a channel of interstate and international commerce. For a 
discussion of the Admiralty Clause’s origins, see Jonathan M. Gutoff, Original 
Understandings and the Private Law Origins of the Federal Admiralty Juris-
diction: A Reply to Professor Casto, 30 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 361 (1999). 
 167. For example, state admiralty courts during the Confederation era of-
ten ignored each other’s decrees, favored local vessels, and tolerated outright 
“plunder[ ]” of vessels from other states. Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: 
Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1429. 
 168. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1. 
 169. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 468 (1793) (Cushing, J.). 
 170. Jurisdiction still exists over suits by rather than against states, which 
allows adjudication to serve as an “alternative to force.” Georgia v. Tenn. Cop-
per Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (“When the States by their union made the 
forcible abatement of outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not there-
by agree to submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the pos-
sibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still remaining 
quasi-sovereign interests . . . .”). However, jurisdiction does not extend to an 
ill-defined set of regulatory enforcement efforts by states that the Supreme 
Court terms “penal” (in contrast to “civil”). Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 
U.S. 265, 289 (1888), overruled in part on other grounds by Milwaukee County 
v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). This jurisdictional gap can undermine 
interstate harmony by allowing out-of-state residents to violate local regula-
tions, default on judgments obligating them to pay fines for such violations, 
and then claim jurisdictional immunity from actions in federal court seeking 
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1795.171 Critiques of the Eleventh Amendment and of the line 
of precedent expanding state immunity from diversity cases to 
federal question cases172 typically frame the problem as an as-
pect of vertical federalism: immunity carves an area of state 
autonomy from federal oversight and thus shields states from 
being held accountable under federal law.173 But viewing the 
Eleventh Amendment and its doctrinal progeny from the pers-
pective of horizontal federalism reveals an additional cost: they 
relegate potentially volatile cases to state courts that might ex-
acerbate interstate friction,174 contrary to five provisions of Ar-
ticle III that attempt to federalize such disputes.175 
 
to enforce the judgments. See id. at 299–300 (finding lack of original jurisdic-
tion in suit by Wisconsin seeking to enforce a fine against a Louisiana insurer 
that had ignored Wisconsin statutes governing conduct of insurance business 
in Wisconsin). A state harboring the defaulting entity could open its courts to 
collection efforts as a matter of comity, but the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
does not compel the state to provide a forum. See id. at 291–92; cf. Milwaukee 
County, 296 U.S. at 279 (“We intimate no opinion whether a suit upon a judg-
ment for an obligation created by a penal law, in the international sense . . . is 
within the jurisdiction of the federal District Courts, or whether full faith and 
credit must be given to such a judgment even though a suit for the penalty be-
fore reduced to judgment could not be maintained outside of the state where 
imposed.”). 
 171. See Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275, 276 n.1 (1959) 
(noting that opposition to federal jurisdiction framed in the rhetoric of state 
sovereignty cloaked a desire to avoid suits on defaulted debts); James E. 
Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Ele-
venth Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1324–28 (1998) (contending that 
states feared being forced to pay debts that: (1) predated the Constitution; (2) 
were denominated in depreciated currency but potentially payable in more 
valuable specie; (3) were not judicially enforceable at the time incurred; and 
(4) fell outside the post-constitutional system for federal assumption of states’ 
Revolutionary War obligations). A similarly aggressive attempt by states to 
avoid honoring bonds financing the Civil War provoked further expansion of 
states’ immunity from suit at the end of Reconstruction. See JOHN V. ORTH, 
THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 58–89 (1987). 
 172. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890). 
 173. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 1, at 1484–92. 
 174. States can exacerbate potential friction by immunizing themselves in 
their own courts from at least some federal claims, see Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 711–13 (1999), but may still be amenable to suit in the courts of oth-
er states, see Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426–27 (1979). 
 175. Adopting a horizontal federalism perspective also helps deflate the 
Supreme Court’s theory that “[t]he preeminent purpose of state sovereign im-
munity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as 
sovereign entities.” Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 
760 (2002). This Article’s structural analysis of the Constitution illustrates the 
framers’ deep unease about the potential of states to act mischievously, and 
the framers’ systemic effort to cabin state discretion and hobble state authori-
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C. FIRST-IN-TIME RULES 
Another constitutional method for mitigating interstate 
friction is the creation of first-in-time rules for determining 
which of two competing states should receive deference in par-
ticular situations. The rules apply in similar circumstances: 
two states assert an entitlement to exercise power over the 
same person or matter, the claimed entitlements are mutually 
exclusive, the conflict should not be allowed to fester, and so 
the Constitution provides that prior entitlements trump subse-
quent claims. This approach is remarkably pragmatic from a 
conflict-avoidance perspective when compared to alternative 
methods. A second-in-time rule would cause friction by encour-
aging entities to seek haven in other states from undesired lo-
cal regulation, while an approach that assessed the merits or 
relative intensity of each state’s claim would likely prolong dis-
pute resolution, stoke passions, and lead to lingering resent-
ment in the losing state. 
First-in-time rules are evident in three constitutional pro-
visions. First, the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states 
to enforce final judgments rendered in other states, subject to 
narrow exceptions allowing the enforcing state to apply its own 
law of remedies,176 or to challenge the rendering state’s juris-
diction over the parties or subject.177 This rule can create fric-
 
ty in matters that transcended state borders. Thus, even if one believes that 
some state independence from federal oversight is desirable, the Supreme 
Court’s effort to cloak a constitutional structure of distrust and disablement of 
states with a majestic mantel of state dignity rings hollow. For a broader criti-
que of the dignity theory, see Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding In-
sult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003). 
 176. See Anglo-Am. Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373, 
373–74 (1903) (holding that a state need not provide a remedy in an enforce-
ment action between nonresidents); M’Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 
327–28 (1839) (holding that a state can apply its own statute of limitations to 
bar enforcement of foreign judgments). 
 177. Collateral attacks on jurisdiction are appropriate only when the ob-
jecting party did not have an opportunity to “fully and fairly” litigate the chal-
lenge in the rendering court. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963); see also 
Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. 
Ass’n, 455 U.S. 691, 710 (1982) (“A party cannot escape the requirements of 
full faith and credit and res judicata by asserting its own failure to raise mat-
ters clearly within the scope of a prior proceeding.”). This limit on collateral 
attacks attempts to balance the inconsistent goals of limiting state power and 
ensuring finality of judgments. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
§ 12 cmts. a–d (1982) (discussing competing concerns). An exception (of unde-
termined breadth) to this rule allows collateral attacks on state judgments 
that violate a federal statute stripping subject-matter jurisdiction from state 
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tion if the basis for the rendering state’s decision is inconsistent 
with the preferences of the enforcing state, but can be unders-
tood as part of a structural choice in the Constitution to favor a 
content-neutral preference rule over case-by-case review of 
each state’s competing interests.178 
Second, the Extradition Clause creates a first-in-time rule 
for obtaining custody over fugitives by prioritizing the interests 
of the state from which the fugitive fled,179 which in a temporal 
 
courts. See Kolb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438–39 (1940) (allowing collateral 
attack on a state judgment rendered on a subject within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of federal bankruptcy courts). Although Kolb’s limit on state overreaching 
invokes the rhetoric of vertical federalism, see id. at 439 (extolling “the su-
preme law of the land”), the opinion’s preference for federal bankruptcy adju-
dication also illustrates the concurrent operation of several methods for regu-
lating interstate friction, including: federal legislative power to preempt state 
law on matters of multistate concern, see supra Part III.E, federal judicial 
power to provide a neutral forum for resolving disputes implicating competing 
state interests, see supra Part III.B, and first-in-time rules that are strict, but 
not so strict that they invite excessive mischief by state courts seeking to ex-
pand their authority. 
 178. The first-in-time rule for enforcing foreign judgments can lead to 
awkward results when the second-in-time court fails to follow the rule and 
thus creates inconsistent judgments vying for supremacy. For example, im-
agine that A sues B in State 1 and wins, then B sues A in State 2 about the 
same matter, but the State 2 court refuses to give preclusive effect to the first-
in-time State 1 judgment and instead enters judgment for B. Further assume 
that A does everything possible in State 2 to pursue its preclusion defense, and 
then unsuccessfully petitions for review of the final State 2 judgment in the 
U.S. Supreme Court. If B then seeks to enforce the State 2 judgment in State 
3, the court in State 3 would face a dilemma: the State 2 judgment would be 
“wrong” because it violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause by not respecting 
the prior State 1 judgment, and yet the State 2 judgment would itself be a 
prior judgment (from the perspective of State 3) that should receive Full Faith 
and Credit regardless of its merit. The Supreme Court has traditionally ap-
plied a last-in-time rule to inconsistent judgments that might require State 3 
to enforce the State 2 judgment. See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 
66, 78 (1939). This rule would foster interstate friction by tolerating State 2’s 
disregard of State 1 (and making State 3 an accomplice), and would under-
mine finality by augmenting B’s incentive to file the State 2 action. A first-in-
time rule would also create friction and undermine finality by forcing State 3 
to undermine State 2 and encouraging A to relitigate its preclusion defense, 
but would at least make the best of a bad situation by penalizing—and per-
haps deterring, rather than rewarding—State 2’s denial of Full Faith and 
Credit to the State 1 judgment. For a similar critique of the last-in-time ap-
proach to inconsistent judgments in the context of the preceding hypothetical, 
see Ruth B. Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The 
Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 798, 831–32 
(1969). 
 179. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. The Clause applies only when a fugitive 
“was in fact within the demanding State when the alleged crime was commit-
ted.” Hyatt v. New York ex rel. Corkren, 188 U.S. 691, 719 (1903). 
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sense was the state with the first relevant contact.180 The 
clause is important only in cases where the asylum state does 
not want to deliver the fugitive—for example, because of the 
person’s connection to the asylum state, or a belief that what 
the fugitive did was not wrong or that rendition would be un-
fair. The clause thus reflects a policy-neutral preference rule 
for resolving interstate conflicts.181 A similar rule governs per-
sonal jurisdiction over “fugitives” in civil cases by allowing out-
of-state service of process against domiciliaries who temporari-
ly leave their home state.182 
Finally, the Fugitive Slave Clause adopted the first-in-time 
approach by requiring a person’s status as a slave in one state 
to follow that person into the territory of a free state, such that 
the person could be forcibly returned to bondage.183 The modern 
relevance of the clause is limited by its odious brutality, its re-
peal,184 and the position of slavery as a “peculiar institution” 
that operated beyond generally applicable constitutional and 
common law norms.185 The clause also sent mixed messages 
about horizontal federalism because even though it was de-
signed to forestall “perpetual strife between the different 
states” that would arise if the North were a haven for southern 
slaves,186 it did not achieve that goal. Implementing the clause 
 
 180. The asylum state might arguably have the first relevant contact if the 
fugitive resided there, departed to commit a crime in the demanding state, and 
then returned. However, the logical starting point for constitutional analysis 
seems to be the time of the crime both because that is the event that triggers 
“Jurisdiction” and because a factual inquiry into the defendant’s whereabouts 
before the crime seems needlessly tangential. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 2; cf. 
id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“Trial shall be held in the State where said Crimes shall 
have been committed”); id. amend. VI (requiring venue and vicinage for feder-
al criminal trials in the state where the crime was “committed”). 
 181. Decisions interpreting the Extradition Clause reject states’ efforts to 
invoke local public policy as an excuse for ignoring an otherwise applicable du-
ty of comity. See New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed, 524 U.S. 151, 154 (1998) 
(holding that duty to extradite trumped state constitutional provision protect-
ing fugitives’ right “‘of seeking and obtaining safety’” (citation omitted)). 
 182. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463–64 (1940). The defendant is 
not obligated to answer the summons, but would risk a default judgment that 
would then be enforceable under the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the new 
state of residence. See id. at 462. 
 183. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
 184. Id. amend. XIII. 
 185. See generally Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of the Peculiar Institu-
tion in American Legal Development, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1009 (1993) (re-
viewing literature about the contortion of U.S. law to accommodate slavery). 
 186. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 612 (1842); see also 
Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 18 (1852) (arguing that returning fugi-
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created volatile interstate friction that contributed to the Civil 
War.187 Nevertheless, the clause is worth noting because it con-
tinues a pattern found elsewhere in the Constitution of at-
tempting to contain the friction-inducing consequences of inter-
state mobility by prioritizing the state with the first relevant 
regulatory contacts.188 
D. INDIVIDUAL EMPOWERMENT 
A less obviously structural but nevertheless critical com-
ponent of horizontal federalism is the Constitution’s creation of 
individual rights tied to the multistate character of the Union 
and its empowerment of private citizens to enforce those rights 
in federal189 or state190 courts. A defining feature of these “hori-
 
tive slaves from the North to the South would prevent “border feuds” and 
“breaches of the peace, violent assaults, riots, and murder”). But cf. COVER, 
supra note 74, at 192 (noting that judicial rhetoric envisioning the Fugitive 
Slave Clause as essential to interstate harmony was in part “a reading of the 
problems of the present backward into history”). 
 187. Northern states and citizens resented having to return fugitives to 
bondage, and southern states and citizens resented the various artifices that 
northern courts adopted to avoid rendition. This simmering animosity periodi-
cally flared into skirmishes, and was part of the build-up to war. See THOMAS 
D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH, 
1780-1861 (1974); Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State 
Courts: Anti-Slavery Use of a Pro-Slavery Decision, 25 CIV. WAR HIST. 5, 22–35 
(1979). 
 188. The Fugitive Slave Clause differs from the other first-in-time clauses 
because it takes sides in a particular substantive dispute by favoring the in-
terests of slave states over free states. In contrast, the Extradition and Full 
Faith and Credit Clauses are relatively neutral on substantive questions be-
cause policies and principles underlying a state’s preferences will vary from 
case to case. This neutrality may in part explain why the latter two clauses 
still exist while the former was repealed, as a textual commitment to one side 
(especially a horrid one) of a heated interstate dispute cannot survive the dis-
favored side’s accumulation of sufficient supermajority power to invoke the 
Article V amendment process. 
 189. Enforcement in federal court is available under federal question juris-
diction, see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, which Congress vested (with some 
exceptions) at the appellate level in 1789 and at the original level in 1875. See 
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73; Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 132, § 1, 
18 Stat. 470. A federal forum was necessary because “[n]o man of sense” would 
expect states to “scrupulously” observe constraints on their power absent some 
means of federal enforcement. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), 
supra note 35, at 475. State immunity from suit in federal court complicates 
enforcement when state actors are necessary parties to an action enforcing 
federal rights, although exceptions exist that facilitate jurisdiction. See Ex 
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) (exception for original suits against 
state officers seeking prospective relief ); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 
Wheat.) 264, 407–10 (1821) (exception for appellate jurisdiction). 
 190. The Supremacy Clause generally obligates state courts to adjudicate 
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zontal rights” is that they shield individuals from adverse ef-
fects of the friction-inducing behavior noted in Part II—such as 
favoritism and overreaching—that are an inevitable conse-
quence of divided sovereignty, coequality, and aggregate state 
power. Examples of horizontal rights that litigants may raise 
as claims or defenses include: freedom under Article IV’s Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause from state action discriminating 
on the basis of state citizenship,191 the right under the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause to travel 
across state borders for the purpose of resettling,192 the liberty 
interest under the Due Process Clause in avoiding personal ju-
risdiction in a state where the person lacks sufficient con-
tacts,193 and the right under an ill-defined constellation of 
clauses to be free from the extraterritorial operation of state 
laws.194 The Double Jeopardy195 and Contracts196 Clauses also 
arguably create rights with a horizontal dimension. Other pro-
visions of the Constitution that are not typically understood as 
 
federal constitutional claims and defenses and to provide federal statutory 
remedies. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990). 
 191. See, e.g., Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287 (1998) 
(invalidating state statute that barred nonresidents from receiving a tax de-
duction available to residents); Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 
(1988) (prohibiting state from admitting qualified residents to the bar on mo-
tion while requiring nonresidents to take an exam). The Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment likewise limits discrimination based on 
state residency, but the standard of review is deferential because state resi-
dency is not a suspect classification. See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 657 (1981) (applying rational basis review to 
uphold a “retaliatory” tax that calculated local rates based on the rates in a 
taxpayer’s home state). 
 192. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502–03 (1999). This right would be 
less important if states were merely administrative units of a single sovereign, 
although the right would still protect against draconian constraints on inter-
nal movement. 
 193. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 
694, 702 (1982) (“The personal jurisdiction requirement . . . represents a re-
striction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of 
individual liberty.”). 
 194. See infra text accompanying notes 312–14. 
 195. See infra text accompanying notes 285–93 (discussing constitutional 
constraints on successive criminal prosecutions by multiple states). 
 196. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”); Michael W. McConnell, Contract 
Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Indi-
vidual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REV. 267, 284 (1988) 
(discussing evidence that “[t]he principal motivating factor” for preventing 
states from impairing contracts “was the effect of such laws on citizens of oth-
er states, on commerce throughout the country, and even on peaceful relations 
among the states”). 
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creating “rights” (such as the Dormant Commerce Clause) are 
privately enforceable,197 further cementing a role for individual 
citizens in the maintenance of constitutional order. 
Private enforcement of individual rights helps stabilize ho-
rizontal federalism in at least five respects. First, allowing in-
dividuals to protect themselves from the pitfalls of divided so-
vereignty imposes litigation costs on overly aggressive states 
that might deter abuses, avoiding interstate friction before it 
occurs. Second, by making unilateral overreaching more diffi-
cult, individual rights may push states toward cooperative solu-
tions to multistate problems.198 Third, the availability of self-
help obviates intervention by states on behalf of their citizens 
in disputes involving action by other states, which reduces the 
possibility of escalating isolated squabbles into direct interstate 
conflicts.199 Fourth, private enforcement of rights against dis-
crimination based on place or duration of residency avoids 
creating a class of “stateless” citizens who upon leaving one 
state lack the protection of another, which might make them a 
source of political tension between states vying to exclude 
them.200 Finally, requiring states to treat each others’ citizens 
 
 197. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 446–48 (1991) (holding that 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 provides remedies for violations of “rights” under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause). 
 198. For example, suppose that two states share a common border, that 
each state emits various forms of pollution that cross the border, and that each 
state receives economic benefits from the pollution-creating activity. One can 
imagine that each state may seek to limit pollution emanating from the other 
while tolerating pollution emanating from itself. If horizontal rights preclude 
each state from enforcing its regulatory preferences on polluting entities in the 
other state, then the two states may have an additional incentive to cooperate 
on establishing mutually agreeable restraints on emissions. (This hypothetical 
scenario assumes for the sake of simplicity that federal statutes do not prec-
lude cooperation by preempting state environmental law.). 
 199. Some states nevertheless choose to inject themselves into disputes in-
volving their citizens, even on seemingly minor issues such as regulation of 
duck hunting. See Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. Hoeven, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1074 
(D.N.D. 2004) (deciding a suit by Minnesota, later joined by individual plain-
tiffs, against North Dakota’s Governor under the Privileges and Immunities 
and Commerce Clauses, challenging residency requirements for hunting li-
censes). 
 200. A similar problem exists in the international system, albeit with more 
severe consequences. Stateless persons in the U.S. federal system would still 
enjoy the protection of national citizenship, but stateless persons in the inter-
national system lack any nationality and are therefore more vulnerable to 
predation. See David Weissbrodt & Clay Collins, The Human Rights of State-
less Persons, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 245, 264–70 (2006) (discussing burdens on state-
less populations in the international system); id. at 275 (“The presence of large 
numbers of stateless persons in a given region can often produce regional in-
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approximately as well as they treat their own helps establish a 
national identity that might override or mitigate regional paro-
chialism.201 
E. FEDERAL OVERSIGHT AND PREEMPTION 
The final constitutional method for managing horizontal 
federalism is authorization of federal regulation in circums-
tances where state action could lead to excessive friction.202 
This approach makes national power both a vaccine and an an-
tidote against interstate conflict, allowing Congress and the 
federal judiciary to avoid friction before it occurs and to contain 
it before it flares beyond control. Vertical constraints on hori-
zontal power can take four forms: authorizing federal field 
preemption, permitting limited federal preemption, enabling 
Congress to regulate interstate relationships directly, and em-
powering federal courts to create federal common law govern-
ing interstate disputes. 
1. Federal Legislation 
First, the mirror image of denying states broad categories 
of powers through “codependence and disablement”203 is vesting 
these powers in Congress. This allocation of power may or may 
not be sensible as a matter of purely vertical federalism—i.e., 
powers might not “belong” at the national rather than regional 
level at a particular time.204 However, there is a clear horizon-
 
stability.”). 
 201. See Laycock, supra note 2, at 264 (“It is critical to the Union that we 
continue to think of ourselves as a single people . . . .”). 
 202. The Constitution’s use of vertical federalism as a tool for addressing 
horizontal friction had its roots in the Virginia Plan that Edmund Randolph 
introduced only four days after the Convention convened. See 1 Farrand, supra 
note 40, at 20. The plan’s sixth element stated that Congress should have 
power “to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, 
or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise 
of individual legislation.” Id. at 21 (emphasis added). The Convention en-
dorsed this concept two days later “with[ou]t[ ] debate or dissent.” Id. at 54. 
The grant of federal legislative power in aid of “[h]armony” survived through 
the early work of the Committee of Detail in July, 2 id. at 131–32, but even-
tually disappeared in favor of a more precise enumeration of congressional 
power, see id. at 181–82. James Madison later contended that the Virginia 
Plan contemplated this transition from generality to specificity, and that the 
harmony clause was merely a “descriptive phrase[ ]” subject to refinement into 
its “proper shape & specification.” 3 id. at 526–27. 
 203. Supra Part III.A. 
 204. For a discussion of how allocation of authority in a federal system is 
an iterative process, see Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism’s Options, 14 
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tal justification for excluding states from regulating in areas 
where conflicting state laws could lead to interstate friction. 
For example, Congress’s power to create “uniform laws on the 
subject of bankruptcies”205 can be understood in part as a reac-
tion to Confederation-era parochialism by states that shielded 
local debtors from out-of-state creditors and imprisoned debtors 
despite discharge judgments from out-of-state courts.206 Like-
wise, Congress’s power to enact a “uniform Rule of Naturaliza-
tion”207 was in part a reaction to “mischievous” disparities be-
tween state citizenship standards that allowed states to 
undermine each other’s immigration policies.208 
Second, the Necessary and Proper and Supremacy Clauses 
combine to give Congress authority to displace state law in 
areas where federal and state power overlap. This issue-by-
issue preemption power enables Congress to wield its authority 
less bluntly than when occupying an entire field (such as bank-
ruptcy), while still preserving flexibility to intervene when 
 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 465, 473 (1996) (“‘State’ and ‘federal’ interests are not 
fixed sets but are interactive and interdependent conceptions that vary over 
time. . . . [W]hat today appears to be or is claimed to be ‘local’ or ‘national’ may 
in another decade be the opposite or may have moved into other spheres, be 
they denominated ‘local,’ ‘international,’ or ‘private.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 205. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 206. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006) (“Foremost 
on the minds of those who adopted the Clause were the intractable problems, 
not to mention the injustice, created by one State’s imprisoning of debtors who 
had been discharged (from prison and of their debts) in and by another 
State.”); BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF 
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 182–83 (2002) (noting that during the Constitu-
tional Convention the topic of bankruptcy first arose in the context of state 
recognition of out-of-state insolvency regimes); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTA-
RIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1102 (1833) (discussing 
state preferences for local debtors). The Bankruptcy Clause also may have 
helped resolve an interstate havens problem by removing incentives for deb-
tors in one state to hide assets in another. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James 
Madison), supra note 35, at 271 (“The power of establishing uniform laws of 
bankruptcy . . . will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their proper-
ty may lie or be removed into different states . . . .”). 
 207. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 208. STORY, supra note 206, § 1098. The problem arose because the Articles 
(and subsequently the Constitution) required each state to respect the others’ 
citizenship determinations. An alien could thus circumvent strict citizenship 
standards by first obtaining citizenship in a state with lax standards and then 
moving to the stricter state, in effect creating both a havens and externalities 
problem. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison), supra note 35, at 270. 
Of course, the Naturalization Clause also addresses much deeper questions 
about the integration of state polities into a national community. See generally 
JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–
1870, at 248–86 (1978). 
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state regulation of a particular subject threatens excessive fric-
tion by, for example, creating externalities,209 excessive compe-
tition,210 or havens.211 Federal preemption may of course be 
sensible from a purely vertical perspective if national regula-
tion is the optimal solution to a particular problem even when 
interstate friction is mild, but fears of horizontal instability can 
supply an added justification for national action.212 Alternative-
ly, in some circumstances local regulation free from federal in-
trusion might be optimal but for the states’ propensity to over-
reach, which would require Congress to weigh the benefits of 
state autonomy against the costs of its abuse.213 Concerns 
about horizontal federalism are thus an important, although 
generally overlooked,214 factor in assessing the proper operation 
of vertical federalism in the ordinary grind of the federal legis-
lative and rulemaking process. 
Third, the Constitution empowers Congress to manage in-
terstate relationships directly, which creates a federal mechan-
ism for balancing competing state interests and intervening to 
avoid conflict (or sometimes to create it). For example, Con-
gress’s power to withhold approval of proposed interstate com-
pacts provides leverage to shape interstate negotiations,215 its 
 
 209. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–671 (2000) (creating nationwide clean air 
standards). 
 210. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2000) (creating minimum labor stan-
dards immune from dilution through interstate competition). 
 211. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2000) (facilitating recovery of child support 
from parents who flee their obligations). 
 212. Even when horizontal conflict justifies national action, strategic beha-
vior by state constituencies seeking to preserve competitive advantages may 
defeat national legislation. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Mat-
ter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic, 89 J. POL. ECON. 152, 162–63 
(1981) (“Individuals may vote against the extension of a state law to the na-
tion as a whole even though they would favor the law in a system with only 
one government. They may wish to extend a state law to all citizens although 
they would oppose the law in a unitary system.”). 
 213. For a discussion of whether current preemption doctrine adequately 
forces Congress to confront the policy choices that preemption raises, see Ro-
derick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the Na-
tional Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2007) (advocating a pre-
sumption against giving federal statutes preemptive effect absent a clear 
statement of preemption). 
 214. For a notable exception, see Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 2, at 
1431 (discussing preemption as a response to interstate “predation”). 
 215. See Kevin J. Heron, The Interstate Compact in Transition: From Coop-
erative State Action to Congressionally Coerced Agreements, 60 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 1, 18 (1985) (“Congressional involvement in compact negotiations has re-
sulted from both state solicitation and congressional imposition.”); Edward T. 
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power to create incentives under the Spending Clause can 
nudge states away from idiosyncratic policies,216 its power to 
admit new states to the Union can affect the interests of exist-
ing states (which was a significant source of conflict before the 
Civil War),217 and its power under the first-in-time rules to es-
tablish procedures for compliance can ensure smooth imple-
mentation.218 Congress might also have authority to waive 
states’ comity obligations in circumstances where forcing states 
to recognize competing positions would create friction. Howev-
er, limits on this authority would be necessary to avoid under-
mining the equal status of states with outlier policies and the 
individual interests of state citizens who rely on those poli-
cies.219 
Although congressional power over interstate relations fits 
within the constitutional framework of avoiding interstate fric-
tion and maintaining state equality, it also can achieve the op-
posite effect. Power to address subjects of interstate dispute 
enables Congress to declare (or purport to declare) a winner by 
endorsing and nationalizing one of the competing positions. For 
 
Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
403, 504–05 (2003) (“[I]t would appear that Congress is permitted to stipulate 
in advance all the compact’s significant terms . . . .”). 
 216. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Congress’s power to induce state action 
with incentives is a potential counterexample to the general constitutional 
theme of promoting interstate harmony through federal intervention because 
incentives can put a majority of states in the “no lose” position of forcing the 
minority to conform or face a competitive disadvantage. Lynn A. Baker & Ern-
est A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 
DUKE L.J. 75, 79, 120 (2001) (discussing how the “political safeguards of fede-
ralism” can fail to protect states from congressional action orchestrated by ri-
val state factions). For an analysis of incentives under the Spending Clause 
from a vertical rather than horizontal perspective, see David A. Super, Re-
thinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2571–79 (2005). 
 217. See, e.g., ROBERT W. LARSON, NEW MEXICO’S QUEST FOR STATEHOOD 
1846–1912, at 13–24 (1968) (discussing North-South conflicts over slavery and 
border disputes with Texas that thwarted New Mexico’s attempts to join the 
Union in the late 1840s and early 1850s); MATSON & ONUF, supra note 45, at 
60 (“The admission of new states inevitably would alter the balance of power 
in the union.”); 7 STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT: NEW YORK LAND PATENTS 
1688–1786, at 13 (Mary Greene Nye ed., 1947) (noting “constant ferment” and 
“more or less open rebellion” in border regions arising from Vermont’s disputes 
with New York and New Hampshire prior to its admission as a state in 1791). 
 218. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (Congress may regulate “Effect” of state 
law under the Full Faith and Credit clause); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 
(24 How.) 66, 99, 104–05 (1860) (noting congressional power under the Extra-
dition Clause); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615–16 (1842) 
(noting congressional power under the Fugitive Slave Clause). 
 219. See infra text accompanying notes 223–26. 
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example, the Defense of Marriage Act prioritized the desire of 
some states to ban same-sex marriages over other states’ poten-
tial interests in having such marriages recognized,220 the Fugi-
tive Slave Acts prioritized southern interests in capturing fugi-
tive slaves over northern interests in freeing them (or at least 
in not being instruments of their continued servitude),221 and 
numerous federal statutes waive restraints on state authority 
to regulate specific areas of commerce that spill across their 
borders.222 The constitutionality of these congressionally sanc-
tioned forms of discrimination has divided scholars. Gillian 
Metzger has proposed that Congress can define the “national 
interest” to tolerate situational inequality between states sub-
ject to constraining individual rights,223 while a competing posi-
tion views state equality as a structural constraint on federal 
power that elevates nondiscrimination from a constitutional de-
fault to a constitutional requirement.224 
The analysis in this Article suggests that competing argu-
ments about the scope of congressional power to authorize dis-
crimination are incomplete. Broad opposition to congressional 
discrimination undervalues the fact that the categories of state 
action discussed in Part II have significant extraterritorial ef-
 
 220. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). 
 221. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; An Act to Amend, and Supple-
mentary to, the Act Entitled “An Act Respecting Fugitives from Justice, and 
Persons Escaping from the Service of Their Masters,” ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 
(1850). 
 222. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 1472 & n.9 (collecting examples). Anoth-
er divisive but unavoidable form of “discrimination” occurs when Congress fa-
vors particular states with federal largesse in the form of federal institutions, 
infrastructure, or earmarks. For example, states frequently compete for the 
economic and social benefits that flow from attracting and retaining military 
bases. See generally ANN MARKUSEN ET AL., THE RISE OF THE GUNBELT: THE 
MILITARY REMAPPING OF INDUSTRIAL AMERICA (1991); DAVID S. SORENSON, 
SHUTTING DOWN THE COLD WAR: THE POLITICS OF MILITARY BASE CLOSURE 
(1998). 
 223. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 1475 & n.16. There is no consensus 
about the nature of the rights that constrain federal power. Some scholars 
would deem equality rights under Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities 
Clause to trump federal power, while Metzger focuses more narrowly on rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 1475 n.16, 1490–92, 1490 n.81 
(discussing competing positions). 
 224. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Con-
straint on the Commerce Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249, 255–56 (2005) (identifying 
uniformity principle that may preclude Congress from using its power over 
commerce to “regulate along state lines and treat the same object differently 
in different states”); Kramer, supra note 76, at 2006 (contending that Congress 
lacks power to “legislate away the minimum requirements of mutual respect 
and recognition”). 
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fects. Congressional silence would thus not be nondiscrimina-
tion, but rather a form of acquiescence to aggressive state be-
havior that threatens to undermine interstate harmony. In 
trast, broad tolerance of congressional discrimination un-
undervalues the fact that congressional power over interstate 
relations exists in part as a method of avoiding interstate fric-
tion. The possibility that a federal statute may create friction 
could thus be a factor weighing against Congress’s power to 
enact it.225 The structure of horizontal federalism may there-
fore both necessitate and restrain congressional power to 
oritize competing state interests, although the contours of those 
constraints are fuzzy and require further development. 
2. Federal Common Law 
The power of federal courts to create federal common law 
can be understood in part as an aspect of horizontal federalism. 
The rationale justifying federal power here is similar to the ra-
tionale for the interstate jurisdiction clauses.226 Some inter-
state or private disputes can involve such sensitive state inter-
ests that resolution in a state forum or under state law could 
trigger resentment or further conflict. This tension might be 
especially intense, as noted in Part II, when states attempt to 
exercise dominion over other states, to externalize costs onto 
other states, or to overreach their borders by regulating activity 
in other states. Federal common law applies in precisely these 
 
 225. Metzger contends that state representation in Congress validates dis-
crimination by ensuring a national consensus, see Metzger, supra note 2, at 
1484, which implies that interstate friction should not be cause for concern if 
the states collectively endorse it through their representatives. However, sev-
eral constitutional provisions can be read as establishing structural protection 
of even minority state interests, such that national consensus is not a com-
plete defense to federal legislation that might otherwise create a legitimate 
state grievance. See U.S. CONST. art. V (insulating state equality in the Senate 
from the Article V amendment process); id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (precluding con-
gressional majority from creating new states from the territory of existing 
states); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 (precluding congressional majority from favoring 
one state’s ports). Moreover, protecting equality is an inherently countermajo-
ritarian enterprise because the most potent threats to equality are likely to 
have majority support. See Baker & Young, supra note 216, at 110 (“[T]he fed-
eral political process threatens state autonomy insofar as that process is the 
means by which a majority of states may impose their own policy preferences 
on a minority of states with different preferences.”). Courts considering con-
gressional findings about the propriety of discrimination should therefore 
temper their deference with skepticism depending on the nature of the collu-
sion against minority states. 
 226. See supra Part III.B. 
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scenarios, such as border disputes (dominion cases),227 actions 
involving interstate pollution or the downstream effects of up-
stream water uses (externality cases),228 and disputes about in-
tangible property with multistate contacts (overreaching cas-
es).229 
The constitutional foundation for this judge-made law is 
debatable. There is no explicit text that courts can purport to 
be interpreting,230 and thus separation of powers principles 
counsel that substantive federal law should emanate from Con-
gress rather than the judiciary.231 However, this Article’s sys-
temic approach to horizontal federalism suggests that a form of 
structural preemption might justify judicial action. Concerns 
about interstate friction may strip states of their power to regu-
late certain sensitive interstate disputes, converting coequality 
into codependence and requiring reliance on shared institutions 
to resolve conflicts.232 Absent congressional regulation, federal 
 
 227. See Cissna v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 289, 291, 296 (1918) (discussing 
“the law of interstate boundaries” as applied to suit by state challenging pri-
vate citizen’s title to land in border region). 
 228. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 102–03 (1972) (“When we deal 
with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal 
common law . . . .”); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931) (“New 
York has the physical power to cut off all the water within its jurisdiction. But 
clearly the exercise of such a power to the destruction of the interest of lower 
States could not be tolerated.”). Congress has preempted aspects of federal 
common law governing water pollution. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 
304, 317 (1981). 
 229. See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677 (1965) (“Since the States 
separately are without constitutional power to provide a rule to settle this in-
terstate controversy and since there is no applicable federal statute, it be-
comes our responsibility in the exercise of our original jurisdiction to adopt a 
rule which will settle the question of which State will be allowed to escheat 
this intangible property.”). 
 230. In contrast, judge-made rules anchored to specific constitutional pro-
visions—such as limits on state power to interfere with interstate commerce—
are not the same species of federal common law discussed here because there 
is a textual basis both for the courts’ authority to act and, more tenuously, for 
the content of the courts’ decisions. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Consti-
tutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14, 17 (1975). This distinction be-
tween lawmaking and interpretation splits fine theoretical hairs, but illu-
strates how the judiciary has multiple roles within the structure of horizontal 
federalism, even if each role raises concerns about justification and legitimacy. 
See id. at 31 (noting that constitutional interpretation and common lawmak-
ing differ in “degree” rather than kind). 
 231. See Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, 
and the Interpretative Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. 
REV. 761, 792 (1989). 
 232. The textual basis for judicial authority to fill the void left by structur-
al preemption of state law and congressional inaction would presumably be 
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courts injected into the dispute by the interstate jurisdiction 
clauses become the lawmaker of last resort and must fill the 
regulatory void rather than allow interstate conflicts to linger 
and escalate.233 Separation of powers concerns that weigh 
 
the grant of “judicial Power” to federal courts in Section 1 of Article III. Law-
making is an exercise of “power,” and thus can be valid only if that power is 
contained within the “judicial Power.” The jurisdiction clauses in Section 2 of 
Article III would then limit the scope of judicial lawmaking power to enume-
rated areas over which federal courts have cognizance. However, relying on 
Article III to justify federal courts’ common law-making power leads to an ad-
ditional complication when federal common law is used to preempt state law 
in state courts, where jurisdiction is not a function of Article III. The best jus-
tification for applying federal common law in state courts may be that struc-
tural preemption bars state courts from applying state law and thus, as a mat-
ter of choice of law under the Supremacy Clause, state courts must borrow 
federal law, which absent congressional action would be federal common law. 
Although this argument seems to solve the federal-common-law-in-state-
courts problem, it does lead to an anomaly. If an issue arises in state court on 
which state law is structurally preempted but for which federal courts have 
not yet created federal common law, the state court presumably would need to 
develop the federal common law rule itself. Yet the state court’s power to 
create federal law would not have any apparent foundation in the Constitution 
because Article III, the presumed source of federal common law making power, 
clearly does not grant any power to state courts. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 
(vesting judicial power only in the Supreme Court and courts created by Con-
gress). The anomaly perhaps is avoidable through the fiction that state courts 
would not be “creating” federal common law so much as “predicting” what fed-
eral common law would be if the Supreme Court were to confront the issue, 
just as federal courts applying state law attempt to predict how the state’s 
highest court would rule. See Comm’r v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) 
(“[T]he underlying substantive rule involved is based on state law and the 
State’s highest court is the best authority on its own law. If there be no deci-
sion by that court then federal authorities must apply what they find to be the 
state law after giving ‘proper regard’ to relevant rulings of other courts of the 
State. In this respect, it may be said to be, in effect, sitting as a state court.”). 
For a general discussion of state judicial power to create federal law that is not 
linked to interstate relations cases, see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts 
and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825 (2005). 
 233. Other scholars have used different analytical approaches to reach a 
similar conclusion about the legitimacy of federal common law. See Bradford 
R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1245, 1322–23 (1996) (federal common law “implement[s] the constitu-
tional equality of the states” and applies to interstate disputes due to the 
states’ lack of “legislative competence”); Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of 
the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1031 
(1967) (federal common law applies because “state competence is excluded by 
necessary implication from the constitutional grant of jurisdiction”); Jay Tid-
marsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 585, 631 (2006) (federal common law avoids states “stack[ing] the deck to 
favor themselves”). Aspects of federal common law in admiralty cases involv-
ing interstate waters might have a similar justification, see supra text accom-
panying notes 166–67, but other forms of federal common law lacking a nexus 
with horizontal federalism would still require a separate defense that is 
 558 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:493 
 
against judicial lawmaking are thus in tension with horizontal 
federalism concerns that favor providing a federal rule of deci-
sion for interstate disputes in cases where Congress has not 
acted.234 
Recognizing the important role of federal common law 
within the framework of horizontal federalism raises interest-
ing questions about how far the judiciary’s power should ex-
tend. Intriguing possibilities include creating a federal common 
law of interstate venue to police overreaching by state courts,235 
 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 234. Framing judicial power to create federal common law in terms of a 
need to avoid interstate friction raises an interesting question about the Erie 
doctrine, which requires federal courts to apply state substantive law in diver-
sity cases. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). If one accepts 
that concerns about interstate friction helped justify federal jurisdiction over 
diversity actions, see supra text accompanying notes 155–62, then arguably 
those same concerns favor applying federal law, at least when applicable state 
law has a parochial slant that might instigate friction. The Erie decision never 
considered this possibility (which prior precedent justifying general federal 
common law had not relied upon), and thus never explained why federal 
courts could displace state law in some disputes implicating a federal interest 
in avoiding interstate conflict, but not in diversity cases. Accordingly, there is 
a plausible argument that considering federal common law from a horizontal 
federalism perspective reveals a hole in Erie’s reasoning. However, that hole is 
probably inconsequential for two reasons. First, the Supremacy Clause re-
quires that federal common law, unlike the “general law” of the pre-Erie re-
gime, 304 U.S. at 75, apply even in state courts, which would mean that a fed-
eral common law of diversity analogous to the federal common law of 
interstate conflicts would displace a large volume of state law in routine inter-
state litigation. While Congress might have authority to displace state law in 
diversity cases if there were a sufficient nexus to Article I powers, it is difficult 
to believe that the Constitution silently confers such broad preemption author-
ity on federal courts. Second, even if one accepts a theoretical power of federal 
courts to create federal common law in diversity cases involving potential in-
terstate friction, the nature of the federal interest in the substance of most di-
versity cases is minor compared to the interest in cases involving, for example, 
state borders and water rights. The Erie doctrine could thus be rejustified as 
creating a sound policy disclaiming federal preemption as a matter of pru-
dence rather than constitutional infirmity. 
 235. Federal courts have claimed power to create common law venue rules 
for diversity actions in federal court but have not made those rules mandatory 
in state court. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (affirming 
dismissal of diversity action on forum non conveniens grounds despite exis-
tence of proper venue under the applicable federal statute); cf. Am. Dredging 
Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 443 (1994) (holding that state court need not apply 
federal forum non conveniens doctrine in admiralty action). Scholars have 
suggested that these federal common law venue rules should bind state courts 
in cases implicating foreign relations, but have not extended that insight to 
interstate relations. See Mark D. Greenberg, The Appropriate Source of Law 
for Forum Non Conveniens Decisions in International Cases: A Proposal for the 
Development of Federal Common Law, 4 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 155, 187–96 
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allowing federal courts to craft choice of law rules for friction-
generating disputes with multistate contacts (rather than tole-
rating state rules that might excessively favor local inter-
ests),236 and treating states’ claims to immunity from suit in 
federal question cases with horizontal dimensions as a matter 
of common law rather than constitutional entitlement.237 These 
 
(1986); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Nationalizing International Law, 36 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 121, 136–38 (1997). Treating venue as a question of federal 
common law binding on state courts would avoid potential Erie problems that 
arise when state and federal venue rules differ in diversity actions, but would 
raise separation of powers and federalism concerns that arise whenever feder-
al courts displace state law. See Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 
YALE L.J. 1935, 1974–76 (1991) (discussing application of Erie to state forum 
non conveniens doctrine); sources cited supra note 233 (discussing federal 
common law in interstate relations cases). 
 236. Common law choice of law rules could take two forms: rules that apply 
in federal actions but not in state actions, or rules that preempt state law even 
in state courts. The federal-only approach is less intrusive on state interests 
but would promote vertical forum shopping by allowing forum choice to deter-
mine the applicable law, while the preemption approach would mitigate forum 
shopping but would entail significantly more aggressive assertion of federal 
power. For a general discussion of whether federal common law choice of law 
rules are sensible, see William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal Sys-
tem, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23 (1963) (advocating federal common law in federal 
actions because states should not have discretion to determine when local law 
will “yield to” or “prevail over” the laws of “competing” states); Michael H. Got-
tesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Sta-
tutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 20–21 (1991) (preferring federal statutory rather than 
common law choice of law rules); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between 
State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 515 (1954) (“The Rules of De-
cision Act says that ‘the laws of the several states’ are to be followed only ‘in 
cases where they apply.’ The federal courts are in a peculiarly disinterested 
position to make a just determination as to which state’s laws ought to apply 
where this is disputed.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World 
of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 1839, 1867 (2006) (suggesting that federal subject-matter juris-
diction over class actions implicating “nationwide economic activity” may justi-
fy imposing federal choice of law rules); Laycock, supra note 2, at 282 
(advocating preemptive federal common law in part because “[c]hoice-of-law 
rules . . . resolve conflicts between states, and neither state’s attempt to re-
solve such a conflict unilaterally has any claim to legitimacy”); Daniel J. Melt-
zer, The Judiciary’s Bicentennial, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 438 (1989) (noting 
that creating uniform federal choice of law rules might require both congres-
sional action and federal judicial “leadership” in the “exposition” of statutory 
standards). 
 237. This idea is an extension of Vicki Jackson’s insight that immunity can 
be understood as a form of federal common law governing remedies. See Vicki 
C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign 
Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1988). My twist is that the content of this com-
mon law might vary depending on the extent to which relegating a dispute be-
tween a state and an out-of-state citizen to state court—or to no court—would 
generate interstate friction and thus be inconsistent with the federal forum 
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possible innovations may or may not be sensible on their own 
merits. But viewing them together and in the broader context 
of horizontal federalism can add a new dimension to analysis of 
the federal common law of interstate relations, and warrants 
further research. 
  * * *   
Identifying the Constitution’s distinct methods of regulat-
ing horizontal federalism illuminates a systemic approach that 
transcends traditional doctrinal categories. Specific provisions 
scattered throughout the text and ostensibly focused on dis-
crete subjects are means to a larger end. These provisions 
range from vague (the Full Faith and Credit Clause), to mysti-
fying (the Privileges and Immunities Clause), to ethereal (the 
Dormant Commerce Clause). Understanding these seemingly 
inscrutable texts requires considering how they fit within the 
framework of horizontal federalism, which is possible only if 
one realizes that such a framework exists. The analysis in this 
Part reveals the framework, which leads to the development in 
Part IV of a model for explaining and critiquing its jurispru-
dential components. 
IV.  A MODEL OF JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO 
HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM   
The preceding Parts established that interstate friction is a 
systemic problem for which the Constitution provides a system-
ic response. This insight helps frame the structure of horizontal 
federalism, but cannot itself determine the validity of any par-
ticular assertion of state power. Resolving specific cases re-
quires a process of constitutional translation and refinement: 
structure yields to text, text succumbs to interpretation, inter-
pretation spawns doctrine, and doctrine enables courts to re-
solve specific cases and controversies by converting factual in-
puts into legal outputs. This Part therefore considers whether 
thinking about horizontal federalism as a field, as Parts I-III 
suggest, can help to explain and improve the doctrines that 
courts use to manage interstate activity. Section A defines a 
 
norm underlying the interstate jurisdiction clauses. Another possibility is that 
entire categories of federal claims could be exempt from the common law of 
immunity. For example, if a federal claim against a state invokes one of the 
“horizontal rights” discussed in Part III.D, the common law of remedies might 
deem state immunity fundamentally inconsistent with the nature of the right. 
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model for framing judicial arguments, and Section B explores 
the model’s implications. 
Systemic analysis of horizontal federalism jurisprudence 
faces two daunting obstacles. First, the Supreme Court has 
never viewed horizontal federalism as a field, and thus there is 
little overt connection between its various components. The 
constitutional landscape of horizontal federalism consists of 
scattered silos of doctrine built on foundations in particular 
clauses and keyed to particular fact patterns, without an ob-
vious common architecture. Developing broadly applicable in-
sight therefore requires thinking abstractly about whether a 
unifying blueprint underlies these seemingly idiosyncratic si-
los. 
Second, a comprehensive approach to horizontal federalism 
requires assessing dozens of doctrines, which is beyond the 
scope of a single article. However, it is possible to create a mod-
el for thinking about these myriad doctrines that future scho-
larship can adapt to concrete situations. Such a model can un-
cover common elements of distinct rules, identify sources of 
much-derided doctrinal incoherence, and suggest pathways for 
reform. 
A. HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM JURISPRUDENCE 
The model covers cases in which a claim or defense chal-
lenges a state’s authority to regulate due to aspects of horizon-
tal federalism discussed in Parts I–III.238 The basic premise is 
that challenges can be conceptualized as taking one or more of 
only four forms: that something inherent in the Constitution’s 
vision of state sovereignty limits the regulating state’s capacity 
to act, that a constitutional right or immunity constrains the 
state’s otherwise extant capacity, that centralization of power 
in the national government limits state authority, and that 
states with capacity to act free from constraint and central con-
trol must yield on comity grounds to the relatively more signifi-
cant interests of another state. All horizontal federalism doc-
trines rely upon or reject (often implicitly or unconsciously) at 
least one of these forms of argument.239 These arguments blur 
 
 238. For a discussion of horizontally-based challenges to federal regulatory 
power, see Metzger, supra note 2. 
 239. This characterization is both an empirical statement based on reading 
countless judicial opinions and a practical observation based on how I have 
defined the model, which is designed to encompass (at a high level of abstrac-
tion) all plausible arguments for why the Constitution might prevent a state 
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at the margins,240 but the basic distinctions remain analytically 
useful. 
1. Capacity 
The horizontal fragmentation of sovereignty over U.S. ter-
ritory raises a question about whether a particular state is “so-
vereign enough” to do whatever it is trying to do—i.e., whether 
it has the capacity to act.241 When capacity is questionable, as 
in the overreaching scenarios discussed in Part II, the scope of 
state authority may hinge on inferences from the constitutional 
structure discussed in Part III. 
Arguments based on state capacity recur in horizontal fe-
deralism jurisprudence and illustrate how slogans and fictions 
can shape constitutional law. Invocations of capacity tend to re-
ly on three ideas: states have extensive and potentially exclu-
sive power over entities and activities physically within their 
territory,242 states may regulate based on the local effects of for-
eign conduct,243 and states may regulate domiciliaries even 
outside their territory.244 
 
from taking a particular action. 
 240. For example, an interstate compact that limits a signatory’s authority 
can be seen as either waiving the state’s capacity to regulate or constraining 
that authority through enforceable contract rights. Likewise, dormant federal 
preemption of state commercial regulations is a limit on capacity, a form of 
centralization, and a source of rights protecting interstate actors from discrim-
ination. 
 241. For a discussion of how “sovereignty” is an ambiguous label with con-
text-sensitive meanings, see supra note 9. 
 242. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877); Laycock, supra note 2, 
at 316 (“The allocation of authority among the states is territorial.”). For an 
extensive critique of arguments that states may regulate only and exclusively 
within their territory, see Rosen, supra note 2. 
 243. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (“Jurisdiction over [the 
civil defendants] is therefore proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their 
Florida conduct in California.”) (citation omitted); MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 1.03(1)(a) (2001) (authorizing criminal jurisdiction, with some exceptions, in 
the state where the “result” of a criminal act occurs); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 cmt. f (1971) (“The local law of a state may also 
usually be applied to determine whether a person is liable for the effects with-
in its territory of an act done by him elsewhere.”). 
 244. See, e.g., Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 366 (1939) (upholding 
state’s power to tax intangible property that a local domiciliary held outside 
its territory). But see Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251, 256–57 (1949) (re-
jecting a state’s power to tax land that a local domiciliary held in another 
state’s territory); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion 
and the Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611, 629–30 
(2007) (“In [civil] cases . . . the Supreme Court has said repeatedly that an im-
portant consideration in assessing whether a state can apply its laws to out-of-
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There are at least two tensions in this constellation of 
ideas. First, if states have capacity to regulate local activity 
with foreign effects and foreign activity with local effects, than 
states have overlapping capacity that undermines any claim of 
exclusivity and frustrates efforts to achieve local uniformity. 
Second, when a domiciliary of one state acts in the territory of 
another, both states may have inconsistent interests in regulat-
ing the activity. The unstoppable force of one state’s capacity 
can collide with the immovable object of the other’s capacity, 
yielding doctrine steeped in formality but shallow in reason. 
For example, the Supreme Court has held that states have ex-
clusive control over the disposition of local land that limits the 
authority of other states to transfer title to that land even be-
tween domiciliaries of the other state,245 that states can enforce 
their own criminal laws within their borders but need not en-
force the criminal laws of other states even against the other 
state’s domiciliaries within the enforcing state’s territory,246 
and that states lack authority to dissolve marriages unless at 
least one spouse is a local domiciliary even if both nondomici-
liary spouses are present in a state’s territory and consent to 
adjudication.247 These holdings may or may not have made 
 
state events is whether one of its citizens was involved.”). The domicile and 
effects strands of capacity arguments can blur. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 n.5 (1987) (“A State . . . may apply at least 
some laws to a person outside its territory on the basis that he is a citizen, res-
ident, or domiciliary of the State. Cases that have upheld such exercises of ju-
risdiction, however, have generally involved acts or omissions that also had 
effect within the State.”). 
 245. See Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186, 193 (1900) (holding that a South 
Carolina probate court lacked authority to transfer land in Connecticut from a 
South Carolinian estate to a South Carolinian heir). Although the Court con-
cluded that states lacked capacity to transfer out-of-state land directly, it held 
that states could exercise equitable power over the land’s owner to force a con-
veyance. See id. The case thus draws a formal distinction between a state’s ca-
pacity to regulate extraterritorial land and a state’s capacity to compel extra-
territorial conduct by its domiciliaries. Evolution of preclusion doctrine has 
limited Clarke’s practical effect, as now a decision by a state court erroneously 
exercising jurisdiction over foreign land is enforceable in the foreign court for 
the sake of finality. See Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Acci-
dent & Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 455 U.S. 691, 705 n.11, 706 n.13 (1982). 
 246. See supra note 170; infra note 290. 
 247. See Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 37–38 (1903) (holding that a 
Massachusetts statute barring domiciliaries from leaving the state to obtain a 
divorce stripped a South Dakota court of jurisdiction to order the divorce even 
though both spouses were present for the South Dakota litigation). In con-
trast, capacity to grant rather than dissolve marriages is a function of the 
couple’s presence rather than domicile in the state. See Brian H. Bix, State In-
terests in Marriage, Interstate Recognition, and Choice of Law, 38 CREIGHTON 
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sense in their particular contexts, but for present purposes the 
holdings are thinly theorized and often rely on sweeping asser-
tions about “the essential nature”248 of state power and “consti-
tutional barriers by which all the States are restricted within 
the orbits of their lawful authority . . . .”249 This rhetoric does 
not accommodate the practical realities of regulating activity 
that sprawls across multiple state territories, has far-reaching 
effects, and involves domiciliaries of multiple states. More 
nuance and refinement is therefore necessary. Thinking broad-
ly about capacity across the different contexts where it is rele-
vant can be a productive step toward developing a more subtle 
account of state authority. 
2. Constraint 
A second form of argument applies when a state has suffi-
cient capacity to regulate interstate activity, but a right or im-
munity constrains that power in particular circumstances. The 
distinction between lack of capacity and constrained capacity 
can appear technical because any assertion in the form “State X 
lacks power to regulate activity Y” can be restated as “actors 
engaging in activity Y have a right not be regulated by state X.” 
Despite this equivalence (at least at a high level of abstrac-
tion),250 arguments framed in the language of rights resonate 
 
L. REV. 337, 341 n.16 (2005). Domicile was also a foundation for a state’s au-
thority to probate wills. See Burbank v. Ernst, 232 U.S. 162, 163–64 (1914) 
(holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require a Louisiana 
court to enforce a will recognized by a Texas probate court if the decedent, who 
had died in Texas, was domiciled in Louisiana at the time of death). The Bur-
bank decision is no longer an accurate reflection of Full Faith and Credit law, 
see supra note 177, but a diluted version of its emphasis on domicile as a pre-
requisite to probate jurisdiction animates modern law governing multistate 
estates. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. IV gen. cmt. (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 
pt. II, at 311 (1998) (“The recognition provisions contained in Article IV and 
the various provisions of Article III which relate to administration of estates of 
non-residents are designed to coerce respect for domiciliary procedures and 
administrative acts to the extent possible.”). 
 248. Andrews, 188 U.S. at 34; see also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 
336 (1989) (noting “inherent limits” of state power). 
 249. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914) (holding that Mis-
souri law could not govern action in New York to modify an insurance policy 
that had been purchased and delivered in Missouri). Modern opinions quote 
this rhetoric approvingly. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 
U.S. 408, 421 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 n.16 
(1996). 
 250. The equivalence is ingrained in the Constitution’s origins, as the fra-
mers created rights in part to limit government power and thus imbued them 
with structural undertones. See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not 
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differently than arguments framed in the language of power.251 
The distinction may be especially sensible in the context of ho-
rizontal federalism, in which the scope of state power and coun-
tervailing rights often hinges on the interests of four sets of ac-
tors: the regulated entity, the regulating state, other affected 
states, and the federal government in its role as a monitor of 
interstate relations. In contrast, more typical invocations of 
rights often involve only two actors: the regulation’s enforcer 
and subject.252 The broader sprawl of horizontal federalism cas-
es complicates assessment of power and rights, such that 
nuances in framing arguments could influence the weight of 
each actor’s competing interests. Moreover, even if capacity and 
constraint arguments are theoretically connected, critical prac-
tical differences distinguish them. For example, regulated enti-
ties can by consent or conduct waive constraints on state power 
but cannot expand a state’s capacity,253 the extent to which a 
state must justify its actions can differ for capacity and con-
straint arguments even in otherwise identical cases,254 and the 
 
Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. 
LEGAL. STUD. 725, 730–36 (1998). 
 251. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE 
L.J. 1277, 1278 (1989) (“Choosing to talk in terms of rights rather than poli-
cies or interests represents a fundamental jurisprudential commitment which 
is reflected in the way that concrete problems are resolved. Rights arise pri-
marily in deontological ethical theories while policies and interests are in-
strumental or consequentialist.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights 
and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343 (1993) (discussing and cri-
tiquing the right/power distinction). 
 252. Third- and fourth-party interests also occasionally exist, such as lis-
tener interests in free speech cases, and federal interests in providing and en-
forcing remedies for violations of federal rights. 
 253. This is why, for example, a court’s lack of personal jurisdiction is 
waivable while a court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not. See Ruhrgas 
AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583–84 (1999) (contrasting the two 
forms of jurisdiction). 
 254. For example, two Supreme Court decisions written less than one year 
apart adopted distinct standards for analyzing capacity- and constraint-based 
challenges to municipal regulations requiring a threshold percentage of work-
ers on municipally-funded projects to live within the municipality. Compare 
White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 205–06, 214–
15 (1983) (holding that regulation survived Commerce Clause challenge be-
cause the municipality was acting in its capacity as a “market participant” ra-
ther than as a regulator), with United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. 
Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220–21 (1984) (holding that municipality’s 
“market participant” status did not immunize it from an Article IV Privileges 
and Immunities Clause challenge claiming that the residency requirement 
burdened protected rights). The different outcomes owe in part to the different 
ambits of the Commerce and Privileges and Immunities Clauses: one governs 
only regulation of commerce, while the other extends to even nonregulatory 
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availability of some constraint arguments can depend on 
whether the claimant is a person or a corporation.255 Distin-
guishing capacity and constraint theories can therefore help in 
assessing a disputed claim’s foundation in text, history, and 
policy, in determining the outer limits to which the claim can 
extend, and in weighing the claim against competing claims. 
Many horizontal federalism doctrines rely on the concept of 
constraint by recognizing “rights” that defeat otherwise valid 
assertions of state authority. The argument applies most often 
in the favoritism and overreaching categories discussed in Part 
II, and invokes the individual empowerment method of consti-
tutional regulation discussed in Part III. For example, the Su-
preme Court has recognized a liberty interest that constrains 
personal jurisdiction,256 an expectation interest that constrains 
choice of law,257 and a right to avoid discrimination based on 
the existence or duration of state residency.258 
3. Centralization 
A third line of argument tracks the codependence and fed-
eral oversight methods discussed in Part III by invoking federal 
power to limit state power. Centralization arguments appear 
primarily in one of three forms: states lack power absent con-
gressional authorization (such as a statute waiving the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause), states possess power until Congress 
removes it (as in statutory preemption cases), or state power is 
a function of federal common law.259 A fourth flavor of centrali-
zation argument has a separation of powers rather than fede-
ralism accent. This permutation manifests when courts decline 
to invalidate questionable state action that Congress has nei-
ther authorized nor condemned, but is institutionally better 
equipped to assess.260 Judicial deference to legislative compe-
 
burdens on individual interests “of fundamental concern.” United Building, 
465 U.S. at 220. 
 255. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868) (holding that 
corporations are not “citizens” under Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities 
Clause). 
 256. See infra note 284. 
 257. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985). 
 258. See supra notes 92, 191. 
 259. See supra Part III.E. 
 260. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1817 (2008) (declining 
to consider a Dormant Commerce Clause claim in part because “the Judicial 
Branch is not institutionally suited to draw reliable conclusions of the kind 
that would be necessary”). 
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tence has the effect of making state power an acceptable de-
fault unless and until Congress intervenes.261 
Centralization arguments resemble the capacity argu-
ments discussed above, but warrant separate treatment for at 
least three reasons. First, capacity arguments depend on as-
sumptions about the allocation of power among states, while 
centralization arguments depend on assumptions about the al-
location of power between states and the federal government.262 
Second, a state’s lack of capacity to regulate is permanently 
disabling absent a constitutional amendment, while limits on 
state power due to centralization can evolve in tandem with 
federal statutory and common law. Finally, capacity arguments 
focus on the content of rules limiting state power, while centra-
lization arguments often focus on who decides what the rules 
should be: federal courts (via the interstate jurisdiction clauses 
and federal common law), Congress (via preemption and over-
sight), or the states themselves (via the Compact Clause). 
4. Comity 
The most intriguing—and least used—form of argument is 
relevant when two or more states each have capacity to act free 
from constraint and central control. The first-in-time rules dis-
cussed in Part III resolve allocation problems in cases where 
they apply. For example, when two states both have the capaci-
ty to regulate a fugitive free from any constraining right of the 
fugitive, the Extradition Clause enforces the prior claim.263 
Likewise, when two states each have subject-matter and per-
sonal jurisdiction in a dispute, the state that first produces a 
judgment can bind the other under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause even if the first state’s judgment is clearly wrong on the 
merits.264 But when the Constitution does not provide a clear 
 
 261. Separation of powers concerns complicate federalism by exposing ten-
sion between four of the constitutional mechanisms for policing interstate re-
lations discussed in Part III. The individual empowerment, federal common 
law, and interstate jurisdiction mechanisms presume a strong judicial role in 
regulating horizontal federalism, while the legislative preemption mechanism 
assumes a strong legislative role. These mechanisms are normally comple-
ments, but in rare instances separation of powers concerns render them alter-
natives. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817. 
 262. For discussion of how horizontal and vertical federalism blur, which 
complicates drawing neat lines between capacity and centralization argu-
ments, see supra Part I.B. 
 263. See supra text accompanying notes 183–88. 
 264. See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237–38 (1908) (holding that 
Mississippi courts were obligated to enforce a judgment from Missouri that 
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preference rule, courts must decide whether to create one. For 
instance, in the competition, exclusion, havens, and overreach-
ing scenarios discussed in Part II, competing state regulatory 
interests could lead a court to require one state to yield to 
another by inferring a comity principle from the structure of 
horizontal federalism in Part III. Although “comity” often con-
notes a voluntary act of courtesy, I use the term here as a proxy 
for mutual respect, and suggest that the Constitution might re-
quire a threshold level of respect between states in at least 
some circumstances. While the idea of mandatory comity may 
seem like a contradiction in terms, it may be a fitting contradic-
tion for the unusual contours of the United States’ multi-
dimensional federalism. 
A fascinating aspect of horizontal federalism jurisprudence 
is that comity rules generally do not exist. The Supreme Court 
cites interstate comity as an ideal, but not as a judicially enfor-
ceable mechanism for denying state power in circumstances 
where capacity exists free from constraint and central con-
trol.265 For example, the constitutional rule in both personal ju-
 
itself enforced a contract made in Mississippi despite the fact that a Mississip-
pi statute voided the contract). The first-in-time rule creates a mandatory 
form of comity that subordinates state policy preferences to systemic concerns 
about interstate harmony and finality of judgments. See Estin v. Estin, 334 
U.S. 541, 545–46 (1948). But cf. supra note 178 (noting that if a state incor-
rectly refuses to obey the first-in-time rule and enters a judgment inconsistent 
with another state’s prior judgment, the second judgment may qualify for prec-
lusive effect in other states under a last-in-time rule). Federal law provides 
standards for proving the existence of the prior judgment, see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 
(2000), and thus the comity rule includes a centralization component. 
 265. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 425–26 (1979) (“In the past, this 
Court has presumed that the States intended to adopt policies of broad comity 
toward one another. But this presumption reflected an understanding of state 
policy, rather than a constitutional command.”). Comity concerns also some-
times influence judicial assessments of constraint. See United Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220 (1984) (desire to 
achieve “comity” and “interstate harmony” helps explain scope of Privileges 
and Immunities Clause). Comity arguments are more prevalent in the vertical 
federalism context, where comity occasionally justifies deferring to states even 
when federal capacity to act exists free from constraint. See Pennzoil Co. v. 
Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (stating that “comity between the States and 
the National Government” requires federal equitable restraint in civil litiga-
tion implicating various “important” state interests); Brockett v. Spokane Ar-
cades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 508 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that 
“comity” concerns help justify federal abstention when federal constitutional 
claims are “entwined with the interpretation of state law”). This vertical comi-
ty is easier to justify than horizontal comity, which would be constitutionally 
compelled rather than prudential, and would involve imposing restraints on 
states rather than exercising self-restraint. 
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risdiction and choice of law doctrine is that one state’s relative-
ly strong claim to provide a forum or apply its law is not a 
ground for rejecting another state’s weaker claim.266 Likewise, 
the Court has allowed multiple states to tax the same intangi-
ble property rather than trying to allocate taxing authority to a 
single state with the strongest regulatory interest.267 
The dearth of comity rules merits further study. A consti-
tutional common law of comity, if applied with a light touch, 
could arguably help avoid interstate friction and thereby ad-
dress concerns animating the constitutional structure of hori-
zontal federalism. Mandatory comity rules might also lead 
states to avoid conflict by strengthening their existing volunta-
ry comity rules,268 or refraining from aggressive assertions of 
authority that would trigger judicial intervention. However, 
comity rules would be highly subjective and therefore difficult 
to predict ex ante and to apply ex post. They may also exacer-
bate rather than ameliorate systemic friction by undermining 
interstate coequality, sacrificing federal neutrality, and inflat-
ing minor skirmishes into higher stakes battles that would 
generate broadly applicable precedents about the weight of 
 
 266. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003) (“Without a 
rudder to steer us, we decline to embark on the constitutional course of balanc-
ing coordinate States’ competing sovereign interests to resolve conflicts of laws 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 
(1984) (personal jurisdiction is appropriate in “any State” with sufficient “min-
imum contacts” to the dispute). 
 267. See, e.g., State Tax Comm’n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 178–79 (1942). 
 268. For example, courts in some states avoid unnecessary conflicts with 
other states by presuming that the forum state’s statutes do not apply extra-
territorially. See N. Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 162 P. 93, 94 (Cal. 1916) 
(“Although a state may have the power to legislate concerning the rights and 
obligations of its citizens with regard to transactions occurring beyond its 
boundaries, the presumption is that it did not intend to give its statutes any 
extraterritorial effect.”); Union Underwear Co. v. Barnhart, 50 S.W.3d 188, 
190 (Ky. 2001) (noting the “well-established presumption against extraterri-
torial operation of statutes” that “helps to protect against unintended clashes 
of the laws of the Commonwealth with the laws of our sister states”); Coca-
Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671, 682 (Tex. 2006) (“[A] statute 
will not be given extraterritorial effect by implication but only when such in-
tent is clear.”). Federal courts apply the same presumption when interpreting 
federal statutes and could consider extending the presumption to state sta-
tutes as a form of federal common law designed to promote interstate harmo-
ny. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“It is a 
longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a 
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States. . . . [This canon of construction] serves to protect 
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which 
could result in international discord.” (citations omitted)). 
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competing state interests. Congress might therefore be in a bet-
ter position than courts to balance the political and economic 
factors that comity rules would need to consider. Whatever the 
merit of comity rules, it is still interesting to note their rarity 
relative to arguments about capacity, constraint, and centrali-
zation. Future scholarship might therefore consider whether 
any particular horizontal federalism doctrines would benefit 
from comity rules, and whether judicial or legislative lawmak-
ing would be a superior method of regulation.269 
Another interesting and unexplored aspect of comity con-
cerns the extent to which a state’s acquiescence to potentially 
unconstitutional conduct by another state validates the con-
duct. The Court’s most recent horizontal federalism decision 
seems to invoke this vision of waivable comity obligations, al-
beit with minimal analysis. In Department of Revenue v. Davis, 
the Court reviewed a Kentucky statute that taxed bonds from 
out-of-state municipal issuers while not taxing bonds from in-
state municipal issuers.270 The statute enabled Kentucky to in-
sulate domestic issuers (including the state itself) from foreign 
competition in local capital markets, and thus seemed to be a 
suspicious hybrid of the competition and favoritism phenomena 
discussed in Part II.271 The Court nevertheless upheld the sta-
tute based on technical nuances of Commerce Clause doc-
trine.272 For present purposes, the relevant aspect of the hold-
ing is the Court’s repeated statement that forty states imposed 
differential taxes similar to Kentucky’s, and that all forty-nine 
other states filed an amicus curiae brief endorsing Kentucky’s 
position.273 The Court never claimed to rely on this unanimous 
state sentiment, but clearly thought that unanimity was an 
important factor warranting relatively deferential scrutiny of 
Kentucky’s statute.274 
 
 269. For an argument that comity and reciprocity theories should not dis-
place a preference for forum law in conflicts analysis, see Louise Weinberg, 
Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53 (1991). 
 270. 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008). 
 271. See supra notes 87–97, 108–13 and accompanying text. 
 272. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811 (holding that a state performing a “tradi-
tional government function” such as bond issuance “does not have to treat it-
self as being ‘substantially similar’ to other bond issuers in the market,” and 
can thus favor itself without engaging in “discrimination”). 
 273. See id. at 1811, 1815, 1817. 
 274. See id. at 1817 (“[T]he unanimous desire of the States to preserve the 
tax feature is a far cry from the private protectionism that has driven the de-
velopment of the dormant Commerce Clause.”). 
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The Court’s deference to Kentucky raises at least three 
questions that the Court never asked, and that are ripe for fur-
ther scholarship. First, is comity important for its own sake 
(such that discriminating against foreign states is undesirable 
even if the other states do not object), or is comity important 
only when a dispute crosses some threshold of contentiousness? 
The answer may depend on the purpose of a particular limit on 
state autonomy. If the purpose is to protect other states, then 
the views of other states should matter. But if the purpose is to 
protect investors, then unanimity among the foxes ought not 
prejudice the hens.275 Second, if state unanimity is important, 
does it follow that non-unanimity is also important—such that 
the Court would have ratcheted up the level of scrutiny if a 
state had complained about Kentucky’s statute? If the answer 
is yes, then the holding in Davis is flimsy because shifting polit-
ical winds or economic theories could erode unanimity by lead-
ing a state to decide that it would like to compete in foreign 
markets on a level playing field. If the answer is no, then the 
decision in Davis would raise questions about how much leeway 
states have to use the tools of sovereign regulatory power (here, 
the power to tax) to antagonize each other.276 Finally, is the 
fact that most states adopt the same discriminatory law evi-
dence that the law is not objectionable, or that the law has 
spawned a trade war requiring judicial intervention? The Court 
in Davis seemed to take the status quo of reciprocal discrimina-
tion for granted.277 But if the reciprocity arose as a form of re-
taliation,278 then the fact that states are now comfortable in the 
 
 275. Emphasizing the potential role of investor interests in evaluating com-
ity arguments is not equivalent to invoking the concept of constraint because 
the argument would not be that investors in out-of-state bonds have a right to 
the same favorable tax treatment as investors in local bonds. Instead, the ar-
gument would be that comity obligations bar differential taxation based on the 
origin of commodities because such taxes impose undesirable limits on con-
sumer choice that are inconsistent with the ideal of creating a national mar-
ket. Congress could protect consumer choice by preempting discriminatory 
state statutes, but the comity argument—if valid—would bar states from dis-
criminating even absent Congressional intervention. 
 276. Collusive tolerance by states of a discriminatory taxing regime that at 
least one state challenged would also raise concerns underlying the potential 
Compact Clause requirement that Congress approve interstate agreements 
that threaten interstate equality. See supra Part III.B. 
 277. The Court explained that the first statute imposing differential taxes 
on municipal bonds appeared in 1919 and that forty-one states now have simi-
lar statutes, but did not explain why differential taxation became ubiquitous. 
See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1806–07. 
 278. See Brian D. Galle & Ethan Yale, Can Discriminatory Taxation of 
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protectionist market they created does not necessarily mean 
that this market should persist (although there would still be a 
question of whether any reform should come from Congress ra-
ther than the courts).279 The Court’s tentative suggestion in 
Davis that aggregate state sentiment may be relevant in the 
constitutional calculus of horizontal federalism thus raises 
questions about the meaning and importance of comity that 
warrant further research. 
B. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL 
Using the model as a prism for refracting horizontal fede-
ralism doctrine helps illuminate sources of incoherence and in-
stability, as well as potential routes to reform. The insight that 
accrues from treating horizontal federalism as a field and 
searching for patterns of argument can also situate academic 
literature about specific doctrines in a broader context, provid-
ing an alternate justification for existing critiques. Three brief 
examples illustrate the model’s utility, and suggest avenues for 
further scholarship. First, the model can help assess the 
soundness of any particular doctrine’s foundation by focusing 
on the consequences of choices between capacity, constraint, 
centralization, and comity arguments. Second, the model en-
courages precision in identifying the arguments that animate 
decisions, which can help identify fuzzy reasoning and poorly 
theorized analysis. Finally, by grouping all horizontal federal-
ism doctrines within a single framework, the model can reveal 
potentially unjustified methodological inconsistencies between 
rules that serve similar purposes, and can suggest ways of in-
tegrating rules that should operate in harmony. 
1. Assessing Doctrinal Foundations 
Justifying or rejecting an interpretation of the Constitution 
using capacity, constraint, centralization, or comity arguments 
requires courts to reach two distinct conclusions: that the cho-
sen form of argument is appropriate to the context in which it 
appears, and that alternative arguments are less appropriate. 
Unfortunately, these conclusions are often implicit rather than 
 
Municipal Bonds Be Justified?, 117 TAX NOTES 153, 157–58 (2007) (contend-
ing that “tit-for-tat” retaliation may explain why most states adopted discri-
minatory tax exemptions). 
 279. Cf. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817–19 (discussing relative institutional 
competence to police markets in the context of whether the Kentucky statute 
imposed an excessive burden on interstate commerce). 
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explicit in judicial opinions because courts do not always recog-
nize the range of available choices.280 But even when a court 
clearly prioritizes one form of argument over another, critics 
can question whether that argument is the best fit for a partic-
ular problem. Visions of what constitutes an appropriate fit will 
of course vary with the context and the interpreter’s sensibili-
ties. Nevertheless, whatever the best fit may be, one is unlikely 
to find it without consciously looking for it. 
A model of horizontal federalism jurisprudence that identi-
fies and distinguishes potential lines of argument can create 
value by forcing judges to confront difficult choices about doc-
trinal foundations. When a past choice no longer makes sense, 
a new animating principle can move the doctrine in new direc-
tions. Stare decisis may limit judicial flexibility to uproot estab-
lished lines of reasoning, but the instability and incoherence of 
many horizontal federalism doctrines makes them relatively 
amenable to reevaluation. For example, over the past 150 years 
personal jurisdiction doctrine has vacillated from a capacity 
approach founded on customary international law,281 to a ca-
pacity approach founded in due process,282 to a constraint ap-
proach speckled with capacity arguments,283 and then to solely 
 
 280. See infra text accompanying notes 294–308 (discussing judicial impre-
cision in framing arguments about horizontal federalism). 
 281. See D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 176 (1850) (holding 
that statute implementing Full Faith and Credit Clause did not “overthrow” 
“the international law as it existed among the States in 1790 . . . that a judg-
ment rendered in one State, assuming to bind the person of a citizen of anoth-
er, was void within the foreign State, when the defendant had not been served 
with process or voluntarily made defence, because neither the legislative ju-
risdiction, nor that of courts of justice, had binding force”). Other opinions 
from the same era were less clear about the foundation of personal jurisdiction 
doctrine. See, e.g., Harris v. Hardeman, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 334, 339 (1852) (not-
ing that judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction is “void”); Boswell’s 
Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336, 350 (1850) (framing the doctrine in terms 
of constraints on state power for the “security of absent parties”). 
 282. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (“[E]very State possesses 
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its 
territory. . . . [But] no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over 
persons or property without its territory.”); id. at 733 (invoking the Due 
Process Clause, even though the Fourteenth Amendment had not yet been ra-
tified at the time of the underlying conduct). Justice Field, the author of Pen-
noyer, made the same point in an earlier opinion about limits on state capacity 
to serve process extraterritorially without relying on the Due Process Clause. 
See Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 367–69 (1873). 
 283. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding 
that jurisdiction hinges on fairness to the defendant and the nexus between 
the action and the forum); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 
(1992) (holding that a state forum must be “reasonable, in the context of our 
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(or nominally) a constraint approach.284 Having bounced ha-
phazardly to its current resting point, the doctrine should not 
be immune from further reform if analysis suggests that its 
present foundations are not satisfactory. 
An example illustrates how reevaluating doctrinal founda-
tions could alter the contours of horizontal federalism jurispru-
dence. Consider Heath v. Alabama, in which the Supreme 
Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar Ala-
bama from prosecuting—and seeking to execute—a person who 
was already serving a life sentence in Georgia for the same set 
of criminal acts (the murder in Georgia of a person kidnapped 
from Alabama).285 The Court assumed that the second prosecu-
tion would have violated the Double Jeopardy Clause if Georgia 
had initiated it, and thus the sole question was whether the 
clause allowed one state to pursue charges that were barred in 
another.286 
The Heath opinion is striking because it relies entirely on 
capacity and comity theories, and yet ignores the arguably 
more important question of constraint. The decision hinges on 
the Court’s perception of “crime as an offense against the sove-
reignty of government,” such that states with “separate and in-
dependent sources of power and authority” each have capacity 
to prosecute crimes with a local nexus.287 Neither state need 
yield to the other because requiring a “race to the courthouse” 
(i.e., a first-in-time rule) or a “balancing of interests” (i.e., a 
comity rule) would be an affront to the “prerogatives of sove-
reignty.”288 This reasoning entirely overlooks the question of 
 
federal system of Government”); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (stating that personal jurisdiction doctrine prevents 
states from “reach[ing] out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status 
as coequal sovereigns in a federal system”). 
 284. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 
694, 702 (1982) (“The personal jurisdiction requirement . . . . represents a re-
striction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of 
individual liberty.”). 
 285. 474 U.S. 82 (1985). Alabama eventually executed Heath. See Alabama 
Executes Man Who Arranged His Wife’s Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1992, at 
10L. 
 286. See 474 U.S. at 87–88. 
 287. Id. at 88–89. 
 288. Id. at 92–93. The dissenting Justices’ response was not entirely clear 
and might have benefited from following the model in Part IV.A. The dissent 
seemed to challenge Alabama’s capacity to prosecute by giving minimal weight 
to its sovereign interests, but also suggested that the phrase “same offense” in 
the Double Jeopardy Clause might apply to the underlying murder and thus 
create a right against successive prosecutions that trumped Alabama’s sove-
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constraint, which one might frame as: does the Double Jeopar-
dy Clause, as incorporated against the states by the Due 
Process Clause, create a right limiting the burdens that inter-
state conflict or collusion may impose on criminal defendants? 
Framing the question in this way makes the Court’s holding 
more troubling by inviting analogies to other aspects of hori-
zontal federalism that express greater concern for burdens on 
individuals. Relevant analogies include limits on taxation of the 
same property or income by multiple states,289 the right of “re-
pose” underlying the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s doctrine of 
interjurisdictional preclusion in civil disputes,290 and the fra-
mers’ use of the Bankruptcy Clause to preclude one state from 
imprisoning persons for debts that another state had dis-
charged.291 These analogies, coupled with a general norm 
against double jeopardy,292 suggest that the Court’s reasoning 
 
reign interests. Id. at 98–101 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent also relied 
on the alternative argument that collusion between Georgia and Alabama 
triggered a rule preventing two states “from combining to do together what 
each could not constitutionally do on its own.” Id. at 102. 
 289. The Due Process Clause tolerates taxation of the same income stream 
by multiple states, but spares taxpayers from excessive duplication by requir-
ing states to apportion the income among themselves. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Comm’r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436–37 (1980). For example, two states can 
each tax twenty percent of a business’ income, but they cannot each tax seven-
ty-five percent. The doctrine thus recognizes the potential for interstate com-
petition or collusion to create constitutionally intolerable burdens that require 
a remedy, which is an insight missing from Heath. The analogy between 
double taxation and double jeopardy is imperfect because taxes are cumulative 
while the duplicative portions of sentences (but not trials) are concurrent. 
However, the general point remains that the imposition of a burden by one 
state may be a reason to question the ability of a second state to impose a dup-
licative burden on the same person arising from the same conduct. 
 290. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 463 (1982) (interpreting 
a statute implementing the Full Faith and Credit Clause). Preclusion does not 
apply in criminal cases due to states’ perceived incapacity to apply their “pen-
al” laws extraterritorially. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668–69 
(1892). The exclusion of criminal cases from the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
arguably supports Heath’s holding because it suggests by negative implication 
that judgments in criminal cases should not bind other states. However, that 
observation begs a question that the Court never asked: is the Double Jeopar-
dy Clause a criminal law analog to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, such that 
both clauses together create a comprehensive first-in-time regime for civil and 
criminal actions? 
 291. See supra note 206. 
 292. See Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law 
After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–6, 27 (1995) (challenging Heath 
based on arguments about the meaning and historical origins of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause independent from structural arguments about horizontal fe-
deralism). The individual right underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause might 
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was too thin to support its conclusion. Capacity to regulate free 
from limits based on comity is a necessary condition for states 
to impose criminal punishment, but is insufficient to justify 
prosecution if the Constitution constrains state power in order 
to insulate federal citizens from interstate maneuvering. Thus, 
whatever the outcome of Heath should have been, thinking sys-
tematically about horizontal federalism and modeling judicial 
arguments about state power can reveal hidden dimensions of 
problems and suggest alternative approaches to constitutional 
questions.293 
2. Identifying Doctrinal Imprecision 
A disciplined approach to horizontal federalism can expose 
a lack of discipline in judicial reasoning. One need not expect 
all opinions to fit neatly into the model. But at a minimum it 
should be possible to read an opinion in light of the model and 
determine the basic elements of the court’s reasoning and the 
role of each element in the court’s conclusion. This precision is 
often missing, however, as courts either do not rely on any par-
ticular line of argument, or rely on a jumble of arguments in 
 
also manifest in successive prosecutions by different states in the form of lim-
its on the second state’s jurisdiction over the defendant. See Anthony J. Colan-
gelo, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A Jurisdictional Theory, 86 
WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). This jurisdictional approach would not 
have altered the result in Heath, however, because Alabama’s courts had au-
thority to adjudicate on any plausible theory of jurisdiction: both the defen-
dant and the victim were Alabama residents, and the crime began with a kid-
napping in Alabama. See Heath, 474 U.S. at 83–84. 
 293. Another interesting question about successive interstate prosecutions 
that did not arise in Heath is whether a centralization argument might apply. 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment enables Congress to enforce provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights—including the Double Jeopardy Clause—
incorporated by the Due Process Clause, and even to extend federal protection 
slightly beyond a right’s limits. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 
(1997) (“Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall 
within the sweep of Congress’s enforcement power even if in the process it 
prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional . . . .”). Congress argua-
bly could invoke this remedial power to enact an ‘interstate criminal comity’ 
statute that would govern cases such as Heath. If Congress has such power, an 
alternative justification for Heath’s holding might be that courts should re-
frain from circumscribing state authority on horizontal federalism grounds in 
circumstances where a more politically accountable branch could address the 
problem. The persuasiveness of this argument would depend on: (1) whether 
the Double Jeopardy Clause creates self-executing constraints on state power 
that courts should enforce regardless of congressional silence; and, if not, (2) 
whether the Clause is sufficiently broad to permit Congress to legislate a com-
ity rule; and, if so, (3) whether legislative power warrants judicial restraint in 
adopting common law remedies for violations of constitutional rights. 
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one case or across a line of related cases.294 The capacity, con-
straint, centralization, and comity model can therefore help to 
sort out confused reasoning and suggest alternative approach-
es. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in BMW of North America, 
Inc. v. Gore295 illustrates how imprecise reasoning can lead to 
confusion. The Court in Gore reversed an Alabama court’s 
“grossly excessive” two million dollar punitive damages award 
punishing BMW for allowing an Alabama dealer to sell a car 
without disclosing shipping damage that had required repaint-
ing.296 Alabama clearly had authority to punish the fraudulent 
sale in Alabama,297 but had gone further: the jury calculated 
the award in part by multiplying compensatory damages by 
969, which was the number of transactions in which BMW had 
failed to disclose similar damage to cars sold in other states.298 
Alabama thus punished BMW for extraterritorial conduct. The 
969 sales were apparently legal in the states where they oc-
curred because those states did not require disclosure of the 
relatively minor damage covered in the plaintiff ’s suit.299 The 
Court therefore had to determine whether the extraterritorial 
sales were relevant to calculating punitive damages before it 
could determine if the amount was excessive.300 
 
 294. One possible explanation for fuzzy analysis in opinions is that 
precedent obscures the choices that confront courts trying to apply the mallea-
ble constitutional methods discussed in Part III to the manifestations of inter-
state friction discussed in Part II. Each silo of horizontal federalism doctrine is 
an accretion of layers built on past decisions that committed recurring fact 
patterns to the domain of particular constitutional clauses and derivative 
rules. New cases might move a doctrine in slightly new directions to account 
for novel facts or heightened insight, but not quite far enough to pull the doc-
trine off its foundation. Over many years, the aggregate effect of subtle inno-
vations might cause the old foundation to no longer support the new infra-
structure, and yet the foundation may persist from inertia. The historical 
origins of a doctrine can thus control its future development even if changed 
circumstances challenge earlier commitments. See generally Oona A. Hatha-
way, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in 
a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 605 (2001) (“[C]ourts’ early reso-
lutions of legal issues can become locked-in and resistant to change.”). 
 295. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 296. Id. at 562–63. 
 297. See id. at 568–70. 
 298. See id. at 564, 567. 
 299. See id. at 577–78. 
 300. The question was arguably moot because the Alabama Supreme Court 
had affirmed the award (after a remittitur) based solely on BMW’s in-state 
sales. See id. at 566–67. However, the U.S. Supreme Court apparently was 
skeptical about whether the state appellate decision fully excised the award’s 
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The Court held that the extraterritorial sales could not be 
a multiplier in the damages calculation,301 but did not clearly 
explain why. The Court first seemed to deny Alabama’s capaci-
ty to regulate car sales beyond its borders, citing nineteenth 
and early twentieth century precedents rooted in the territorial 
approach to state power.302 Yet the capacity problem is more 
subtle than the Court’s cursory statement suggests. For exam-
ple, if Mr. Gore had left Alabama to purchase the car from 
BMW in Mississippi, received the misleading disclosures in 
Mississippi, and then driven the car back to Alabama and there 
discovered the fraud and experienced the injury, the Court’s lax 
choice of law jurisprudence might permit Alabama to apply its 
tort law to the extraterritorial sale.303 Even if applying Ala-
bama law to a Mississippi sale were deemed unconstitutional, 
the rationale would probably be “unfair surprise” to BMW,304 
 
extraterritorial components. See id. at 567 n.11 (noting that considering solely 
in-state sales should have led to an award of only $56,000). 
 301. See id. at 573–74. The Court also held that Alabama could attempt to 
use the out-of-state sales as evidence that BMW’s conduct was reprehensible 
and thus worthy of “strong medicine” to “cure the defendant’s disrespect for 
the law.” Id. at 576–77. These positions are difficult to reconcile, reducing to a 
curious form of constitutional mathematics in which out-of-state conduct can-
not multiply damage awards, but can add to them. 
 302. See id. at 570–71, 570 n.16. 
 303. For example, the Court allowed Minnesota law to govern an automo-
bile insurance policy issued in Wisconsin to a Wisconsin resident who died af-
ter other Wisconsin residents crashed into a motorcycle that he was riding in 
Wisconsin. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 305, 313–19 (1981) 
(plurality opinion). Minnesota’s sole contacts were that: (1) the decedent had 
worked in Minnesota (although he was not driving to or from Minnesota at the 
time of the accident) and thus his death depleted the local work force; (2) the 
defendant conducted business in Minnesota (although none connected to the 
accident); and (3) the insured’s widow moved to Minnesota after the accident 
and became the representative of the insured’s estate. See id. at 313–19. If 
these vaporous contacts are sufficiently “significant” to satisfy constitutional 
scrutiny, id. at 320, then applying Alabama law to a suit by a defrauded resi-
dent and local worker against a car distributor that does business in the state 
would likewise seem constitutional, even if all other relevant contacts were in 
Mississippi. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145(2)(c), 
148(1) (1971) (preferring to apply the fraud rules of the place where the misre-
presentation and transaction occurred, but recognizing that the law of the vic-
tim’s domicile might also apply); Laycock, supra note 2, at 258 (“Hague may 
mean that there are no limits whatever on a state’s power to apply its own law 
to benefit a resident litigant.”). 
 304. Hague, 449 U.S. at 318 n.24 (plurality opinion); cf. World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (holding that the Due 
Process Clause protects a car dealer’s reasonable expectation that it will not 
be subject to personal jurisdiction in distant states where purchasers take 
their cars). 
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which is more a problem of BMW’s rights (constraint) than Al-
abama’s territorial authority (capacity). Perhaps unsatisfied 
with its invocation of capacity, the Court moved (primarily in a 
footnote) to an argument based on constraint by noting that 
punishing a defendant for legal conduct violates due process.305 
The Court also invoked centralization by implying that “bur-
dens on the interstate market for automobiles” might violate 
the Commerce Clause, and invoked comity by suggesting that 
Alabama was obliged to “respect the interests of other 
States.”306 But the Court did not develop any of its observations 
or purport to rely on any particular one of them. 
The lack of a clear rationale for excluding extraterritorial 
sales from the punitive damages calculation led to a remarka-
bly muddled summary of the holding. The Court stated that: 
We think it follows from these principles of state sovereignty and 
comity that a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of 
its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in 
other States. . . . [B]y attempting to alter BMW’s nationwide policy, 
Alabama would be infringing on the policy choices of other States. To 
avoid such encroachment, the economic penalties that a State such as 
Alabama inflicts on those who transgress its laws . . . must be sup-
ported by the State’s interest in protecting its own consumers and its 
own economy. Alabama may insist that BMW adhere to a particular 
disclosure policy in that State. Alabama does not have the power, 
however, to punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it oc-
curred and that had no impact on Alabama or its residents.307 
This summary raises three sets of troubling questions that 
the Court does not appear to have considered. First, if other 
states’ “policy choices” are consistent with the forum’s, then can 
the forum regulate extraterritorially? If so, how would that 
extraterritorial regulation square with the Court’s invocation of 
limited state capacity, and if not, what was the point of men-
tioning conflicting policies? Second, if there is evidence that a 
defendant’s extraterritorial conduct has an “impact on [the fo-
rum] or its residents,” then can the forum punish the conduct 
despite its legality in the states where it occurred? If so, how 
would punishing legal conduct square with the Court’s invoca-
 
 305. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 572–73, 573 n.19. 
 306. Id. at 571. The Court did not explain why “respect” was important in 
this context, while irrelevant in other contexts. See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. 
State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671 (1981) (holding that states have a 
legitimate interest in using “retaliatory” taxes to induce other states to alter 
their tax codes). 
 307. 517 U.S. at 572–73. The dissenting Justices did not critique this as-
pect of the majority’s reasoning because they deemed it to be dicta. See id. at 
604 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 610 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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tion of constraint, and if not, what was the significance of men-
tioning local impacts? Finally, if a forum lacks “intent” to un-
dermine other states’ policies but does so recklessly or 
gently as an incident to local regulation, will the forum’s 
conduct survive constitutional scrutiny? If so, how would not 
respecting other states square with the Court’s invocation of 
comity, and if not, what was the point of mentioning intent? 
A lower court trying to decipher Gore thus has little guid-
ance about what precisely was wrong with Alabama’s consider-
ation of extraterritorial sales. The defect could have been the 
conduct’s extraterritorial location (capacity), its legality in the 
places where it occurred (constraint), its effect on commerce 
(centralization), or its inconsistency with other state’s prefe-
rences (comity). The simplest explanation for the holding—
beyond the Court’s general hostility to punitive damages308—is 
probably that BMW had a legitimate expectation of avoiding 
punishment for conduct that it reasonably believed to be legal 
at the time that it acted, and that this expectation constrained 
Alabama’s power.309 But this rationale is not obvious from the 
opinion, which raises more questions than it answers. The Gore 
decision thus illustrates the confusion that can arise when 
courts blur distinct forms of argument into sweeping conclu-
sions about the scope of state power in cases implicating hori-
zontal federalism. 
3. Improving Doctrinal Coordination 
Conceptualizing horizontal federalism as a field highlights 
the similar functions that many subsidiary doctrines promote. 
The greater the similarity, the more one might wonder whether 
 
 308. For post-Gore decisions vacating punitive damages awards on various 
grounds, see Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2626–34 (2008) 
(award was excessive under federal maritime law); Philip Morris USA v. Wil-
liams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063–65 (2007) (award impermissibly accounted for 
harm to nonparties); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 
408, 418–29 (2003) (award was excessive under Due Process Clause); Barnes 
v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (controlling statutes did not authorize 
punitive damages); cf. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 
U.S. 424, 443 (2001) (vacating Court of Appeals decision affirming punitive 
damages award and remanding for reconsideration of excessiveness). But cf. 
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (holding that punitive dam-
ages might be available in Title VII case depending on facts adduced on re-
mand). 
 309. Cf. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 421 (citing Gore for the proposition that “[a] 
State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where 
it occurred”). 
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analytical approaches to each doctrine should be consistent, or 
at least work in tandem. Moreover, recognizing that distinct 
doctrines serve similar purposes raises the possibility that each 
is merely a fragment of what the governing law should be for 
any particular situation, such that redefining fact patterns at a 
higher level of abstraction could unite distinct doctrinal 
strands. The model discussed in this Part, coupled with the 
analysis in Parts I-III, can facilitate this systemic analysis by 
exposing the complete range of arguments applicable to a given 
problem and allowing observers to ask if current law considers 
those arguments in an integrated and coherent manner. For 
example, considering the extent to which personal jurisdiction 
and choice of law doctrines do or should similarly employ capac-
ity, constraint, centralization, and comity arguments could help 
determine whether courts should heed calls from scholars to 
combine or converge inquiries into adjudicative and legislative 
jurisdiction.310 Likewise, a holistic approach might help unravel 
the tangled web of opinions that address “discriminatory” state 
laws under, variously, the Commerce Clause, the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause.311 
The model is also useful for dealing with clusters of fact 
patterns that raise constitutional concerns without clearly im-
plicating any particular constitutional text. For instance, Do-
nald Regan has shown that judicial efforts to explain when 
state statutes can govern extraterritorial conduct flounder be-
cause none of the potentially applicable constitutional claus-
es—Due Process, Commerce, Full Faith and Credit, and Privi-
leges and Immunities—provide a satisfactory analytical 
framework.312 The permissible extraterritorial scope of statutes 
governing taxation, criminal law, corporate regulation, con-
sumer protection, and a host of other regulatory objectives thus 
depends on a morass of inconsistent and often unstable 
precedent.313 Regan concluded that restraints on extraterrito-
 
 310. See Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judi-
cial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249 (1991). 
 311. See Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, 
and Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 382 (1987) (discussing both 
intra- and interstate discrimination based on residence, and noting that “[t]he 
absence of a self-conscious approach to these problems has left the courts to 
resolve individual cases without a consistent backdrop”). 
 312. See Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics 
Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial 
State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1887–95 (1987). 
 313. See id.; see also MeadWestvaco v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 128 S. Ct. 
1498, 1505 (2008) (stating that two different Constitutional provisions—the 
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riality are atextual and rooted in constitutional structure,314 
which raises a question about how to weave wisps of structure 
into judicially enforceable standards. The model in this Article 
suggests one possible approach to filling the textual void by 
identifying methods of constitutional regulation and forms of 
argument that can help translate constitutional structure into 
workable rules. The translation process would obviously be sub-
jective, but holds the promise of greater consistency and rigor 
than attempting to squeeze cases into the ill-fitting pigeonholes 
of contemporary doctrine. 
In addition to helping when no text seems applicable, the 
model can help when too many texts seem applicable. A recur-
ring theme in academic literature is that the Supreme Court 
can make its decisions more coherent by shifting the textual 
foundations for particular doctrines. For example, scholars 
have proposed using the Privileges and Immunities Clause to 
supplant the Commerce Clause in limiting states’ power to re-
gulate regional markets,315 using the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause to supplant the Due Process Clause in limiting personal 
jurisdiction,316 and using various formulas to reallocate the rel-
ative weights of clauses that govern choice of law.317 These pro-
posals individually may have merit, but collectively create a 
risk that courts will employ a constitutional shell game in 
which interpretative sleight of hand reassigns problems among 
clauses without resolving deeper structural concerns. The anal-
ysis in this Article demonstrates that the many fragments of 
 
Due Process and Commerce Clauses—provide “distinct but parallel” rules that 
“subsume[]” the same “‘broad inquiry’”); Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of 
Interstate Business: Perspective on Two Centuries of Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 41 TAX LAW. 37 (1987) (noting twists and turns in the Court’s efforts to 
define the boundaries of state taxing authority). 
 314. See Regan, supra note 312, at 1885. 
 315. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 
YALE L.J. 425, 446–55 (1982). But see Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce 
Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L. REV. 384, 388 (2003). 
 316. See Robert H. Abrams & Paul R. Diamond, Toward a Constitutional 
Framework for the Control of State Court Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REV. 75, 
87–89 (1984). 
 317. See Lea Brilmayer, Credit Due Judgments and Credit Due Laws: The 
Respective Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in the Interstate 
Context, 70 IOWA L. REV. 95, 95–97 (1984); Brainerd Currie, The Constitution 
and the “Transitory” Cause of Action, 73 HARV. L. REV. 36, 62–66 (1959) (ex-
amining roles of the Equal Protection and Full Faith and Credit Clauses); 
Roosevelt, supra note 129, at 2527–33 (discussing relative roles of the Full 
Faith and Credit and Privileges and Immunities Clauses). 
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constitutional text governing interstate activity are manifesta-
tions of an underlying structure. Each clause is a foundation for 
silos of doctrine formed by the accretion of common law deci-
sions, but focusing on the silos obscures the landscape connect-
ing them. Semantic variations among clauses give important 
guidance to courts, but sliding problems from silo to silo will 
not be a satisfying source of doctrinal insight if one does not al-
so learn something about their common architecture. Thinking 
about capacity, constraint, centralization, and comity can thus 
clarify debates about the textual foundation for particular doc-
trines by creating a metric for evaluating how each clause 
might differ from the others and which clause provides the 
most appropriate fit for a particular problem. 
Finally, the model may be useful for tracking how forms of 
argument flutter in and out of fashion across different lines of 
precedent over time. Studying discrete legal subjects tempts 
observers to consider doctrinal evolution as a function of factors 
unique to that subject. From this perspective, each strand of 
doctrine seems to have intrinsic content that animates its de-
velopment and differentiates it from other strands. However, 
such an isolated view is not realistic when all doctrines derive 
their content from an adjudicative process with a single institu-
tional overseer—the Supreme Court. Some spill-over in style 
and approach is inevitable when the same nine Justices con-
front distinct doctrinal problems roughly contemporaneously. 
Accordingly, it would not be surprising if capacity, constraint, 
centralization, and comity arguments occasionally ebb and flow 
through horizontal federalism jurisprudence in a discernable 
temporal pattern that may help to explain seemingly anomal-
ous doctrinal changes.318 Of course, imprecision in reasoning 
might still lead to tension even between contemporaneous deci-
sions.319 The model thus creates a framework for analyzing the 
evolution of horizontal federalism doctrines within and across 
distinct eras. 
 
 318. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307–08 (1992) (re-
lying on recent developments in personal jurisdiction doctrine to refine rules 
governing state taxation of extraterritorial activity). 
 319. Compare id. at 307 (“we have abandoned more formalistic tests” of 
state power that focused on a regulated entity’s “‘presence’ within a state”), 
with Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (“[A] statute that directly 
controls commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds 
the inherent limits of the enacting State’s authority . . . .”). 
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  CONCLUSION   
Removing horizontal federalism from the shadow of its ver-
tical counterpart reveals connections between an array of prob-
lems central to the configuration of U.S. government. Thinking 
about these problems systemically helps to identify the struc-
tural origins of interstate friction, the distinct scenarios in 
which such friction manifests, the interrelated methods that 
the Constitution uses to address friction, and the dynamics of 
jurisprudence that implements these methods. Insights from 
this broad approach can help to redesign dozens of ostensibly 
distinct doctrines and suggest new directions for scholarship 
about the regulation of interstate activity. 
